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It is a pleasure and honour to preface this book by Cesareo 
Rodríguez-Aguilera which you are now reading. Professor Rodríguez-
Aguilera, Professor of Political Science at Barcelona University, is a 
first class reference in the study of comparative politics in our country 
and this book does nothing but confirm this. This work makes an 
extremely significant contribution to our understanding of the pheno-
menon called “Euroscepticism” for at least three important reasons. 
It does this, firstly, at a critical time for European integration, when 
the process of integration is going through one of its deepest crises, a 
crisis, no doubt, with such existential overtones that its survival is in 
question. It is well known, what was at first was a peripheral shadow in 
the system, British euroscepticism in the early 1990s, introduced and 
encouraged by Margaret Thatcher in the UK, ended up spreading to 
continental Europe. The Maastricht Treaty, with the victory of “no” in 
Denmark and the narrow victory of the “yes” in France marked a turning 
point in European integration. Although the EU believed in extricating 
itself from that first encounter between elites and electorates, the failed 
referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005 not only threw the draft 
European Constitution overboard but, as noted by Professor Rodríguez-
Aguilera, European integration suffered a fracture (a cleavage) that since 
then has run transversely across European policy. The so-called 
“permissive consensus” by which the construction of Europe was 
governed during its first fifty years of history was swept from the stage, 
leaving the European Union to face a very dangerous spiral. It is 
increasingly difficult for the EU to legitimise itself through effective-
ness, as “losers” or “victims” have appeared that call into question the 
official narrative presented by the EU as a process where everyone 
always wins. Nor can it completely legitimatise itself with its procedures 
because ultimately, democracy continues to reside at the national level 
and neither the public nor the politicians have wanted or have known 
how to democratise the EU (hence the poor results of the elections to the 
European Parliament and the paradoxical emergence of eurosceptical 
parties within the European Parliament itself). Nor, in the final instance, 
can it legitimise itself through identity, because precisely European 
integration has not only failed to create the support for identity it needs 
to survive, but, as this book shows, is perceived by some as a threat, not 
as a guarantee of these identities. So, Euroscepticism is here to stay – we 
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must live with it, it becomes essential to understand it better, it is what 
this book shows us and which, at the same time, constitutes its second 
substantial contribution. 
This second contribution comes from the fact that both the term and 
the phenomenon of Euroscepticism are, despite their validity and current 
visibility, complex realities, hard to handle, difficult to capture and 
explain. What better claim for the task of social scientist and the utility 
of political science than the commitment Professor Rodríguez-Aguilera 
offers us here in observing reality, stopping the clock, reviewing, 
analysing problems, breaking down complexity, understanding the rele-
vant variables that explain a problem, developing concepts that account 
for the observed and building explanations that account for that reality. 
This is a rigorous, well structured, intensive yet extensive piece of work, 
whose ambition is to cover the entire scope of Euroscepticism, from 
right to left, in all its rich and varied hues. Euroscepticism is a 
polysemous term, almost a cliché or catch-all concept under which are 
grouped, without much rhyme or rigour, in a superficial analysis pheno-
mena that seem alike, but which reveal themselves to be different when 
examined in more depth. Here the work of Professor Rodríguez-
Aguilera seems like that of an entomologist, who patiently dissects the 
22 objects of study (in this case, eurosceptical parties) to offer a 
taxonomy that allows us to understand what we mean when we speak 
about Euroscepticism. It does this, moreover, despite the difficulty of 
obtaining the data underpinning his study because, as he surprisedly 
points out, parties pay so little attention to their manifestos, that are 
supposedly their contract with voters; that they do not even bother to 
save them, send them to the citizens who request them or deposit them 
in the library of the European Parliament. 
The third reason why the contribution of this book strikes me as very 
relevant relates to the specifically Spanish context in which it is 
published. Spain is a country with a long tradition of European thought. 
For historical reasons that are well known to readers (Francoism and the 
transition to democracy), national and European interests have merged 
in such a way that it has generally been impossible to separate and 
distinguish between them. From Spain, the criticism of the alleged 
“democratic deficit” of the EU has always been misunderstood and 
mismatched, partly with good reason, because certainly our country was 
almost certainly more democratic, in some ways less democratic, merely 
because of being a member of the EU. This structural inability to 
understand the EU as a threat to identity, prosperity and democracy is 
what led to Spain, of all the countries of southern Europe, being the only 
one where the consensus on accession was total. While in Portugal or 
Greece communist parties were always critical of European integration, 
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which for them already felt like a product of commercial and financial 
capitalism, that is, an advance of what later would be called “globa-
lisation”, in Spain there was not only unanimity, but unanimism, i.e. 
assent to Europe became the unquestioned ideology. Not surprisingly, 
and as proof, the Spanish United Left party (Izquierda Unida) broke 
apart in 1991-1992 over the decision on whether to vote in favour or 
abstain in the parliamentary vote on the Maastricht Treaty, leaving a 
leading group of leaders, the PCE and the coalition at that time, standing 
alone. From the sidelines, it was not without its logic that a Communist 
Party would vote against a monetary union such as that established in 
Maastricht – it would also happen with regard to the European 
Constitution, where again the radical Spanish left would take a critical 
stance, Spanish Euroesceptics never took such as position. As Professor 
Rodríguez-Aguilera rightly asserts, these facts fully justify the need to 
design categories that help us understand not only the phenomenon of 
Euroscepticism but its nuances and in many cases, the enormous 
differences between parties and attitudes that, out of laziness or a need 
for simplification, are usually grouped under the same conceptual 
umbrella. 
Therein lies ultimately the last and most significant merit of this 
book. To the timely, analytical and contextual relevance of his research, 
the relevance of his results must be added. The exhaustive review of the 
existing literature that Professor Rodríguez-Aguilera carries out is 
helpful, though also extremely demoralising at first sight. Eurocritics, 
Europhobes, Eurorrealists, Europragmatics, gradualists, rejectors, 
revisionists, minimalists, reformers, maximalist Euroenthusiasts, Euro-
optimists, Europessimists, “hard stance”, “soft stance”. Having over-
come the initial instinct to throw in the towel, Professor Rodríguez-
Aguilera gets down to work and using the scalpel of the political 
scientist, gives us the keys to reconstruct and understand the material. 
For this he analyses the different dimensions and demands on which 
these parties pronounce their Euroscepticism: left-right, more or less 
integration, sovereignty, identity, immigration, globalisation. 
His conclusions are clear and far reaching. Firstly in taxonomic 
terms, his findings are robust while elegant and leave us with a much 
more accurate route map than we had when we started reading. As he 
indicates, we can even see the horizon, at least in analytic or academic 
terms, where we could dispense with the term “Eurosceptic” having then 
found substantially higher analytical alternatives. 
Second, in substantive terms or content, his conclusions allow us to 
separate right-wing Euroscepticism very precisely, clearly more directly 
anti-European and focused predominantly on immigration (i.e., 
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identity), from that of the left, which maintains an integrative predisposi-
tion, but is openly critical of the economic design and orientation (of 
neoliberal persuasion) of the European project. They clearly share, with 
different nuances, democratic and sovereigntist concerns, but by 
finalising substantially different understandings of the meaning and 
purpose both of sovereignty and democracy, this rhetorical mechanism 
structured around the concepts of sovereignty and democratic deficit is 
not solid enough to force a common stance. 
Beyond the differences and similarities between them, this distinction 
between “Europhobes” on the radical right and “positive Eurosceptics” 
on the radical left is very useful not only in itself but because it allows 
us to understand how this fracture is configured in Europe when we add 
the two remaining categories: on the one hand, the “Europhiles” parties 
represented by the parties of center-right and center-left, supporting 
European integration today which are generally in line with both the 
concept of integration and its main results and secondly, the “negative 
Eurosceptics” or conservative and agrarian parties, that reject the 
principle of integration but live with its results in a pragmatic way. So, 
with the author as a guide and with rigour and elegance, readers can 
immerse themselves in the forest of complexity that the phenomenon of 
Euroscepticism represents, coming out the other side with a much 
clearer picture than at the outset. It is for this reason, returning to the 
beginning of this prologue, that we must thank Professor Rodríguez-
Aguilera and congratulate his work in giving us a much needed 
contribution to the study of Euroscepticism. 
 
José Ignacio Torreblanca 
Professor of Political Science of UNED  





The initial idea for this book came about due to a certain personal 
dissatisfaction that made me see a systematic categorisation of all the 
parties that criticise the current EU as “Eurosceptic”, with no differences 
and no regard to their ideology. The term is often used as a catch-all 
concept not only in the media, but also in academic forums (in this case, 
with nuances) and this led me to investigate the issue in depth, 
especially bearing in mind that my main object of scientific interest is 
precisely political parties in their European projection. In analysing the 
types of criticism of the radical right and left in the EU today, apart from 
some objective coincidences, I quickly discovered the different 
proposals of each group (to reject further integration in the first case and 
advocate another type of integration in the second, always with some 
exceptions) and that is what prompted me to start this research three 
years ago, now presented here in completed form.  
The first chapter is not intended to provide new types or unpublished 
empirical contributions, but to review and organise the vast material 
available today with regard to the issue. The objective is to provide the 
main descriptive and analytical elements of the eurosceptical pheno-
menon in its various dimensions in a systematic way, both conceptual 
and empirical. In this sense, this overview addresses the problems of a 
multi-purpose term that semantically includes two possible dissimilar 
attitudes: complete rejection or specific reservation. 
This book analyses the more significant theoretical and empirical 
contributions made by qualified specialists in the study of Euro-
scepticism. The following outlines the root causes of the same, both in 
its social and partisan dimension: more specifically it looks at the main 
instrumental socio-economic theories, the focus on political legitimacy 
and linkage to national identity. Since this research focuses on parties, 
we especially look in depth at this area with regard to the appraisals and 
attitudes the groups of left and right have had. 
At the outset of the second chapter, we analyse the recent historical 
background of the parties under research to highlight the main items of 
criticism of the EU, both deducible from their programme documents 
and their political action. It reviews the main arguments of both 
ideological groups of parties and their internal variations in the three 
principal selected critical dimensions: national sovereignty / democracy 
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deficit / neoliberalism (higher to lower in the case of the radical right 
and reverse for that of the radical left). Following on from this, there is a 
specific presentation of the criticisms these parties make in these areas, 
with occasional collateral reference to other similar formations not 
included in this research. I should point out that, in this section of the 
second chapter, the parties are usually grouped by some kind of affinity 
(on the radical right: classic extreme/postmodern populist; on the radical 
left: orthodox communist/postcommunist). The characteristics of the EP 
elections of 2009 are then set out, given that the election manifestos 
analysed correspond exclusively to this election and a cursory study of 
the national context of the campaign and the results of this type of party 
in the countries selected. In this case, the analysis of election results is 
done according to the alphabetical order of each country. 
The third and final chapter deals with the comparative and transversal 
analysis of the election manifestos of political parties selected – which 
are the most representative of both ideological groups – in the three 
important dimensions indicated and the exposition of the different ways 
for right and left, given the different intensity that they both attribute to 
the above factors, have been organised. Therefore the ideological and 
programmatic centrality of the doctrine of national sovereignty in every 
one of the radical right parties selected is brought into focus. In this 
sense, it highlights the clear rejection of the possible federalisation of 
EU policy, and denial in assuming a multicultural society, hence the 
xenophobia against non-EU immigration or exclusion of Turkey as a 
possible member of the collective. On the other hand, the main factor of 
EU criticism for the radical left focuses on the objection to its neoliberal 
socioeconomic policies exclusively favouring big business and 
detrimental to workers and people in general. The last dimension 
considered is the EU’s “democratic deficit” where the objective coinci-
dence of criticism of both ideological groups of parties is high. This 
chapter does not follow the alphabetical order of countries or parties for 
the exposition of these parts (political/economic/cultural) of their 
respective manifestos, but of the electoral and parliamentary strength of 
each party in their respective state or territory (in the case of subnational 
parties), from highest to lowest. For operational reasons only the parties 
EFD and GUE/NGL integrated into EP eurogroups have been consi-
dered, together with some outstanding members of the radical right who 
are in the EP as “unregistered” entities. So well known eurosceptical 
parties of the conservative right (ERC) or a few of the green left (present 
in the EFA) are not included in this research. 
Of the 27 current EU states, I have selected 17 of the 22 theoretically 
possible for study (in the remaining five, radical parties of the right or 
left of the two researched eurogroups did not achieve representation). I 
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had to finally renounce five of which some had indeed achieved repre-
sentation to the EP because it was completely impossible to obtain their 
manifestos, despite repeated requests on varied occasions on a very 
personal basis, but otherwise, their absence is not that important since 
these concern (almost exclusively) very small parties that achieved a 
minimal presence. So in the seventeen countries finally chosen the 
picture is as follows: radical right parties only achieved representation in 
a total of eleven, radical left parties in only nine and both ideological 
groups in only three. 
Table 11 
Country Radical Right Radical Left 
Germany - DL 
Austria FPÖ - 
Belgium VB - 
Bulgaria NSA - 
Czech Republic - KSČM 
Cyprus - AKEL 
Denmark DF - 
Spain - IU 
France FN FG 
Greece LAOS KKE / SYRIZA 
Holland PVV - 
Hungary JMM - 
Italy LN - 
Portugal - BE / CDU-PCP 
United Kingdom UKIP SF 
Romania PRM - 
Sweden - VP 
 
I would like to point out that it is not in any way the objective of this 
research to concern myself with defining what a “radical” party is: I 
assume the elaborate and consolidated conceptualisations of specialists 
such as Mudde, Ignazi and Perrineau for the radical right and Backes 
and Moreau, Dunphy, De Waele and Seiler with regards to the radical 
left. Although, in general, I analysed only the specific programmes that 
the 22 selected parties presented for the EP elections of 2009, in some 
cases I had to resort to a complimentary documentation: this is the case 
of LAOS that produced two separate texts on its proposed policy on this 
issue and of the VB, given that the European and regional elections 
                                                          
1 See the list of acronyms at the end of the book. 
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coincided in Flanders and their European positions were reflected in two 
different texts. 
Academic literature justifying recourse to the study of parties’ elec-
toral manifestos is already abundant and I personally had the opportunity 
to study this matter thoroughly in my book Political Parties and 
European Integration, ICPS, Barcelona, 2008 (English version by PIE 
Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009), it is however worth reiterating that these 
are official documents, representative of the whole party and also public. 
In the chosen manifestos of 2009 several common elements were found: 
1) overwhelming dominance of national issues, 2) absence of real 
transnational coordination with homologues from other countries and 
3) few concrete commitments and numerous general statements (see 
Braun, 2010; Sigalas, 2010). 
The use of computer programmes in the analysis of these texts (such 
as “Atlas-ti” or the PIREDU of the Manifesto Group Research of the 
Mann’heimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung / MZES) were 
rejected for various reasons: 1) for the non-coincidence of items of the 
same with the ones I have used, 2) because the coding these systems use 
do not always coincide, 3) for the complexity derived from so many 
different languages (not all can be processed and to translate all the 
programmes into English would imply an extraordinary increase in 
costing for the project) and 4) mainly because these techniques, in my 
view, do not contribute anything especially relevant to the interpretation, 
beyond providing some quantitative indicators that are often insigni-
ficant. In sum, these forms of text analysis, though having produced 
some interesting results (in particular those of the Comparative 
Manifesto Research Group led by Budge) have received numerous 
profound criticisms for having a rather low reliability (in this regard, it is 
of interest to compare the positions of specialists such as Benoit, Garry, 
Laver, Martin and Vanberg). Finally, I would like to mention that I do 
not cite specific pages of manifestos because the translations have 
changed their format (sometimes considerably, the case of illustrated 
texts) and therefore the number of pages is not the same and do not 
match the original. 
The collection all 22 electoral manifestos has been an extraordinarily 
difficult and lengthy task, the whole process requiring frequent and 
repeated contacts of various kinds and nearly six months’ work because 
none were present on the party websites (September 2010 to February 
2011). To begin with, I sent emails to all the party headquarters, but the 
result could not have been be more disappointing: of the 22 parties, only 
six answered and four of these could not provide any manifesto at all 
(only the LN and IU sent theirs back to me). The DF, the FPÖ and the 
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FN limited themselves to sending me a prerecorded bureaucratic 
response that referred to their respective web pages which, as I have 
explained, no longer contained the election manifestos of 2009. For its 
part, the Danish Folkebevægelsen mod EU party clarified that no 
manifesto had been presented as they had lent their support to an 
independant candidate. 
With this option exhausted, I chose to speak directly to each and 
every one of the MEPs of the 22 parties being researched. The initial 
result was even more disappointing because, in the first instance, none 
deigned to answer me. It took a new batch of emails, spaced over time 
to start having some results: in the second instance, a representative of 
the Bulgarian NSA party announced that he would send me their 
programme “soon”, something that never happened despite me sending 
him two reminders of his promise. Only after the third round of emails I 
received the manifestos of the BE, the CDU-PCP, the VP and the DF. 
In summary, neither the parties nor MEPs In general worked (which 
is still somewhat incomprehensible from the standpoint of public 
relations) for the compilation phase of the texts, so it was more practical 
in the end to go to academic colleagues. Although those I now mention 
did not manage to obtain the documents I requested, I know they made 
great efforts in this and so would now like to offer my gratitude: 
William Genieys (University of Montpellier), Pierre Bon (University of 
Pau et Pais de l’Adour) Nonna Maier (CEVIPOF), Pascal Perrineau 
(CEVIPOF), David Mc Crone (University of Edinburgh), Lieven 
De Winter (University of Leuven), Blanca Vilà (Universitat Autònoma 
de Barcelona) and Suzana Tavares (University of Coimbra). However, 
Montserrat Baras (UAB), Pere Joan Plaza Universidad Carlos III), Josep 
Ma Reniu (Universitat de Barcelona) and, especially, Ignasi Pérez (IES 
Abroad Barcelona/University of Chicago) were absolutely decisive with 
their contacts and help. Montserrat Baras gave me the contacts of Eva 
Poptcheva (she obtained the NSA and JMM manifestos), Patricia Correa 
(who, in turn, contacted Eva Finkova who, thanks to her colleague 
Ladislav Mrklas at the University of Prague, was able to get the KSČM 
programme, and finally, that of the FN, surprisingly the most difficult to 
obtain). Joan Pere Plaza obtained the LAOS and the PRM manifestos 
and Josep Ma Reniu obtained the programme of the SF and VB. At the 
same time, Ignasi Pérez, through Kalispera Thanos, obtained the 
manifestos of the KKE, SYRIZA and AKEL and directly that of the FG, 
the PVV and UKIP. In contrast, I received no response from the MZES 
(where I had occasion to conduct research in May 2008), a centre 
specialised specifically in the study of European election manifestos 
because, despite my repeated emails, this time I received no institutional 
help whatsoever from this centre. However, a colleague of the same – 
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currently on secondment at the University of Vienna – was very helpful 
and I obtained the programmes for the DL and FPÖ: I am therefore very 
grateful to Wolfgang Müller. 
Let me also express my heartfelt appreciation to Juan Crespo and 
Lorenzo Mannelli, both in the service of the EP in Brussels, for having 
provided me all the addresses for the euro-deputies and direct support 
given to me in the seat of that institution in June 2011 where I was able 
to collect more materials useful to conclude this research. In this regard, 
I extend special thanks to the library that the MEP Raul Romeva gave 
me access, as well as the efficient efforts of Pilar d’Orey. In any case, it 
is still somewhat surprising that the Library of the European Parliament 
does not have the electoral manifestos of the parties present in the 
institution: it is true that these are not official documents of the same, but 
it would be very easy to request that MEPs to deposit a copy of their 
programs in the centre, which would be an extraordinary help for the task 
of researchers. Finally, I must point out that, in order to improve agility, 
I always asked for the manifestos in their respective original languages 
as I already knew that it would be difficult to have available versions 
translated into English. This means that I had to order several transla-
tions, in many cases minority languages, which increased expense and 
delayed the whole process. As a speaker of Castilian, English, French, 
Italian and Portuguese, I had no problems with the manifestos written in 
these languages, in fact, I found to my surprise that two parties with 
other languages had sent me their texts in English (AKEL and KKE). I 
want to thank the German translations from German (DL FPÖ) by Raul 
Hernandez, from Bulgarian (NSA) by Tsarimir Alexandrov, from Czech 
(KSČM) by Lenka Skalosova, from Danish (DF) by Boersting Mette, 
from Greek (LAOS, SYRIZA) by Stavrinidou Eleni, from Dutch (PVV, 
VB) by Caspar Visser, from Hungarian (JMM) by Kristine Farkas, from 
Romanian (MRP) by Teica Tatiana and from Swedish (VP) by Agnes 
Von Anoint. 
Finally, I would also like to mention other people who, in one way or 
another, also provided assistance in this long and complicated process: 
Òscar Barbera (University of Valencia), Astrid Barrio (University of 
Valencia), Juan Rodriguez (University of Valencia), Esther Martin 
(University of Barcelona), Ana Sanchez (University of Barcelona), 
Montserrat Morante (University of Barcelona) and Ruth Ferrero 
(Complutense University). I want to pay special tribute to Mariano 
Torcal (Pompeu Fabra University) since he very kindly allowed me to 
consult the manuscript of the book co-edited with Joan Font on elections 
to the European Parliament in 2009 – prior to publication. I can not 
conclude without mentioning that this study is linked to the Grup de 
Recerca sobre Elits i Partits (Research Group on Parties and Elites) 
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(GREP.SGR 2009-1290) and to the project coordinated by Montserrat 
Baras “The effects of decentralisation on political parties: human base, 
 
organisation and alliances. Spain in Comparative Perspective” through 
which I would not have received financial support for the translations of 
some election manifestos. 
 
 




Euroscepticism: The State of the Issue 
1. Definitional problems 
The term Eurosceptic appeared in the British press in the mid-1980s 
to qualify the reservations and criticisms that the Premier Margaret 
Thatcher had of the European Community. Since then its usage has been 
synonymic for anti-common market and, more precisely, equivalent to 
all the intense, direct criticism of the process of European integration. 
This was reinforced after Thatcher’s famous speech at the College of 
Europe in Bruges (22 September 1988), in full opposition of an alleged 
“centralisation” of Brussels, the “all embracing nature” of EU 
bureaucracy and the risk of moving towards a European super-state1. 
Although Eurosceptiscism appeared as a distinctively British phenome-
non, it became generalised – in varying degrees – in other community 
members and this has helped to reinforce the fortunes of the term, 
especially since it has become a permanent structural datum of the 
European political landscape. It has therefore overcome de facto the 
classic thesis of British exceptionalism with regard to the EU from the 
moment that the attitudes of reservation and/or rejection were 
significantly manifested in the vast majority of states. 
Although the term Eurosceptic has a journalistic origin, not an 
academic one, European policy specialists have eagerly taken to 
providing it with a theoretical and empirical operating status. This 
expression, as well as other diverse terms such as Europhobia, 
Eurocyinism or Europessimism are – at the outset – media labels that 
only very imperfectly identify ideological values and/or strategies of 
political elites and where appropriate, of public opinion. All were 
journalistic indicators rather than genuine, formal concepts of political 
                                                          
1  The Oxford English Dictionary defines a Eurosceptic as “a person who is not 
enthusiastic about increasing the powers of the European Union”. The dictionary 
cites an article in The Times, June 1986 as the first to use the term, although Spiering 
detected an earlier reference, in November 1985, in the same newspaper in referring 
to an “anti-common market” position. Vid. Harmsen, Spiering, 2004, p. 15-16; 
Harmsen, 2005, p. 280; Hooghe, Marks, 2007, p. 120; Sczerbiak, Taggart, 2008, II b, 
p. 261; Leconte, 2010, p. 3 and 12.  
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theory, among other factors because we are not dealing with perfectly 
defined and closed categories. However, the progressive accumulation 
of a broad background of academic research has continued to refine the 
concept. Euroscepticism is often used synonymously to define some 
kind of opposition, as a practical response to the development of the EU: 
“expressing the idea of a contingent or qualified opposition (…) the 
process of European integration”2. One of the greater conceptual and 
operational difficulties is to draw the boundary which permits certain 
types of criticism of the EU by Euroesceptics, but not by others. This 
means that Euroscepticism implies a continuum that ranges from serious 
doubts to clear rejections. 
Besides the question of gradations, the motivations are not always 
the same given that – sometimes – economic ones predominate (if the 
expected material benefits do not materialise or are not enough), political 
ones at other times (fear of loss of national sovereignty, mistrust in the 
EU institutions for their opacity). In short, at the outset it seems quite 
clear that anyone who is against the EMU could be described as 
eurosceptical, but not the one which – for example – only objects to the 
PPC. Now we are becoming more precise, it should be noted that the 
term has more congruence applied to those with a strict view of 
European intergovernmental cooperation and a rejection of the 
supranational delegation of sovereign State responsibilities3. 
In the mass media and even in some academic literature, the term 
Euroscepticism is used as a catch-all, multi-purpose, hybrid, ambiguous 
and generic term as it includes different attitudes to the EU. Indeed, 
sometimes it is used as a synonym for any kind of opposition to the EU, 
at other times as a reserve against certain relevant EU policies. In fact, 
separate variants need to be clarified as the principled opposition to the 
current EU can not be grouped together (without forgetting that the 
ideological perspectives can be very different in this respect) or the 
criticism of certain EU decisions, important as they are. Consequently, 
the use of the term Euroscepticism can mean both outright rejection and 
permanent doubts about the direction the current EU is taking and this is 
what makes the concept something rather vague and all-encompassing, 
requiring an effort of conceptual clarification and analytical, empirical 
operability4. 
                                                          
2  Taggart, 1998, p. 366; Tierski, 2001, p. 3 and 305; Rovny, 2004, p. 31; Krouwel, 
Abts, 2007, p. 254-255 and 268. 
3  Hooghe, Marks, 2007, p. 120; Leconte, 2010, p. 6 and 8. 
4  Both the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy of Language and that of Maria 
Moliner include two different semantic meanings in the term “Scepticism”: first, 
doubts and reservations, and other negation and opposition. On its application to the 
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In view of this, it seems clear that to pigeonhole any opposition to 
the current EU with the convenient term of Euroscepticism is not very 
illuminating because of its lack of nuance. Ultranationalist Europhobia 
and criticism of the current EU for being insufficiently supranational are 
not comparable, for example. We can neither assimilate the advocation 
of the abandonment and/or dismantling of the EU nor demand a lot more 
integration than already exists. Naturally the “central block” parties that 
support the ongoing process practically without reservation (the three 
main ideological groups of the EP: conservative, socialist and liberal) 
are primarily interested in denouncing all opposition as eurosceptical, 
whether this is ideological or for whatever goals they have, which creates 
a confusing amalgamation of the different types of criticism of European 
integration. In fact, it is not very clarifying to mix negative opposition 
(mostly on the radical right) with positive (the majority of which is on 
the radical left), but if any background criticism to EU policies involves 
these being typecast as eurosceptical, then the term loses conceptual 
value for academic analysis. On the one hand, not all Euroscepticism 
always implies a negative attitude, and other, more differentiation is 
needed to develop more sophisticated analytical typologies5. 
2. A new cleavage? 
Euroscepticism is not just a phenomenon of certain elites, some mass 
media or voters who protest: it is a more complex phenomenon that 
interacts with all these elements in certain contexts. From being initially 
a marginal phenomenon, it has grown steadily since the 1990s and has 
become an element of undoubted impact on the process of European 
integration. The political and social boom of Euroscepticism is related to 
many factors: among others, a weak feeling of European community, 
popular distrust of the political representatives of the establishment and 
the economic crisis reinforcing the tendency towards protectionist 
measures. The disaffection of significant social sectors, the demago-
guery of some clever populist politicians and the increasing difficulty of 
the pro-EU elite in convincing public opinion of their conduct explain – 
for example – the defeats of various national governments on referenda 
held on European issues6. 
                                                          
EU: Harmsen, Spiering, 2004, p. 33; Lubbers, Scheepers, 2005, p. 229; Neumayer, 
2008, p. 136; Sczerbiak, Taggart, 2008, Ia, p. 7 and II b, p. 240 and 253; De Vries, 
Edwards, 2009, p. 10. 
5  Taggart, 1998, p. 366. Krouwel, Abts, 2007, p. 268; Neumayer, 2008, p. 155. 
6  Eichenberg, Dalton, 2007, p. 140; Hooghe, Marks, 2007, p. 119; Krouwel, Abts, 
2007, p. 252-253; Wessels, 2007, p. 288 y 290-291. Leconte, 2010, p. 2-3, 9 and 10. 
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It is a somewhat debatable question as to whether European 
integration is a new cleavage that – in principle – sets the losers of 
globalisation against the winners, though this dichotomy presents some 
relevant exceptions (the United Kingdom as a country is not a “loser” in 
the EU, however, it is largely eurosceptical). If European integration 
were an integral cleavage, it should have a strong internal projection in 
domestic politics, but this is rarely the case because the competition 
between national parties in each state ignores, to a greater extent, the 
eurosceptical issue. In a restricted sense it has been indicated that 
criticism of European integration has a strategic reach and so would not 
become a true cleavage, but in an extensive sense it could considered as 
such as it affects both the confrontation of national sovereignty versus 
supranationality and the division right/left. Therefore, European 
integration itself can be considered broadly as a cleavage because it 
focuses on a redefinition of all those being found in the foreign policy of 
some states and reflects the emergence of a new dimension in political 
competition. However, it is true that the European issue is always 
instrumental and dependent on the domestic agenda, given that 
community affairs – in general – have little direct relevance to national 
political life7. 
From the mid-1950s to the late 1980s Euroscepticism was clearly 
marginal, initiating the change of social and political perception from 
the SEA and, above all, the TEU, which ended the era of “permissive 
consensus” in the construction of Europe. However, it remains 
somewhat schematic to say that before the 1990s there was an almost 
total acceptance of any integrational advance and today a systematic 
opposition as the picture is more nuanced. For example, in the 1950s is 
true that 70% of Western European public opinion was in favour of 
European unification and only 10-15% against, but that half a century 
later, the percentages have changed relatively little so that 60-65% 
continues to support integration while the 15-20% opposes it, this 
without overlooking the different responses to economic integration 
(widely shared) and political integration (significantly lower)8. In any 
case, it is true that the intense debate on the EU Treaty showed a clear 
symptom of a gap between pro-integrationist elites and public opinion 
for the first time, both for economic reasons (negative evaluations of the 
cost-benefit calculation) and identity (very weak feelings for the 
European community and strong national roots) as well as political 
                                                          
7  Setter, 2002, p. 7-9; Sczerbiak, Taggart, 2008, Ia, p. 2; Steenberger, Scott, 2008, 
p. 165-195; Fuchs, Magni-Berton, Roger, 2009, p. 12-13, 15 y 20; Leconte, 2010, 
p. 37. 
8  Gabel, 1998a, p. 112. The figures in Leconte, 2010, p. 44-45 and 162-165. 
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criticism (the “democratic deficit” of the EU). This was because the EU 
Treaty implied a reconceptualisation of European integration and 
increased the powers of EU institutions, two elements not easily 
accepted by large sectors of national public opinion. With this, it was 
found that the greater European integrative process, the greater the 
rejection and the sources of friction – the advance of the process 
generated an increasing amount of discontent, sometimes channelled by 
some parties9. 
The complex and contradictory process of European integration 
shows that the main contrast in this respect is in the continuum that 
ranges from sovereign nationalists to supranationalist Federalists and the 
analytical key lies in discriminating the different types of opposition that 
reflect reservations or hostility, both by sectors of the political elite and 
public opinion. From here, it is noted that Euroscepticism – in all its 
forms – is a transversal ideological phenomenon that crosses the 
left/right axis and is clearly present even within parties themselves. This 
means that although in most cases Euroscepticism is often associated 
with groups that cling to the myth of national sovereignty and are 
unwilling to cede more power (or even recover some or even all already 
ceded) to the EU, at other times formations that – in fact – are not anti-
integracionist in principle, but understand an alternative construction of 
Europe, are tagged with this label, criticising the current process 
underway in considering it insufficient10. 
The uncertainty of the European project is reflected in differing 
models used for understanding integration, one more supranational 
(linked historically to the Franco-German alliance), one more statist and 
economic (led by the British, followed by Scandinavian countries and 
several CEEC) and the mismatch of objectives, causing contradictions, 
setbacks and eventual paralysis. Economic crises and difficulties the EU 
has in addressing them, political conflicts and the nationalist tendency to 
withdrawal contributed to the rise of Euroscepticism as a general 
phenomenon of protest that affects several dimensions, some magnified 
by the radical right (national identity) and others by the radical left (the 
unequal elements of the market economy). This means that opposition to 
the EU takes different forms and also affects distinct elements, in such a 
way that variations are produced: 1) direct opposition to any kind of 
integration, 2) opposition to the current level achieved, considering it 
                                                          
9  Taggart, 1998, p. 364; Sitter, 2002, p. 5; Harmsen, Spiering, 2004, p. 17 and 25; 
Mc Laren, 2004, p. 895; Eichenberg, Dalton, 2007, p. 129 and 131; Hooghe, 2007, 
p. 5. Fuchs et al., 2008; De Vries, Edwards, 2009, p. 5-6; Trenz, Wilde, 2009, p. 1-2; 
Leconte, 2010, p. 167. 
10  Taggart, 1998, p. 363; Sitter, 2002, p. 10; Sczerbiak, Taggart, 2008, I a, p. 9. 
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excessive and 3) opposition to the current level, considering insufficient. 
To refine further: “All who oppose the EU are, in short, sceptics, but not 
all sceptics are opponents” – some groups raise objections to everything, 
while others raise objections to only some aspects of European 
integration11. 
3. The academic contributions 
To measure attitudes (pro-integration / reservations / anti-integration) 
scholars have used various sources: party manifestos, statements from 
party leaders, votes of their representatives in the EP and opinion polls 
(the series of existing Euro-barometers are very abundant), among others. 
These are all being used in an attempt to combine both ideological and 
strategic variables, without overlooking some specific difficulties: at the 
theoretical level, the more internal complexity and variety of the types, 
the greater the difficulty verifying them operationally and at the empirical 
level, what has been relevant is the overcoming of the initial approach 
focused almost monothematically on questions formulated in terms of the 
parameter cost/benefit (the instrumental approach), to address other very 
relevant dimensions (the identity and the quality of democracy). So there 
are many factors under discussion: the impact of economic integration 
and the scope of community public policy, in politics, the strategic 
direction of the process and the performance of institutions and actors, in 
identity factors – the idea itself of the European community and the stage 
achieved. This all has obvious projection on the specific study of 
Euroscepticism that should evaluate not only its “magnitude” 
(quantitative criterion) but also its “motivation” (qualitative criterion)12. 
The academic literature on Euroscepticism is already rich and of 
quality, although no “school” that imposes its views has emerged. Some 
contributions have focused on public opinion (Lubbers/Scheepers), 
others on the party elites (Kopeck, Mudde, Sczerbiak, Taggart) and 
some on the conceptual dimension (Flood, Tierski). The proliferation of 
non-coinciding concepts and classifications has generated significant 
scientific debate that has refined the theoretical level whilst perfecting 
empirical methods of evaluation and treatment of the data. All of this 
with the understanding that there are still problems in operationalising 
                                                          
11  Quoted from Taggart, 1998, p. 366; Eichenberg, Dalton, 2007, p. 139; Hooghe, 
Marks, 2007, p. 125; Fuchs, Magni-Berton, Roger, 2009, p. 21; Leconte, 2010, p. 7. 
169 and 172. 
12  Rovny, 2004, p. 38; Lubbers, Scheepers, 2005, p. 224; Krouwel, Abts, 2007, p. 255-
256 and 270; Wessels, 2007, p. 287-306; Neumayer, 2008, p. 137; Sczerbiak, 
Taggart, II a, p. 5 and II b, p. 239; Fuchs, Magni-Berton, Roger, 2009, p. 16; Kufer, 
2009, p. 40. 
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some types whose explanatory power can be relative and this explains 
why the academic results have not produced a unanimous interpretation 
of the eurosceptical phenomenon. 
It was Flood who provided the most comprehensive theoretical 
framework that includes six major categories with internal subcategories 
to cover the full potential range of positions relative to European 
integration. Although his contribution presents not insignificant 
difficulties in empirical application, it is relevant for its exhaustive 
conceptual character:  
1) rejectionist: 
1.1)  as opposed to EU membership  
1.2)  opposition to participate in some of its basic policies  
2) revisionist:  
2.1) return to the state basic policies transferred  
2.2) do so only with some very specific policies  
3) minimalist:  
3.1)  accepted as the maximum current status quo for the entire 
community structure  
3.2)  only for some areas  
4) gradualist:  
4.1)  supporting a greater integration for the whole  
4.2)  only for some areas  
5) reformist: in favour of greater European commitment and a 
gradual increase in integration;  
6) maximalist:  
6.1)  for maximum integration of the entire structure of the EU,  
6.2)  for certain areas13. 
In this sense the Kopecky and Mudde scheme is more practical, 
which groups the four main variants from two dimensions, the attitude 
towards the principle of integration and to specific Community policies. 
                                                          
13  Flood, 2002. Based on this and other contributions, Perez provides a more simplified 
(and operative) table: 1) Europromotors (the “central block” of the political forma-
tions in favour of the current EU), 2) Euroesceptics (in this case, distinguishing 
between minimalist and revisionist) that propose a halt to the integration process and 
in some cases, a return of powers to the states, but not to dismantle the EU and 
intergovernmental economic cooperation, 3) Eurorepublicanists (they are – in his 
opinion – the critics of the current EU advocating a much more ambitious 
alternative), 4) or anti-Europeans who defend the Europhobes’ abandonment and/or 
dismantling of the current EU. Perez, 2008, p. 92-94 and 115-117.  
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With the integrationist principle, firstly, the divide between Europhiles 
(Euroenthusiasts) and Europhobes is clear, with an initial lack of nuance, 
that of the “agnostics” (Europragmatics). In practice in the Community 
the division includes Euro-optimists and Europessimists: the former 
believe that the current process of integration is right because there is 
really no other possibility (this does not stop them disagreeing with one 
or another specific EU policy) and the latter, who believe, in contrast, 
that the EU is not moving in the right direction in accordance with its 
historical premises. Both authors distinguish, therefore, parties that to a 
greater or lesser extent diffusely oppose the principle of integration (i.e. 
to cede sovereignty to supranational authorities) and those who specifi-
cally oppose either the extension of the ceded part or specific Community 
policies. From this point, the variants are grouped in four positions: 
1) Euroenthusiasts (Europhiles and Euro-optimists), 2) Eurosceptics 
(Europhiles and Europessimists), 3) Eurorejectionists (Europhobes and 
Europessimists) and 4) Europragmatics (Europhobes and Euro-optimists). 
The first group supports the principle of integration and the way this is 
being done (the procedure), the second group are not against the principle, 
but are contrary to the procedure, considering it “excessive”, the third op-
poses both the principle and the procedure and the fourth does not share 
the principle but accepts the acceptance of the procedure as inevitable. 
Table 1 
  SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE 
  Europhiles Europhobes 
SUPPORT FOR  
THE PROCEDURE 
Euro-optimists Euro-enthusiasts Europragmatics 
Europessimists Eurosceptics Eurorejectors 
Source: Kopecky, Mudde, 2002, p. 303. 
The category of “Euroenthusiasts” may be too inclusive and generic 
as it does not quite capture the different types of acceptance of the EU, 
an area in which there is a high level of transversalism even within a 
group of parties, given – occasional – conflicting national interests. It is 
true that the parties of the center-right and center-left often coincide in 
both the principle and the current integrative procedure of the 
Community, but – for example – the differences between the French 
Gaullists and the Belgian Christian Democrats or between the British 
Labour Party and German Social Democracy on both dimensions are 
known. Kopecky and Mudde are aware of the fact and, consequently, 
distinguish within the Europhile field between integrationist and strictly 
economic policies. A nuance clear in theory, but in a particular concrete 
case this may cause some perplexity: in the second sense, Thatcher was 
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not eurosceptical and at the outset went far beyond being europhobic 
and it must be remembered that this British leader has always been 
uniquely regarded as the quintessential example of Euroscepticism. 
Meanwhile, in the europhobic field, nuances between the most radical 
sectors, totally hostile to any European supranational decision making 
entity and the less radical sectors that can accept some form of 
intergovernmental economic cooperation, can be found14. 
Sczerbiack and Taggart have directed the first major systematic 
study comparing eurosceptical phenomenon in various EU countries 
with notable empirical results and theoretical contributions of interest 
open to further discussion. These authors have chosen a dichotomous 
classification (“hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism) which – despite its 
inevitable reductionist schematic – has the advantage of being 
applicable for operational purposes. This is a manageable dual definition 
that though having received some criticism and is open to modification, 
has borne empirical fruit. What these authors call hard Euroscepticism 
implies opposition to the EU, with key principles and/or policy: parties 
and sectors that fall into this category or demand their countries leave 
the EU or their policy proposals are so contradictory and antagonistic 
with the Community that there is no chance of their fitting in. From this 
perspective (in fact, Europhobia), the EU must be rejected, either 
because it violates national sovereignty and would serve to obscure 
“globalisationist” interests (radical right) or it is used as a tool of “big 
capital” to impose neoliberalism (radical left). Consequently, the EU is 
perceived as an anti-national matrix, techno-bureaucratic, elitist, 
undemocratic and unpopular: empirical research has shown that this 
type of scepticism is much less common than the other. Meanwhile, soft 
Euroscepticism implies that it does not object to the principle of 
integration itself, but only certain Community policies, that, in the 
opinion of the groups that occupy this space, are harmful to the 
“national interest”. The soft Eurosceptics can accept the benefits of 
mutually beneficial cooperation between States, but reject the 
transformation of this into a European supranational political authority. 
Therefore, soft Euroscepticism implies an instrumental view of the EU 
and a limited view on the extent of integration, hence the opposition to 
the EU is not direct or of principle, but partial and sectorial15. 
                                                          
14  Kopecky, Mudde, 2002, p. 300-302. Sczerbiak and Taggart, whose simplified 
scheme has been academically successful. It does, however, have the rare intellectual 
honesty to recognise that Kopecky and Mudde’s looks a lot better than theirs, op. cit., 
2008, II b, p. 247. 
15  Sczerbiak, Taggart, 2008, I a, p. 8 and 11-12 (in these two pages the table of 
countries and parties with their eurosceptical variants are included); Tiersky, 2001, 
p. 3-4; Lubbers, Scheepers, 2005, p. 227 and 232.  
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This dual classification has some problems especially in the case of 
those parties who have substantial ambiguities of both the principle and 
of the community policies. In this sense, the generic category of 
Euroscepticism is excessively wide in ranging from parties and groups 
who reject the membership of their countries to the EU to others who 
strongly oppose only some of its policies. This soft classification runs 
the risk of being so vague that almost any disagreement with EU 
policies could fit in it – the concept then needs to be fully refined. There 
are also complicated cases such as those parties who are against the 
principle of integration, but do not advocate leaving the EU. This, in 
principle, seems illogical, however, it is relatively common in certain 
CEE countries where there are anti-EU parties that do not advertise the 
fact because their countries need EU funds and they are not aware that 
no alternative exists. Another example of a difficult fit are those parties 
who distrust the current process of integration, not for going too far, but 
for precisely the opposite (the “Eurocritics” of the radical left who 
refuse to be labelled as eurosceptical)16. 
Sczerbiak and Taggart recognise that it is not easy to unequivocally 
define the concept of Euroscepticism given the notable differences in 
context of each case and so admit the inherent difficulties when it comes 
to coining a general pattern applicable in all countries. At the same time, 
they assume that from an empirical stance the distinction hard/soft is not 
always easy and so, for example, both authors admit they have included 
in the soft category parties that are essentially pro-integrationist, which 
forces us to clarify the scope of the term. Indeed, although a party may 
have some serious reservations about some EU policies, it should not be 
classified as eurosceptical for this reason alone, as the key is to verify if 
it is in favour of the principle of integration. If a party is in favour of this 
and in general, of the direction the community is taking, although it may 
disagree with a specific policy – even one of importance – (these 
specialists mentioned none other than the CFSP) it can not be defined as 
eurosceptical. The pertinent question that arises is: where can the line be 
drawn on what sovereignty a party is willing to cede to determine 
whether or not it is eurosceptical? The answer is not easy as the question 
is not so much quantitative (a party may object only to many 
“secondary” EU policies), but qualitative (a party may object only to 
few “fundamental” EU policies). Of course, this raises a new question: 
regarding community policy – what is a secondary and what is 
fundamental? To determine which EU policies are “peripheral” and what 
others are “core” is something arbitrary and subjective. It is true there 
may be some very clear, specific examples: if a party opposes the EMU 
                                                          
16  Sczerbiak, Taggart, 2008, I a, p. 8; Kopecky, Mudde, 2002, p. 300. 
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as a block it is eurosceptical (or, where appropriate, eurocritical), but not 
if it only opposes the CSF, for example. Taggart and Sczerbiak admit 
that it is debatable to determine which policies are or are not central and 
in this sense they have sustained the CFSP policy is not central: for 
current practical purposes it is true (because of its low real density and 
in part for its strict intergovernmental character), but to oppose its 
limited deployment is a deeply anti-integrationist policy and therefore it 
seems clear that objectively it is not a secondary question17. 
Both authors admit that their binary categories are not necessarily 
exclusive and that some parties may have elements of both, since their 
programme policies on European integration are not always made 
abundantly clear, making their classification difficult. More particularly, 
Sczerbiak and Taggart recognise the problem of conceptualising parties 
that not only do not oppose integration, but also criticise existing 
processes as inadequate (radical left) as eurosceptical. This ideological 
group of parties – in the main pro-integrationist in principle – is often 
severe in judging the existing process, which – in practice – tends to 
produce retardant objective effects on the construction of Europe which 
so far has advanced with the slow and contradictory functionalist 
method. In this case, it poses a problem of form and substance: in theory 
they are very integrationist parties but, in fact, they are not, since they 
do not facilitate the small concrete steps of the “central block” at all, 
always disqualifying the same as “insufficient”. In any case, from a 
conceptual point of view, it seems right to distinguish this type of 
opposition of the majority on the radical right because in criticising the 
current state of integration as being insufficient and, above all, the 
direction that governments are taking, it should not be automatically 
categorised with the block of Eurorejectors (what is relevant in this 
regard is to consider most radical left-wing parties as eurocritical). Still, 
Sczerbiak and Taggart were right to point out that the more types there 
are, the more difficult it is to operationalise and to categorise them in 
parties. With this, the scale hard/soft should be interpreted as a 
continuum, not as two stagnant compartments18. 
4. Causes of Euroscepticism 
There are many different factors driving the rise of the phenomenon 
(economic, political, cultural) and these manifest themselves with 
variable intensity depending on countries and formations. The expansion 
of European integration in primarily political and not only in economic 
                                                          
17  Sczerbiak, Taggart, 2008, I b, p. 361 and II b, p. 249-250. 
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areas has generated more and more resistance in significant sectors of 
national public opinion. In as much as the latter has been broadly 
accepted, the former much less so, which, incidentally, has contradicted 
the strategic expectations of neofunctionnalists. So, Euroscepticism – as 
a reactive phenomenon – indicates a negative perception of the increase 
in community integration, the EU institutions and the assessment of its 
performance. In the approaches to the study of the causes of 
Euroscepticism, the utilitarian perspective has focused on calculating 
cost/profit (increasingly unbalanced in favour of the former, which 
would generate many losers), the political theories of “democratic 
deficit” of the EU (suspicion of supposedly incomprehensible and distant 
Community institutions) and the cultural issue in the area of identity 
(weak feelings towards Europe versus strong of national roots). In short, 
what is rejected or on what issues are there reservations?: 1) the loss of 
national sovereignty, 2) the indefinite expansion of the EU, 3) the 
expansion of responsibilities, 4) the imbalance of power between the EU 
and States in favour of the latter in certain areas, 5) the imbalance 
between the Community institutions themselves generating opacity and 
6) specific community policies. In addition, the open and unfinished 
character of the EU (a possible final format has never been outlined) and 
its permanent process of readaptation contributes to favour the rise of 
Euroscepticism19. 
This phenomenon is a consequence of the perceptions of some elites 
and citizen groups on their primary preferences: if public opinion is not 
satisfied with domestic policies and believe that further European 
integration may change this, they will be pro-European and, inversely, 
consider that when Community policies are less desirable than or are 
more harmful than national policies, they will be eurosceptical. Thus, 
opposition to European integration is more an explicit rejection of 
and/or concerns about the EU’s ability to effectively ensure tangible 
benefits, on the feasibility of a genuine European democratic gover-
nance and the risks to national identity. There are then fears for the 
future of the welfare state (increasingly challenged at all levels), the loss 
of popular control and democratic quality (the Eurosceptics believe that 
from the point of view of regulatory legitimacy the EU is much poorer 
than nation states) and for a supposed project forcing homogenising 
integration, impossible by definition in a Europe as heterogeneous as the 
mosaic of peoples that it is. Euroscepticism reflects hostility toward 
global governance in all its dimensions, something viewed negatively in 
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the civic perception of the lack of accountability of EU institutions and 
the delegative nature of these20. 
The removal of economic barriers in the EU has altered the balance 
between capital and labour in domestic markets and increased compete-
tion for jobs. In particular, less skilled workers tend to feel prejudiced 
and consequently, their support for the EU is low. In addition, in some 
cases, institutional and decisional complexities of the EU contribute to 
increased distrust and suspicion regarding the limited effectiveness of 
Community authorities. Add to this the uncertainties caused by the Euro 
and rising renationalistic trends in various European governments, both 
of which have contributed to the development of Euroscepticism21. 
In studies of European integration there was initially an over-
whelming predominance of views focusing on elites and only since the 
1990s has in-depth research on public opinion been developed. This 
means that, on one hand, we must distinguish between Euroscepticism 
in parties and citizens, and on the other, the wide range of possible 
attitudes (by area), both of which reflect the multidimensional nature of 
support or not for European integration22. Hix has thoroughly 
systematized the complex relationships between parties, interest groups 
and voters formulating the following theses: 1) voters and parties of the 
radical left and right tend to be more eurosceptical than voters and 
parties of the “central block”, 2) individuals and groups who support the 
government parties tend to be less eurosceptical, 3) when the “domestic” 
policy is to the left or right of the European average, voters of left or 
right wing parties tend to be eurosceptical, 4) voters and parties in 
majority democratic systems tend to be more eurosceptical than in 
systems of consensual democracy, with some exceptions, 5) left wing 
electors and parties were more eurosceptical in the 1970s, 1980s and 
2000-2010 and right wing electors and parties in the 1990s, 6) voters, 
parties and interest groups of the large States tend to be more 
eurosceptical than those of small states, however, there are exceptions23. 
                                                          
20  Carey, 2002, p. 388; Hooghe, Marks, 2007, p. 122; Siegers, 2009, p. 115-118; 
Leconte, 2010, p. 247 and 256.  
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5. Social Euroscepticism 
It is a debated question to clarify whether the EU strengthens or 
weakens civil society and in this sense, civic images and perceptions of 
the meaning attributed to “Europe” are relevant to the study of social 
Euroscepticism. With regard to interest groups, the distancing of the 
churches, union unrest, criticism of the majority of the “new social 
movements” and even fundamentalist sectors (in a neoliberal sense) of 
the business confederations against “excessive” EU regulatory zeal is 
perceptible (for different reasons in each case). The mass media deserve 
a special mention as they have had much to do with the phenomenon of 
Euroscepticism, since in some cases (the UK especially) they have set 
the European agenda of the national “political class” and have 
contributed massively to exacerbate hostility towards the EU. Naturally, 
the media landscape is plural, but the eurosceptical media is powerful 
and influential in several countries. However, neither the opposite case 
can not be ignored: in some countries the majority of the media has 
ended up backing the EU and this, paradoxically, has resulted in 
emphasising Euroscepticism in some cases (Scandinavian countries). 
There is one type of media (fundamentally British) that seems to have 
“specialised” in Euroscepticism (the sensationalist tabloids), although 
not necessarily has all of this always been eurosceptical. In this area, the 
absence of a true European “public sphere” and the absolute predomi-
nance of national frameworks is noted24. 
When analysing the dimensions of Euroscepticism it is essential to 
set out from the classic distinction of eastonian origin between diffuse 
generic support and what is specific to the system, in this case, the 
European. In general, research has found a notable lack of diffuse 
support (typical of states) for the EU and a higher incidence of specific 
support according to areas, sectors and circumstances. With this, the 
distinction between the two separate types of support has been, in turn, 
criticised for being “fuzzy” – given that civic assessments of the EU and 
European integration are more complex and dynamic than those of this 
binary model25. Additionally, it is useful to clarify what is supported or 
rejected and – in this sense – it is useful to consider the triple meaning 
of the policy that the English language captures more subtlety: polity 
(structures), politics (processes) and policy (results); that is, the EU 
institutions, European politicians and public policy in the EU. This set 
includes assessments of politician’s responsibility, institutional 
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accountability and the legitimacy resulting from the system, dimensions 
on which various gradations are given. 
Eurosceptical sectors of public opinion believe that the EU is 
normatively invasive, does not function democratically and distorts the 
principle of subsidiarity through the continuous expansion of 
Community competence. In addition, many citizens do not agree with 
the fact that the EU ceaselessly accumulates powers and this is what 
provides a potential basis for eurosceptical parties. While generally 
acknowledging that some policies do require supranational cooperation 
(environment, the fight against organised crime), in others it catego-
rically rejects any community “intrusion” (education, culture, including 
health policies). Nearly half of Europeans are eurosceptical regarding 
cultural policies, more than half on the issue of immigration and asylum 
and third on foreign policy26. 
The membership of a State to the EU has different consequences for 
its citizens (winners/losers) and this makes their interests align or 
conflict with this. Statistical analyses provide significant evidence of the 
variation of support/rejection to integration in terms of different 
dimensions27. 
Table 2: Types and Dimensions of Support/Rejection of the EU 
Types Dimensions 
Support /  
reject on principle 
Economy: high regulation v low regulation policy: 
supranational integration v intergovernmentalism 
Support /  
general rejection 
Support/opposition to the EU as a whole support/rejection 
of the EU as a “regime” 
Support / 
reasoned rejection 
Effectiveness Legitimacy instrumental rules expressive 
Identity 
Source: Fuchs, Magni-Berton, Roger, 2009, p. 23. Personal adaptation. 
 
Indeed, there are three major analytical criteria to gauge the overall 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism: 1) effective evaluation (in instrumental/ 
utilitarian terms), 2) cognitive assessment (from the rational/normative 
standpoint) and 3) emotional evaluation (in terms of identity). The first 
has a clear economic dimension and focuses on the cost/profit correla-
tion, the second proceeds from a judgement of political legitimacy on 
the problems of European governance in relation to the national govern-
ment, the third is linked to the intensity of the feelings of national/ 
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european belonging and loyalty28. From the outset, utilitarian approaches 
focused on the market predominate, following this there was a focus on 
directly political implications and finally, studies in identity developed 
remarkably. In fact, there is no single explanatory factor, although the 
intensity of one or other according to country, social sectors and the 
moment may vary and this is because the popular support/rejection of 
European integration is not fixed but variable and multifaceted29. The 
empirical analyses confirms the differences in support for European 
integration according to levels of vocational training (less educated, less 
support), something only relativised by the factor of identity that is 
interclassist. Beyond the material interest of the participatory 
effectiveness, in the long-term, identification with Europe would be the 
key driver for strengthening the process of European integration30. 
Since diffuse support for the EU is weak and the enthusiasm for the 
same is low, what is essential continues to be the utilitarian criterion. In 
this sense, the key indicator for assessing the cost/benefit is the net fiscal 
transfers to the EU budget: whenever a country contributes more than it 
receives, it is paving the way – in principle – for Euroscepticism. 
Developed European states with a good system of social protection are 
those in which the phenomenon manifests itself more clearly. This has 
started to become increasingly visible since the Euro was launched as 
the economic convergence policy has provoked increasing social costs 
that negatively affect a large sector of public opinion in those countries, 
increasing demands for policies of renationalisation. These social 
concerns for the costs of progress in European integration would seem 
to indicate that most Eurosceptics would be the losers of the same. As a 
consequence, if the acceptance of the EU rests mainly on the material 
benefits expected and on proper and effective management, but the two 
separate elements fail, then rejection and reservations toward the same 
grow so exponentially that the heterogeneous group of malcontents can 
then lean toward clearly eurosceptical parties to “punish” pro-EU politi-
cians. Moreover, neoliberal policies in expansion since the 1990s make 
the EU less attractive to broad sectors of society, who witness the cutting 
of welfare state benefits31. In summary, the economic interests of citizens 
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and their impact on their attitude towards the EU has been analysed 
under both microeconomic and macroeconomic criteria, i.e., both from 
the constant liberalisation of markets and from the personal evaluation 
of performance of the national economy in the context of the EU. 
The cognitive evaluation links not only determined values of political 
legitimacy (participation, accountability) but also the judgement of the 
pros and cons of the relationship between national governments and EU 
authorities, as well as their respective performance. Empirical studies 
have shown that the direct effects of cognitive appraisal are not as high 
as expected and that, therefore, this dimension only relatively determines 
positive or negative attitudes towards the EU. From this latter point of 
view, Eurosceptics who focus on values reject the “interventions” (real 
or perceived) of the EU that have to do with their system of beliefs 
regarding social order (on matters such as divorce, abortion, minority 
rights, the balance between freedom and security and others). Many 
citizens believe the EU is being “invasive” in these areas and thus, for 
example, the expansion of Community competence in areas such as 
immigration or criminal law is not always accepted32. 
The factor of identity initially received little attention in studies of 
Euroscepticism, but when it became evident that the ethnoterritorial 
dimension was very relevant to significant sectors of the public, it gained 
considerable attention in research on the matter. There are now numerous 
studies that apply the Moreno question to the (self) identification of 
citizens: the compatibility European/national is sometimes accepted, but 
not always and invariably to a greater or lesser extent. In principle, 
exacerbated nationalism is a clear obstacle to the process of European 
integration and in this sense, many citizens reject the notion of 
“European citizenship” or European symbols, so that this feeling has 
ended up having a strongly negative impact on the evaluation of the EU. 
Although the compatibility among identities is manifest (albeit 
unbalanced, given the generally derived and complementary character 
attributed to European identity), many citizens reject this. All things 
considered, a strong national identity is not necessarily incompatible 
with support for European integration, even for instrumental reasons33. 
In any case, polls show a weak sense of European identity, or even of 
European citizenship, given that Europeans are heavily linked to their 
national identities, a really significant factor in explaining the reserva-
tions towards the EU. For some citizens “Europe” is a pipe dream and 
its people have nothing in common, although others do recognise the 
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existence of common cultural ties and shared values; without which a 
single political identity could not be mechanically deduced. Given the 
strong predominance of national identity and non-existent practice of an 
effective European identity, it is understandable that the EU is perceived 
by some as a threat to their own community. In addition, there are 
citizens of European states that are deeply suspicious of citizens from 
other member States and in this sense, Euroscepticism is presented as a 
manifestation of nationalist withdrawal34. On the one hand, the nation-
state (or, where appropriate, sub-national community) is the primary 
framework of belonging and loyalty for the great majority of citizens 
and on the other, EU enlargement to the CEEC in 2004 or the candidacy 
of Turkey have increased civil unrest regarding national identity and a 
clear retreat from the multicultural society, a trend that could only be 
reversed if emotional Europeanism is developed35. 
6. Political parties and Euroscepticism 
Ordinarily, attitudes pro or anti-EU are often highly connected with 
the political system itself: as citizens are poorly informed about 
European politics, it is common for their views on the EU to be strongly 
influenced by national politics. In principle, the countries benefitting 
from EU funds tend to be less eurosceptical than net contributors. When 
a country is admitted also has some influence: in Spain the unanimity of 
the “political class” and the receipt of funds were important keys for the 
consolidation of democracy (which explains the high civic 
Europeanism), while in the CEECs tough internal economic reconver-
sion and neoliberal direction which the community took did not help to 
make the EU popular. In any case, the traditional argument that the 
founding members would be so associated with the EC that they would 
not be largely eurosceptical almost by definition, has been greatly 
downplayed after the referendums in France and Holland in 2005. This 
means that the phenomenon of opposition to the EU is not reserved for 
traditionally reticent States, but is also found in countries that have 
always been supporters of the integration process. From all this, real 
different national realities exist: 1) States with limited response in which 
the principle of integration is not rejected and criticisms focus on the 
peripheries of the party system, 2) States with an open response in 
which criticism does not affect only small extreme radical parties, but 
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also important ruling parties in government and 3) States with 
constrained response where there are serious reservations about the 
process, but accepting its inevitability (the case of the CEEC)36. 
The eurosceptical phenomenon manifests itself with more force and 
clarity in the developed nations: in the strongly redistributive States 
(e.g., Sweden), less wealthy citizens are likely to quickly adopt Euro-
scepticism and in States with a lower redistributive level (e.g. the UK) 
the richest citizens may also lean toward this position. The former group 
fear the cutting of social benefits and the latter do not want to be 
permanent net contributors to EU. A different analysis must be 
undertaken with the CEECs: with these countries after 1989, the idea of 
the “return to Europe” was strongly imposed and for that reason virtually 
no significant political movement to oppose integration into the EU 
emerged, as both elites and society knew there was no alternative. 
However, the serious difficulties during their transitions (especially 
economic) and disappointment at a social level after admission to the 
EU (obviously quick, positive, large scale effects are not possible) have 
favoured the emergence and development of eurosceptical political 
movements. In the CEE there is a predominance of widespread 
acceptance of the principle of integration, hence the dominant 
Euroscepticism there is clearly soft as reservations and criticisms are 
constrained by the objective need to be “eurorrealist”. In other words, 
perhaps the EU has not given everything expected of it, but almost 
everyone knows that the CEECs have no choice and that explains their 
pragmatic acceptance of it. It is not always easy to distinguish in the 
CEE who really opposes the principle (formally very few parties) and 
who opposes the trajectories (in this case there are several examples), 
while it seems an increasing degree of Euroscepticism is evident in 
some of the newly independent States (the Baltic countries) than in 
those States with a long history, with the occasional hybrid case. The 
truth is that the continuing process of Europeanisation of political 
parties in the CEE and their integration into transnational federations 
will increasingly assimilate those of Western Europe: given this, there 
are highly integrationist parties and others much less so37. 
Institutional structures also have their influence on the acceptance/ 
rejection of the EU (decentralisation, proportional representation, multi-
party formations): the States that meet the above characteristics seem to 
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have adapted better to the EU, although the empirical evidence is less. 
The type of welfare state can also tilt public opinion in favour or against 
the EU as well as the functioning and performance of political 
institutions themselves (the quality of national democracy) and that – in 
theory – the worse the quality of national democracy, the greater the 
support for European integration, something not always verified. The 
newly independent States are more reluctant to formally cede national 
sovereignty (the Baltics, for example), but states with a very long 
historical tradition can be quite contrary to the supranational community 
(the United Kingdom, Scandinavia). In turn, institutional, regulatory and 
decisional constraints of the EU can cause contrary reactions in some 
countries and tensions with certain governments38. 
National and European election processes show elements of confron-
tation variables in European issues and in this sense, the role of political 
parties can be very decisive. Firstly, there is less Euroscepticism in each 
national arena if the parties overwhelmingly favour integration (not 
without exceptions), although these do not always adequately assess the 
balance between the pros and cons of moving forward with this. In this 
context, the issue of extending the EU or not is of little use in 
determining whether a party is eurosceptical or not because, although 
the British conservatives are very supportive of indefinite extensions to 
block any federalist scenario, the French postgaullistas – always very 
nationalistic – prefer to deepen integration sooner rather than later39. 
Fort he rest, the absence of a genuine European party system favours the 
rise of eurosceptical tendencies. 
In the construction of Europe it is evident that genuinely federalist 
parties are very few and very weak and that the key lies in the majority 
“central block” parties. In this area there has been a change in perception 
as the center-right, which had been the main driver of the European 
Community, has considerably weakened its historical supranational 
projects, while the center-left, which had serious initial reservations, has 
now become the main champion of the current process. Bearing this in 
mind, it can not be ignored that the issue of integration has been very 
divisive internally in some parties and that in some ideological groups 
conflictive issues have emerged: for conservatives the degree of 
acceptable supranationality, for the Christian Democrats the question of 
formalising “Christian roots” (this is something that, in general, divides 
Catholics and Protestants, the former being more confessional, the latter 
more secular), for liberals the tolerable level of regulation or for 
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socialdemocrats the minimum non-negotiable reach of social protection. 
This means with all of them there are perceived swings of opinion: the 
Christian Democrats – who had been “Euroenthusiasts” – have slowed 
their earlier impulses for political integration, the Liberals, who had 
zealously defended the common market now oppose the increase of its 
regulations, the Social Democrats – who criticised the original EEC for 
its social insensitivity – now see that the only hope of preserving the 
welfare state lies with the EU, regional nationalists – initially opposed to 
a union of states – believe that the EU offers them a chance to try to 
realise the autodeterminist principle40. 
The success of European integration during the 1960s and 1970s 
strengthened the pro-integrationist vision of the political elites of the 
“central block”, the reservations of the more radical right and left wing 
formations being marginal at that time. However, since the 1990s, 
tensions and the strength of parties critical of the EU have increased. In 
this regard, the eurosceptical phenomenon is far more typical of the 
parties of structural opposition (in terms of Panebianco): since European 
integration is managed by governments, it is almost “natural” that critics 
are parties in permanent opposition, something which – in some cases – 
has emerged as an useful electoral strategy once the time of lenient 
social consensus towards EU institutions finished.  
In principle, the more distant the likelihood of being the ruling party, 
the easier it is to appeal to Euroscepticism as a distinctive element of 
protest against governing political elites41. This does not preclude 
eurosceptical parties from the possibility of accessing government, 
however, in this case, they moderate their criticism from this position 
and postpone some of their less compatible objectives with the UE42. In 
practice there are indeed elements that mitigate many eurosceptical 
options as parties are, in fact, office-seeking rather than goal-seeking, 
hence the search for positions of responsibility prevail in these cases. In 
fact, some traditionally eurosceptical parties thoroughly deradicalise 
their previous anti-EU bias when acceding to government (the greens, 
for example) and neither is the impact of their integration into 
transnational party federations negligible, the same that tend to reproduce 
reservations and/or opposition to European integration. 
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7. Ideology and strategy of the radical parties 
Generically the radical parties of the right and left wing are the most 
likely to take a eurosceptical stance, but grouping them all together in an 
undifferentiated way can lead to misinterpretation, so it is therefore 
useful to distinguish three positions: parties that advocate leaving the 
EU, parties that advocate cutting its powers and parties that plan to 
expand the same. The first group are explicitly anti-integrationist, the 
second group do not reject the principle of integration, but consider that 
the current EU is forcing the integration of some incompatible elements 
(for these groups the EU is too inclusive), the third group does not reject 
the principle (the opposite is the case), but believe that the EU is moving 
too slowly (for them it is too exclusive). To be more precise: the 
opposition to any kind of integration (negative rejection) are actually 
Europhobes, whilst being against the current EU does not necessarily 
imply being anti-integrationist as there are parties that aspire to a 
different type of integration (positive rejection). The latter should be 
classified as eurocritical as they repudiate the current process as 
insufficient: they are anti-integrationist, but do not believe the EU will 
move more clearly and decisively in a supranational direction. 
When analysing the positions of the renowned eurosceptical parties, 
we must distinguish between those who support a minimum of inter-
governmental economic cooperation (the most) and those who even 
reject such a possibility (the least). In any case, various eurosceptical 
parties believe that the EU has gone too far, advocating in turn the 
renationalisation of some ceded policies and others (few) proposing an 
exit. Opposition to the current process of European integration focuses 
mainly on two dimensions: cultural-identity and socio-economic, without 
forgetting a third related to the “democratic deficit” of the EU. The 
radical right especially criticises the European Union for threatening 
national sovereignty and ethnic identity and the radical left for neoliberal 
policies only benefitting big business. Additionally, community institu-
tional opacity and the non-participatory and delegative character is 
establishing uncontrollable supranational political power43. 
In any case, the electoral support for radical parties is limited, as is 
their parliamentary representation. If support for these parties increases, 
it would suggest that popular support for integration is decreasing, and 
yet the results of the analyses show that the growth of opposition to the 
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establishment has more complex effects. For example, the rise of the 
radical parties can cause the growth of support for integration from 
citizens who do not support them. Therefore, it should be clear that 
radical opposition parties represent electoral minorities and can 
paradoxically contribute to building support for integration among those 
who do not vote for them44. Better put: it is known that the radical right 
is generally more eurosceptical than the radical left as ethnic ultra-
nationalism is more difficult to integrate than socio-economic demands. 
Just as the radical right is not only opposed to the current direction of 
the EU, but has serious reservations about the principle of integration, 
the radical left does not usually pose the latter question but focuses on 
the methods the community uses45. 
EP elections tend to favour eurosceptical parties because they are 
perceived as “second class” in which there appears to be nothing really 
important at stake. These are election-consultations operating in a mode 
of “second round” or “primaries” in many countries, usually offering a 
classic opportunity to “punish” the government of the day and are non 
operative as a strategic vote (which favours small, new and radical 
parties). Even if you add together the Eurosceptics of the central parties 
and the percentage increases to about one third, the strength of radical 
groups is much lower and also their degree of cohesion in the EP is 
weak. The members of the EP tagged with the label of Euroscepticism 
fall under four ideal types: 1) anti-EU (rejecting both the project and EU 
policies), 2) minimalist (can accept the project, but disagree with the 
majority of its policies), 3) reformist (offering moderate criticism both 
of the project and its policies) and 4) resigned (rejecting the project in 
theory, but accepting policies in the main)46. 
                                                          
44  Gabel, 1998a, p. 87; Leconte, 2010, p. 15.  
45  Manners, 2006, p. 79-81; Benedetto, Quaglia, 2007, p. 482-487; Lubbers, Scheepers, 
2007, p. 71-92; Hanley, 2008, p. 148, 179 and 186; Lubbers, Scheepers, 2010, p. 790.  
46  Overall Eurosceptics in the EU average 32%, with internal scales (14% inflexible, 
9% critics, 9% indifferent), with significant contrasts by country: 46% in the United 
Kingdom (29% irreducible), but only 10% in Luxembourg (only 2% unyielding): 
Wessels, 2007, p. 300. Holmes, 2002, p. 1; Sczerbiak, Taggart, 2008, II, p. 19; 
Leconte, 2010, p. 128-131.  
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Source: Costa, Brack, 2009, p. 257. 
In general, the success of eurosceptical parties has much to do with 
national conditions of political competition and although European 
integration per se does not restructure the party system, its influence is 
perceptible (“Europeanisation”) in the same. In this way, Euroscepticism 
contributes to increased electoral volatility and in its case, to further 
fragmentation of the party system47. In the competition between left and 
right the use of Euroscepticism may sometimes work electorally when 
European issues are divisive (at the heart of elites and public opinion) 
being then of political benefit. Euroscepticism, then, is a reactive 
symptom of certain types of parties and a usable element according to 
their ideology and actions. However, there are very few monothematical-
ly eurosceptical parties, that is, who turn this orientation into the 
exclusive and defining base of their policy. There is another factor that 
helps explain why some parties turn to Euroscepticism: the growing 
weakness of the classical forms of political representation. As traditional 
parties are unable to offer new forms of really refreshing organisation 
and proposals, opposition to the EU can function as an opportunity for 
some to criticise the conventional mechanisms of participation48. 
The different degrees of hard and soft in ideology and strategy allow 
the classification of various party groups into four generic Eurosceptic 
categories, parties motivated: 1) by hard ideologies (ultra-nationalists, 
orthodox communists), 2) by hard strategies (populist), 3) by soft 
ideologies (agricultural, postcommunist) and 4) by soft strategies 
(conservative). Combining the two dimensions can create another 
typology: 1) single-issue parties whose raison d’être is direct opposition 
                                                          
47  Harmsen, 2005, p. 285; Fuchs, Magni-Berton, Roger, 2009, p. 13; Leconte, 2010, 
p. 117 and 120.  
48 Taggart, 1998, p. 384-385; Sitter, 2002, p. 15 and 24; Rovny, 2004, p. 36; Roger, 
2009, p. 275, 278 and 280.  
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to the EU (UKIP, the list of Philippe de Villiers in France), 2) populist 
protest parties using Euroscepticism as one more element of their 
ideology and strategy against the establishment (DF, LN, the old list of 
Pim Fortuyn in Holland), a movement radicalising the most extreme 
parties (FNVB) in their closed defence of national sovereignty and even 
some classic Communist Parties (KKE, PCP, KSČM), 3) central 
government parties that are somewhat critical of some community 
policies (the left wing of the French Socialist Party or Swedish Social 
Democracy) or – more broadly – most of them (the British Tories are 
archetypal in this respect and some CEE right wing parties such as the 
Czech ODS and the Polish PiS have joined them)49. 
Beyond the classic right/left division (basically socio-economic) 
other conceptualisations of identity and attitudinal elements have 
developed. In this way, Hooghe and Marks classify parties in relation to 
the eurosceptical phenomenon into two broad categories: 1) green / 
alternative / libertarian (gal) and 2) traditionalism / authority / 
nationalism (tan). “Gal” type parties are more integrationist than type 
“tan”, but this dichotomy is very sketchy because sometimes “gal” / 
“tan” trends coexist in one party. There are “tan” parties that, for 
economic reasons, could be considered more integrationist (the French 
Gaullists) and others, type “tan” that are much more reticent (the Nordic 
Green Left) due to their opposition to neo-liberalism. In the CEEC a link 
is often given between left and “tan” and right and “gal”, the contrary to 
what happens in Western Europe50. 
A singular specific mention must be made on the subject of 
nationalist parties at a sub-state level (ethnoregionalists in international 
academic terminology) given that the European integration process 
provokes contradictory reactions in them. To begin with, most of them 
are favourable – in principle – to European integration with two sets of 
considerations: 1) against more Europe, less state, in which they are 
included and 2) only in the EU does it seem feasible to try to articulate 
more or less sovereigntist joint projects given that within these small 
States are viable. In territories where the issue of identity is politically 
mobilising, this type of party often opts for an instrumental Europeanism 
of a classical nature as it aims to reproduce the intergovernmental model 
of the nation state on a smaller scale. In some developed areas, regional 
political movements expressing reservations and even rejection of 
redistributive EU policies have emerged. A kind of increasingly 
                                                          
49  Taggart, 1998, p. 368-369 (includes a complete list of parties on pages 370-371, but 
this is now outdated); Sitter, 2002, p. 10; Rovny, 2004, p. 46; Harmsen, 2005, p. 281-
284 (provides a typology of five variants).  
50  Hooghe, Marks, 2008 p. 16-19.  
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unsupportive welfare chauvinism is being expressed within them, 
ranging from the radical right of the VB or the LN to more moderate 
conservative formations such as the Bavarian CSU. Therefore, in some 
rich regions there is the emergence of populist movements that reflect 
the “solidarity fatigue” of territories that, as such, do not receive EU 
structural funds because they are above the EU average and this may 
incline them towards a growing Euroscepticism51. 
Party Euroscepticism has two facets, one ideological, the other 
strategic and that while in some the first is more influential and others 
the second, both elements are interrelated. In the first instance, parties of 
the “central block” are more pro-EU than radical parties, and in the 
second, the parties of government are much less eurosceptical (if they 
are, they have to moderate this when in power) than the permanent 
opposition. Over time, the centre right has become less integrationist, 
while the opposite has occurred with the center left, for their part, the 
opposition of the radical right and left tend to diverge in both the 
dimensions that they reject (supranationality and neoliberalism 
respectively) and the finalist perspective (less/more EU). In general, 
Euroscepticism is a conscious strategy of some parties that is also often 
linked to certain ideological conceptions and so the two dimensions do 
not exclude each other but have to be complementary52. 
Although Euroscepticism is a cross-ideological phenomenon (neo-
fascist, neo-populist, conservative, ethnoregionalist, confessional reli-
gious, agrarian, radical left) there is empirical evidence that there are 
doctrines that predispose to the same (the exclusive type of nationalist 
ideology) but others, however, much less (internationalist solidarity 
ideologies). For some analysts of the phenomenon, the ideological 
dimension is the most important factor to explain, above the strategic 
dynamics (Taggart, Kopecky and Mudde, Hooghe), while for others, 
although it provides a clue, it is not always is the most relevant (Rovny, 
Neumayer, Fuchs). From the latter the point of view is held that for 
practical purposes Euroscepticism is not an ideology in itself (except in 
very exceptional anti-EU single issue parties, such as the British UKIP), 
while contrastingly the strategic use of it is much more common. 
Ideologies are undoubtedly important, but are not sufficient for 
explaining the adoption of eurosceptical strategies in themselves: the 
right/left wing scale is insufficient to determine whether a party is 
                                                          
51  Haesly, 2001, p. 81; Karolewski, 2007, p. 23 and 31; Karolewski, Suszyki, 2007, 
p. 187 and 191; Hooghe, 2007, p. 9; Hoppe, 2007, p. 67.  
52  Kopecky, Mudde, 2002, p. 319; Rovny, 2004, p. 34; Neumayer, 2008, p. 136 and 
141; De Vries, Edwards, 2009, p. 11; Trenz, Wilde, 2009, p. 7; Leconte, 2010, 
p. 107-109.  
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eurosceptical or not as they exist in both spectra and this is what is 
required to combine the ideological and strategic explanation. In fact, 
the parties that use Euroscepticism as an element of political 
contestation and electoral competition are the result of a strategic choice 
determined by national conditions that encourage such mobilisation. 
From the start, it is more likely that hard eurosceptical parties will be so 
because of ideology and the soft parties because of strategy, although – 
in the end – the most important factor is the distance or proximity to 
government: the farther from it, the more likely the use of this issue and 
therefore the phenomenon is recurrent in protest parties. In other words, 
the position in the national party system gives key clues and as a 
consequence, it seems that the practically permanent opposition parties 
may be more prone to Euroscepticism53. 
                                                          
53 Taggart, 1998, p. 376-378; Sitter, 2002, p. 23 and 24; Rovny, 2004, p. 34 and 36-37; 
Krouwel, Abts, 2007, p. 263; Sczerbiak, Taggart, 2008, I a, p. 9-11, II b, p. 255 and 




Background of Parties  
and their Impact on the 2009 Elections 
1. Traditional positions of the parties 
1.1. Are the radical right and left comparable? 
As has been noted by various analysts, from the TEU of 1992 posi-
tions challenging the process of European integration have continually 
increased, which has ended the previous situation of permissive tacit 
consensus held by citizens. This worked without any significant 
problems between 1957 and the SEA in 1987, the text which marked the 
beginning of separation. On the one hand, there appears an increasing 
Europeanisation of protests against the current EU, and on the other, a 
radicalisation towards the ends of the political spectrum on this issue. 
Although deeper motivations of the radical right and left are not the 
same, the fact is that in both persuasions, the rejection of the community 
establishment is politically and electorally profitable. In any case, the 
highest level of challenge comes from the radical right – who are 
benefiting most today from the impasse of the EU, although the radical 
left have, in turn, an average effect not as insignificant as is often 
assumed in comparison to it. The appearance of substantial political 
forces contrary to the “Community method” reflects the crystallisation of 
a new cleavage in the European political scene1. In the sixth Legislature 
of the EP (2004-2009), these were the percentages of rejection of the 
current process of European integration in the eurogroups that included 
the largest number of opponents: 1) Independence and Democracy 
(radical right), 92.3% of its MEPs, and 2) GUE/NGL, 79.1%; if – in 
addition – the Union for Europe of the Nations is considered 
(conservative right), in this Eurogroup, the percentage was 47.7%2. 
                                                          
1  Poirer, 2007, p. 42 and 53; Heine, 2009, p. 164; Van Eijk, Franklin, 1996; Lacroix, 
Coman, 2007; Balme, Chabanet, 2008; Neumayer, Roger, Zalewski, 2008; 
Mc Donnell, Newell, 2011, p. 443.  
2  Brack, 2009, p. 187. The UEN should be included more in the field of the 
conservative right rather than in the radical right (notwithstanding certain reactionary 
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A proper distinction is not always made between the rejection of the 
current process of European integration and the negation of any form of 
supranational linkage. Consequently, it is not academically relevant to 
amalgamate any criticism of the EU, however radical it may be, with the 
opposition to the very idea of European integration. It is therefore 
essential to distinguish the different types of opposition to the EU as the 
most radical is opposed to the very principle of integration itself, while 
another may just challenge the existing operating and institutional 
framework. This means there is one type of “antisystem” opposition to 
the EU (rejecting all it represents in substance and form) and another 
that essentially refers to its policies. The first is a global opposition, of 
principles, which fully affects the project of European integration; the 
second – in contrast – affects its functional dimension. Structural 
opposition is very small in the EU (even among the radical right), while 
the functional opposition large in these political areas3. Indeed, direct 
rejection of the EU is defended only by a minority of radical parties that 
represent an irresponsible opposition in sartorian terms. By contrast, the 
critical judgment of the institutions and policies is the norm with the 
majority of the radical right and almost all of the radical left. In any 
case, criticism of aspects of European integration has a negative variant, 
typical of populist eurosceptical parties (the vast majority of the radical 
right) and a positive one, common in progressive groups (not without 
some exceptions in this field). In the latter case, the radical left tends to 
focus their criticism on the current ongoing process and on its leading 
actors, not on the idea of integration per se. While anti-European 
impulses are more common with the radical right (for their usual ethnic 
nationalism), with the radical left they are much less frequent (because 
of their theoretical doctrinal internationalism), criticising this EU and 
asserting that they want “another” Europe4. 
The process of European construction affects the traditional bases of 
the nation state and this favours the exacerbation of narcissistic 
nationalism in significant sectors of public opinion, which, in part, are 
captured by radical organisations. On the one hand, the absence of a 
governing majority and an opposition in the European Parliament merely 
reinforces those who challenge the EU, and on the other, the complexity 
                                                          
impulses of some of its members) for its composition and programmes. The UEN has 
been partially replaced in the seventh Legislature (since 2009) by European 
Conservatives and Reformists that group, among others, the British Tories (formerly 
“observers” in the PPE/DE) and the Polish and Czech conservatives of the PiS and 
ODS respectively.  
3  Mair, 2007, p. 3-4, 10 and 12; Brack, 2009, p. 185; Heine, 2009, p. 9-10.  
4  Crespy, Petithomme, 2009, p. 26 (Introduction) and p. 336 (Conclusions); Heine, 
2009, p. 11 and 149.  
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of the distribution of competences (to know “who does what”) and the 
usual institutional opacity of the Community have increased feelings of 
uncertainty and questions about the future. In addition, the technocratic 
language of the community elites and tough economic targets that 
subordinate social rights favour radical parties. The construction of the 
EU counts minimally on citizens, is top-down and elitist, working 
through barely transparent or controllable consociative agreements. 
In this way, the radical parties of the right and left gather part of the 
social discontent generated by some negative consequences of the 
current process of European integration and are able to mobilise – for 
different reasons – part of the anti-EU civic sentiment5. Euroscepticism 
(and, often, Europhobia) is one of the reasons for the electoral success of 
the radical right who present globalisation and Europeanisation as two 
sides of same denationalising coin. The radical left also rallies concerns 
about the uncertainties of the current process and particularly as 
economic integration (from the EU Treaty of Maastricht) and police 
cooperation (Schengen) advance, the hostility of this political spectre 
increases against the Community establishment. In both cases, the fact 
of not being parties in government (with some very few exceptions), the 
tendency to accentuate criticism of the EU is greater6. 
In addition to these reasons, other factors also contribute to explain 
the greater or lesser degrees of rejection/criticism of the EU in various 
EU countries. The degree of public support for European integration is, 
for example, relevant: in France this has ranged between 50% and 70% 
depending on the period in question (which leaves ample room for 
potential challenge), whereas in Italy and Spain it has fluctuated between 
60%-80% in the first case and 70%-80% in the second (with much less 
room for manoeuvre for the anti-EU opposition)7. The institutional 
system and the national party system also affect this dimension and do 
or do not accentuate opposition to the EU: for example, if the electoral 
system encourages partnerships, it is more likely to attenuate 
eurosceptical impulses. Finally, strong, long term partisan bureaucratic 
leadership explains the persistence of more or less favourable attitudes 
to integration (the radical right have contrasted the anti-Europeanism of 
Le Pen and the possibilism of Haider, in the radical left the 
Euroscepticism of Cunhal and strong support for integration of Carrillo). 
                                                          
5  Brack, 2009, p. 182; De Vries, Edwards, 2009, p. 6.  
6 Cosseron, 2007, p. 136; Frölich-Steffen, Rensmann, 2007, p. 124; Heine, 2009, 
p. 161-162.  
7 Benedetto, Quaglia, 2007, p. 487-488.  
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The interrelationship between the radical right and the left in the 
European system of parties is a complex issue because although a strong 
ideological antagonism exists (with occasional agreement in certain 
cases), to some extent all compete for a relatively similar popular 
electorate8. So in theory there is no relationship as they are at odds 
(“particularism” of the right versus “universalism” of the left), but both 
reject the “system” (from different perspectives) and dispute similar 
electoral margins (the discontent, the losers). Indeed, it is still striking 
the not insignificant space where an objective coincidence is produced: 
anti-system, anti-globalisation, anti-US, against the “powerful”, for 
national sovereignty (with degrees, differences and nuances), in favour 
of those marginalised by the community establishment and all with a 
vision – at times – politicist (politics in “command”, politics must decide 
everything)9. 
However, notable differences are also evident: 1) those on the right 
are nativist and ethnocentric, xenophobic and obsessed with “security”, 
favourable (with overtones according to parties) to the market economy, 
elitist and hierarchical (with an instrumental/functional concept of 
democracy) and conservative and conformist in the social order, 2) the 
left are internationalist/cosmopolitan (with conditions in some cases), 
favourable to open multicultural societies, advocates of strong public 
intervention in the market (for the sake of solid Welfare States), 
supportive of base democracy, being equitable and showing solidarity in 
the social order. Perhaps one of the most contradictory elements (for the 
radical left) is that of national sovereignty: their rejection of any ethnic 
concept of the same being evident, there are many example of parties of 
this type strongly advocating “national interests” against Brussels. In 
this case, such a policy is defended with the argument that the EU is an 
agent of capitalist globalisation, harmful to people in general and 
workers in particular and also with political workings of poor democratic 
quality. Although the radical left believes in principle that the nation-
state is an anachronism destined to disappear in the process of global 
                                                          
8  Backes, Moreau, 2008 (Conclusions), p. 601; Brack, 2009, p. 189; Hooghe, Marks, 
Wilson, 2002, p. 965-989.  
9  Chirumbolo, Mayer, De Witte, 2006, p. 255-258 and 266-267. An interesting recent 
study emphasises the nationalism of the radical right and left as the main axis of 
challenge to the EU from both spectra. Although the authors recognise the differences 
between the exclusive ethnic nationalism of the first and the civic linked to popular 
classes of the second, they affirm that it is the principal common element that 
explains Euroscepticism in both ideological groups of parties. Although true that the 
Orthodox CPs are now in effect, nationalist, it is much less evident in the case of 
several postcommunist parties and the New Left: Halikiopoulou, Nanou, 
Vasilopoulou, 2012, p. 1-2, 5 and 29.  
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transformation, its conception of European politics remains essentially 
national. In rejecting the EU, the radical left objectively coincided with 
the extreme europhobic right, fanatical defender of the Nation-State10. 
Even in the economic area differences are not always as great 
because significant sectors of the radical right criticise neoliberalism for 
harming “ordinary people”. In this sense, the two spectra are benefiting 
from the erosion of social democracy and from the serious decline of its 
traditional hegemony with the classic working class11. Some authors 
have coined the expression gaucho-lepenisme (left wing “LePenism”) to 
highlight the populist use of denunciation of the “powerful” in the ambit 
of the working class. Indeed, radical right and left compete – sometimes 
intensively – for an electorate affected by economic globalisation: the 
radical right benefits from the vote of the “chauvinists” of the Welfare 
State itself and the radical left from the discontent and protest of the 
losers. Therefore, the two spectra capture sectors of an electorate 
disenchanted with traditional establishment parties12. 
In short, the radical left is theoretically in favour of supranational 
integration, but rejects the economic values of the model existing in the 
EU, while the radical right rejects the whole idea of a Europe superior to 
nation-states. While the radical left focuses its criticism on the EU 
neoliberalism that is mining the Welfare State, the radical right 
emphasises national sovereignty and ethnic identity. The radical left 
benefits from popular fears of the loss and decline of social rights and 
the radical right exploits feelings of insecurity regarding extra-commu-
nity immigration from abroad and the uncertainty and opacity of the 
decision taking mechanisms of Brussels. These strategies tend to favour 
a general process of withdrawal, mistrust and fear that “infects” the 
moderate centre right much more given that the radical left reject the 
issue of xenophobia outright. This does not mean that a sector of social 
democracy is partially sensitive to extremist pressures in these issues 
                                                          
10  In the French debate on the occasion of the referendum of 2005, virtually all radical 
left formations were united in their rejection of the CTEU (the “nonists”) in contrast 
to minority theses of well known advanced activists and intellectuals, such as Cohn-
Bendit or Negri, who favoured the text – aware of its limitations – as a first step to 
overcoming the anachronistic nation-state. Cosseron, 2007, p. 135 and 218; Crespy, 
2008, p. 589-603.  
11  Backes, Moreau, 2008 (Conclusions), p. 603; Van der Brug, Fennema, 2010, p. 61; 
De Vries, Edwards, 2009, p. 19-22.  
12 Backes, Moreau, 2008 (Conclusions), p. 603-604. On the crisis of traditional social 
democracy: Lavelle, 2008, p. 7-45. The term gaucho-lepenisme left wing “left wing 
LePenism” is from P. Perrineau.  
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(the traditional support of the Left in general for the model of a 
multicultural society has fallen)13. 
1.2. The arguments of the radical right 
The radical right’s negative valuation of the EU is nearly unanimous, 
while there are varying degrees of rejection and even challenge (leave it, 
eliminate it, reduce it to just a forum for intergovernmental cooperation 
without supranational concessions). In any case, right wing party coinci-
dence in opposition to every advance in integration is also complete, 
hence their systematic rejection of any treaty reform moving in that 
direction14. 
The radical right is against the current EU supposedly because it 
would lead to a super-European federal state, but, – from this point on – 
national positions are not always coincident. Some parties of this 
spectrum (fewer in number) propose to abandon or even eliminate it, but 
others suggest reforming it thoroughly to “slim it down” and remove 
powers that should then be renationalised. In this sense, most radical 
right-wing parties could support some form of loose economic coopera-
tion between sovereign states that would create a large European free 
trade area. To choose any of the three strategies mentioned (opt out, 
liquidate, reformulate) depends on if, in defending the “national 
interest” it is more beneficial (at the end of the day, for each party) to 
choose one of these, on the understanding that all are against increasing 
the supranationality of the current EU, especially politically. In this way, 
some radical right-wing parties are more flexible than others in relation 
to the EU either because they need funds from the same and/or because 
their voters are not totally hostile to it15. Consequently, there are grada-
tions from lesser to greater opposition, largely correlated to varying 
degrees of authoritarianism in every party this ideological family: 
1) Europragmatics. The PRM, for example, was highly critical of the 
EU, but, – for instrumental reasons – it has softened its position because 
it expects material benefits (funds) from the same, 2) Eurosceptics. Not 
openly advocating leaving the EU or liquidating it, but rejecting almost 
                                                          
13  Brack, 2009, p. 188; De Vries, Edwards, 2009, p. 6 and 9; Van Spanje, 2010, p. 569 
and 579. The effect of the thesis of the radical right in the moderate right: Raniolo, 
2000, p. 261-266; Brustier, Huelin, 2011, p. 240-246.  
14  Mudde, 2007, p. 159. On the general typologies of the radical right, beyond their 
specific positions on the EU, see: Various, 1998; Ignazi, 2000, p. 35-57 and id., 
2003; Schain, Zolberg, Hossay, 2002; Betz 2002; Betz, 2004; Carter, 2005, p. 50 et 
seq. netjes, Edwards, 2005; Williams, 2006; Ivarsflaton, 2008, p. 3-23.  
15  Mudde, 2007, p. 165-166 and 182; Hanley, 2008, p. 198-199; Vasilopoulou, 2009, 
p. 4.  
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all policies regarded as “intrusive” (VB, LN), 3) Eurorejectors. For these 
the EU would be an intolerable and grave threat to national sovereignty 
and they would advise abandoning, even liquidating it (UKIP, BNP)16. 
The radical right politically exploits some of the negative conse-
quences of globalisation and European integration, hence their hostility 
towards the EU is connected with this its discourse and populist strategy 
(against the establishment, against the elites, against party politics, 
against immigrants and so on). The truth is that one of the main 
paradoxes of such parties is that their electoral successes force them to 
act within an institution – the EP – which they doctrinally reject17. For 
the radical right the EU is an instrument of leftist strategy to negate the 
values of the “silent majority” and, beyond that, “the idea of the EU is in 
many ways similar to the ideology of Communism” for their alleged 
“denationalisatory” and even “totalising” pretensions18. From this point 
of view, the radical right affirms that the EU would lead irreversibly to 
the European federal super-state, centralising, hyper-regulatory and a 
deadly threat to national sovereignty. Indeed, for these parties the EU 
has already established intrusive supranational body, with an intolerable 
expansive interventionalism which is mining nation states, national 
economies and cultures19. 
The radical right, in its absolutism of the idea of nation, condemns 
Europeanisation as a process attacking the ethnic identities and sover-
eignty of peoples. Consequently, the EU contradicts the basic nature of 
each country in being an artificial device. The EU also favours the 
crystallisation of a multicultural society, which would mean the end of 
the native cultures of Europe. For a Hungarian radical rightist, the 
increasing integration of the EU would lead to “cosmopolitan homo-
genisation” and would convert European nations into simple provinces 
to serve the “powerful”20. In line with its traditional conspiratorial view 
of the world, for the radical right Europeanisation is nothing more than a 
further manifestation of globalisation led by the United States and 
international financial corporations, which is why the EU becomes an 
instrument at the service of supranational power elites. Consequently, 
the radical right rejects the Eurocrats in Brussels and all the “political 
                                                          
16  Mudde, 2007, p. 162-164; Vasilopoulou, 2009, p. 18.  
17  Simón, 2007, p. 14; Brack, 2009, p. 179-180.  
18  The quotation is from a radical right-wing Czech, in Mudde, 2007, p. 160; Poirer, 
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class” of the establishment. These parties reject the “Europe of mer-
chants”, one of whose alleged denationalising strategies is a 
permissiveness to non-EU immigration which is only in the selfish 
interests of “stateless bankers”21. 
Although the radical right is in favour of market economy, it 
expresses this with close minded nationalist mentality and is therefore 
critical of the EU for affecting the competitiveness of national economies 
with its invasive and hyper-regulatory policies of supranational 
character. Consequently, the radical right criticises cross border EU 
neoliberalism and calls for, in all cases, a Welfare chauvinism against 
the same22. 
In general, a large sector of the radical right advocates the 
renationalisation of the policies ceded to the community and the 
strengthening of “red lines” with more exclusions that impede the 
continued expansion of the competences of the EU. The list is extensive 
and covers all areas, not only supranational (which are rejected), but 
even many of an intergovernmental kind. What the radical right is clear 
about is its opposition to any federal scenario for the EU: “We reject any 
kind of European community state”23. The radical right only supports 
greater European intergovernmental cooperation in the face of the 
pressure from the United States and the “threat” [sic] from the Muslim 
world24. These parties have embodied (mostly) their principal objectives 
with respect to the “Vienna Declaration of parties and patriotic move-
ments in Europe”, 2005, which proclaim: 1) the acceptance, at the most, 
of a European confederation of sovereign and independent states, 2) the 
total rejection of the creation of a European super state, 3) the rejection 
of eventually incorporating countries from outside Europe (Turkey) into 
the EU, 4) cooperation against terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and 
imperialism (of the United States), 5) the paralysis of migratory move-
ments, 6) the support for policies encouraging increased birth rates and 
family development in the interests of ethnic homogeneity of European 
nations, 7) the rejection of globalisation and 8) justice for European 
ethnic communities25. 
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In short, the radical right rejects supranationalism and clings to an 
ethnic/territorial communitarianism, nativist and essentialist in character 
and this is what explains the firm defence of the nation state or, in the 
case of regionalist parties with this group ideology, of the community 
(in the case of VB or LN, for example). These parties offer malcontents 
and the losers from European integration a different identity (of an 
ethnically exclusive type) and those responsible for the main problems 
(the elites of the establishment and Brussels)26. Yet, despite his 
hypernationalism, the radical right supports a certain idea of Europe 
(neither pluralistic nor liberal, i.e. unenlightened) because it assumes the 
thesis, completely respectful to national sovereignty, of the “Europe of 
nations” (with certain Gaullists resonances). This formulation presents 
gradations according to national parties: 1) Europe of the nations, 
without going into detail (UKIP), 2) Ethnic European (“white” and 
“Christian”) against multiculturalism and the continued influx of non-
EU immigrants (VB, LN) and 3) imperial Europe (this is now a minority 
thesis, only defended by small, rather irrelevant extremist groups)27. 
After 1945 the radical right manifested a rejection of the dual 
hegemony that the United States and the USSR (who had colonised, 
divided and subordinated the continent that had been a former world 
power) had over the whole of Europe, albeit with a resounding non-
symmetric difference given its traditional anti-communism. The truth is 
that the radical right claims a certain “differentiation” of Europe in the 
world, hence its references to the mythical nature of this place as an 
ethnic community and as the mother of all civilized nations. There is, 
therefore, a certain myth about Europe existing with the contemporary 
radical right that has its origins in the classic fascisms that aspired to a 
“new European order.” These parties admit a certain global cultural pan-
european reference linked to the idea of “Western Christian civilization”, 
whose main practical effect is xenophobic and – today – especially 
Islamophobic. Indeed, the current emphasis of the radical right on 
“Christian roots” (all things considered, it is surprising that some parties 
in this ideological group have reservations about orthodox Christianity, 
such as the BNP) is explained by the net rejection of Islam. This has a 
double projection: internally – directed against Muslim immigrants 
residing in the EU (these would be “inintegratable” and potentially 
dangerous) and the externally – against the candidacy of Turkey. 
According to the radical right, this country should be totally excluded 
under any circumstances, not only for not being “European”, but even 
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more accurately for being “anti-European” (historically the Ottoman 
Empire came about to oppose Europe and today there are radical 
islamist elements that could endanger the West). The least important is 
that these theories are weak or inconsistent because the key is to tune 
into the fears of a significant section of European voters28. 
Given the structural ultranationalism of the radical right its 
significant difficulties for coordination at a European level can not be a 
surprise. Initially, the radical right had quite clear leadership from the 
FN and the MSI, but successive EU enlargements and the transforma-
tion of Italian neo-fascists into a non-extreme conservative party (AN) 
diluted such prominence. Despite several attempts to create a single 
parliamentary group in the EP this has never come about, hence the 
fragmentation of this sector. In the 2004-2009 Legislature one part of 
the radical right was in the Independence and Democracy Eurogroup 
and the other part not signed up. The ephemeral Eurogroup Identity, 
Tradition and Sovereignty created in 2007 barely lasted a year and, apart 
from that, the creation of this Eurogroup did not mean the incorporation 
of Independence and Democracy. In the Legislature inaugurated in 2009 
the Eurogroup changed its name (with some changes in the participating 
parties) and it is the one that groups more parties of the radical right (the 
EFD) others being among those not signed up. In short, the radical right 
is against creating Europarties as have other European ideological groups 
because, in its opinion, it would only serve the thesis of pro-European 
Federalists. Therefore, only for instrumental and operational reasons 
various parties in this sector have agreed to converge in the EFD29. 
1.3. Specific parties of the radical right 
There are several EU countries with radical right parties whose 
election results exceed 10% of votes: France, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, 
Austria, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria30. 
First, within the Western European countries, Le Pen, the principal 
leader of the FN, said that the EU is “similar to the Soviet Union, 
cosmopolitan, detached from its Christian roots and swamped by 
Islam”31. The FN is therefore hostile to the European integration process 
because, in his opinion, it would have very negative consequences for 
France. The FN is opposed to any deal that limits national sovereignty, 
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for example, the Schengen system. Subsequently, the French radical 
right has accepted the free movement of people, but only of Europeans 
in the strict sense to avoid loopholes for illegal immigration. Meanwhile, 
freedom of movement of capital represents an attack on national 
financial interests. In summary, for the FN Community institutions are 
not any more than an instrument in the service of secretive bureaucratic 
lobbies, hence in the face of such an artificial, anti-national and anti-
popular device, you should fight for another alternative, for the “Europe 
of homelands”32. At the end of the day, the FN is opposed to increasing 
European integration for cultural, political and economic reasons: 
among the first, for its rejection of immigration, its closed nationalism 
and xenophobia, among the second for its direct criticism that the 
Community institutions already weaken the nation-state, among the 
third, for its critique of worldwide neoliberalism (in its jargon) that 
limits national sovereignty33. For his part, Mégret (who split from the 
FN with very little electoral success) said the EU would aim to copy the 
United States, since its increasing integration would increasingly 
degenerate into a federal super-state, a policy which – basically – is 
nothing more than the strategy of the American empire, with which the 
EU would be its “Trojan horse” on the continent. 
For the FPÖ, Europe is a community assigned to history, hence their 
reservations regarding Austria’s integration into the EU. Additionally, 
for this party, the EU has an ungovernable negative supranational poli-
tical vocation for the interests of the country itself – it also favours the 
model of a multi-cultural society that affects Austrian “spiritual values”. 
The populist radicalisation of the FPÖ’s discourse is what has led it to 
become increasingly critical of the current EU, although the party could 
accept a loose European confederation submitted to the principle of 
national subsidiarity, accepting that the common market, collective 
security and the defence of certain principles could justify its existence34. 
Unlike the French radical right, its German namesake has not 
achieved national representation (among other factors, because of its 
fragmentation in – at least – three options), one of whose parties that 
evidently emerged in the 1990s (the Republikaner) defining the 
Maastricht Treaty as a “Versailles without arms”, though it has never 
openly advocated leaving the EU35. 
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Finally, within the three principal EU states, the case of UKIP is 
different, since this party has neither had a neo-fascist past (in contrast 
to the FN or the German neo-Nazis), nor defended an ethnocentric 
programme (unlike the BNP). The UKIP is clearly a populist right party 
with a monothematic policy, reduced almost exclusively to the firm 
advocation of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, with 
its fame for harming British national interests36. 
In the case of some small European countries there clearly is – if 
anything – a strict defence of national sovereignty, which has a double 
projection: against further transfers of powers to the EU and against 
immigration proceeding from outside the EU. Consequently, parties like 
the DF, the PVV or LAOS declare themselves openly anti-federalist – 
although they may accept eventual mutually beneficial forms of inter-
governmental economic cooperation – and advocate a drastic closure of 
borders against immigration.  
Secondly, in the case regional parties, the radical right takes 
particular interest in the positions of the VB and the LN. 
The Flemish radical right is against the solid and broadly pro-EU 
consensus of almost all the Belgian “political class” and so denounces 
the alleged “attacks” on national sovereignty, emanating also from a 
clear democratic deficit due to the “Eurocracy” of Brussels. The VB 
opposes the ongoing process of European integration since this – from 
its perspective – would lead to federalisation, fatal for “natural” national 
identity. The VB could accept – in its case – a loose economic 
confederation, mutually profitable, respectful of European ethnic 
identities. In any case, it entirely rejects the idea of giving the EU social, 
redistributive, educational or cultural powers. On the one hand, it should 
both limit itself to the role of the Commission and strengthen the Union 
Council (formerly Council of Ministers) and on the other, relaunch many 
community focused policies. All this accompanied by strict restrictions 
on successive expansions, reinforcement of protectionism, elimination of 
“European citizenship” and a return to national currencies. In contrast, 
the VB maintains a very significant exception to the rejection of 
supranational policies: security against the “threat” of Islam in general 
(which, of course, leads it to reject Turkey’s presence in the EU)37. For 
this, the party maintains a certain ambivalent discourse regarding the 
EU: a strong desire for certain policies, but advocating the disappearance 
of others. So the VB is in favour of economic integration (with a dose of 
national protectionism, of course), of effective cooperation on defence 
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and security, strong common policies on migration, asylum and the fight 
against terrorism. However, it is radically opposed to the interference of 
the EU – not even indirectly – in educational and cultural affairs, social 
security or “law and order.” In its view, a federal EU is not only totally 
unnecessary but is dangerous and harmful to its peoples, hence the VB’s 
rejection of the notion of “European citizenship”, which is deemed 
empty and even absurd. Finally, it should be noted that the party has 
relatively “Europeanised” its program in order to give – at least in theory 
– a possible route for the Flemish secessionist strategy (“independence 
in Europe”), a strategic adaptation of an instrumental character38. 
The LN, increasingly critical of the EU, rejects a federalising 
scenario of the same and constantly calls for a limit to the expansion of 
its powers. Bossi believes that the EU is the “Soviet Union of Europe”, 
sponsored by “communist freemasons and co-bankers” [sic] and that 
“Europe is the new fascism and we will carry out civil resistance against 
it” according to the usual demagogic rhetoric of the leaguist leader39. In 
the early 1990s this group seemed to opt for a tactical instrumental 
Europeanism of internal confrontation (“against more Europe, less 
Rome”), to abandon this view later. The LN does not advocate the exit 
of Italy from the EU, but rejects its expansion (especially the candidacy 
of Turkey) and its “interference” in local interests. The LN, apart from 
not encouraging the notion of “European citizenship” has continued to 
emphasise “Christian roots” – having accentuated its xenophobic 
strategy since the early twenty-first century. The LN accepts neoliberal 
economic integration as it is (although with the criteria of Welfare 
chauvinism), but refuses to extend this to more political areas. In 
summary, one can conditionally accept economic cooperation for the 
predicted material benefits, but reject almost any other link40. 
Finally, a third specified block of parties is represented by those of 
the CEE area in which a constrained Euroscepticism manifests itself 
under the assumption that no alternatives exist to the presence of the 
same in the EU. 
For the Hungarian radical right (JMM), the EU threatens the 
continuity of the Magyar ethnic group as an independent entity, given 
that – from this point of view – it would be the modern version of the 
USSR: “The European Constitution is a new Soviet system of centralisa-
tion which has been prepared in the west” and whose inspiration 
                                                          
38  Swingedow y otros, 2007, p. 85-86; Laible, 2008, p. 121 and 147-148.  
39  The first quote is from Bossi in Mudde, 2007, p. 161, and the second from the 
newspaper La Libre Belgique, 5-3-02.  
40  Rodríguez-Aguilera, 2009, p. 26-28; Vasiliopoulou, 2009, p. 10; Tarchi, 2007, p. 189 
and 193-194.  
Euroscepticism, Europhobia and Eurocriticism 
62 
reminds us of the infamous breznevist theory of “limited sovereignty”41. 
Precisely in the case of the Hungarian radical right we should mention 
that there are certain neofascist features given that the JMM has 
recovered part of the ideological heritage of the national right wing of 
the interwar period and even the sinister “Arrowed Cross” from the final 
phase of World War II. This explains why its traditional anti-
communism is ever recurring in the post-Soviet world even today. The 
Hungarian far right rejected Hungary’s integration into the EU (the 
predecessor of JMM, the Truth and Life Party Itsvan Gurka) from the 
beginning, although it is not currently recommending its abandonment, 
it is in favour of the renegotiation of the terms of entry42. 
With relatively similar though attenuated tones, the NSA has taken 
on more characteristics of the contemporary radical populist right and 
focused its criticism on the supposed denationalising “dangers” for 
Bulgaria resulting from its EU membership, in addition to rejecting 
“influences” of Brussels regarding the rights of the Turkish minority. 
The party exploits the sense of insecurity and desires for internal order 
and has been able to capitalise on diffuse social unrest against the EU43. 
Meanwhile, the PRM captures, in part, the discontent of social 
margins affected by European integration and although as an ultra-
nationalist party it is critical with respect to the transfer of sovereign 
powers to the EU, it has pragmatically attenuated its initial opposition to 
the same for financial benefits (funds) that the country receives. 
Doctrinally the PRM would prefer to be further from the EU, but it 
limits itself to criticism of some of its sectorial policies (for example, 
those related to the primary sector in Romania are still very relevant). 
This combination of nationalism, populism and pragmatism explains the 
PRM’s peculiar kind of relative opposition and ambiguous 
Euroscepticism to the EU44. 
1.4. The arguments of the radical left 
Historically CPs were decidedly against the EC during the “Cold 
War” and “field” political ideologies. The EC was seen as an instrument 
of big capital and imperialism of the United States, and NATO the army 
of the Western block against the USSR. Therefore, the EC and NATO 
are two sides of the same coin reflecting capitalist transnationalisation. 
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Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 several Western 
European CPs not only distanced themselves from the model of real 
socialism, but became increasingly favourable of autonomous European 
integration, the case of Italian communism being the most obvious. 
However, still at the beginning of the seventies, Marchais (General 
Secretary of the PCF) went on to state that the EC was essentially a 
network of big business detrimental to national sovereignty and not even 
Gorbachev’s perestroika in the mid-1980s helped change – in essence – 
such a discourse. But the easing of international tensions had an impact 
on some CPs: Although the PCF (like the PCP or KKE) continued to 
cling to an orthodox position, the ICP would end up considering the EC 
and the PCE-PSUC in a positive light with their struggle to oppose the 
Franco dictatorship, viewing them favourably for the process of internal 
change. Therefore, the degrees of reservation to, rejection of or qualified 
support for European integration varied according to national parties and 
the historical moment45. The move of some Western CPs to gain 
independence from the USSR would highlight the phenomenon of 
“Eurocommunism” as an attempt (ultimately abortive) at a “third way” 
between the Soviet system and classical social democracy. The main 
“Eurocommunist” parties, with the PCB leading (which the PCE-PSUC 
and the interior part of the KKE immediately joined), saw in the EC not 
a manoeuvre of big business, but an opportunity for workers and the 
peoples of Europe. Since the early seventies the PCI had opted for the 
strategy of “historical commitment” which emphasised its acceptance of 
the EC and even NATO to try become a reliable partner in government. 
Over time, most of the PCs evolved from outright rejection of European 
integration to the acceptance of its inevitability. After the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the postcommunist restructuring of several of 
these parties there has been a clear shift in relation to European integra-
tion: for the majority, you should take not even a single step back, 
integration should be strengthened and above all, reverse the current 
dominant logic excessively favouring neoliberalism46. 
Currently, almost all of the radical left (with varying degrees within 
this sector) is integrated into the Eurogroup GUE/NGL (and a number of 
the same parties in the PIE europarty) and can be classified into three 
categories for its ideological and programme postulates: 1) post-
communist and renovated CPs open to critically accept European 
integration (PRC, DL, IU), 2) “orthodox” CPs that are very reluctant 
and even hostile to the process (PCP, KKE, KSČM) and 3) renovated 
postcommunist eurorejectionist parties (Nordic green Left). This implies 
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the existence of two principal positions: 1) that of the parties that 
“critically” accept the EU and 2) that of those who have very serious 
reservations and even advocate the abandonment or dismantling of the 
EU, deeming efforts to change it useless. The vast majority of the GDP 
is favourable to keeping the EU, but reversing the current direction: they 
support the principle of integration, but demand the elimination of the 
neo-liberal model. 
Instead, the “observer” parties of the PIE are mainly eurorejectionist, 
like those of the NGL, tinged with accentuated populism47. One explana-
tion for the different European strategies for this group of parties is as 
much to do with their situation in each national political system as with 
their alliances and perspectives to influence the government. So parties 
that need to ally with social democracy and/or green parties should 
temper their rejection of the EU, while those who have few possibilities 
or expectations of access to government are often much more critical. 
This would seem to confirm Panebianco’s thesis of the incidence of 
these factors on the characteristics and strategies of the parties (parties 
with a vocation for government/standing opposition parties). 
One of the major alterglobalist groups, ATTAC (Association for 
Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens ATFTAC) 
has popularised the main arguments against the EU in the radical left 
media: the principle of greater supranational integration is accepted, but 
the effective modalities of the current EU for this are totally rejected. So 
the ATFTAC does not accept the logic of the community establishment 
that discriminates between pro and anti-European according to whether 
or not their criteria and policies are shared. From this perspective, to 
criticise – even in depth – the current EU is not to be “anti-European” or 
“eurosceptical”, it is to be against the hegemony of neoliberalism that 
sacrifices “social” Europe48. 
The radical left has always had an ambivalent attitude towards 
European integration: while acknowledging its positive aspects 
(supranational values, eradication of war in the “old continent”) it 
criticises some very negative aspects (the hegemony of capital, the 
“democratic deficit”). This ambivalence is apparent in the PIE, since it 
admits that the EU is a useful space for common political action, while 
rejecting its capitalist nature. The criticism of the current EU focuses on 
three dimensions: 1) the neoliberal drift, 2) the democratic deficit and 
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3) the risk of mining national identities49. In general, the radical left 
believes that neoliberal Europe makes people compete with one another 
and emphasises nationalist limitations, which would require a deepening 
of democracy and an advance in social rights in counterbalance. Thus 
the radical left advocates an employment policy at a European level, a 
new political economic policy focused on enhancing public services and 
other development models. As a result of this, existing EU treaties 
should be repealed and a real “popular democratic process” should be 
opened to replace them50. 
1.5. Specific parties of the radical left 
There are several EU countries where radical left parties have a not 
insignificant presence in their various manifestations (predominantly 
postcommunist conversions and electoral coalitions, with the orthodox 
CPs being the fewer)51. Unlike the radical right, the radical left has been 
far more operative when coordinating supranationally: in 1994 the 
Eurogroup GUE was founded and was expanded the following year with 
the postcommunist Scandinavian (NGL). This offset the abandonment 
of the former communist Italians, formerly the largest contingent of the 
predecessor Eurogroup in the GUE, to become the PDS, which was then 
integrated into the PSE. In the GUE/NGL postcommunist parties 
mutually exist, platforms fuelled by Communists and some classic CPs 
and their reasonably smooth and continuous collaboration led to the 
majority founding the PIE52. 
In 1991 the Forum of the New Left (on the initiative of IU) was 
created to exchange information and experiences and out of this came 
the idea of forming the PIE – which subsequently happened in 2004, 
driven by the DL and the PRC. In this Europarty two organic groups 
have come about: fully formed members and observers, quite critical of 
the former, but sharing a Eurogroup in the EP. In effect, the more radical 
parties (Scandinavia postcommunists and Orthodox CPs) reject the 
“moderation” and “reformism” of the PIE and consider that making 
excessive concessions to the EU system sometimes verges on 
Europhobia (KKE KSČM, PCP). This makes the PIE, as such, take an 
ambivalent position with regard to the EU: assuming it to be an 
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important space for common political action, but severely criticising its 
clear neoliberal leanings53. 
Although in general there are two main attitudes of the parties of the 
GUE/NGL to the EU (critical acceptance, deep reservations/rejection), it 
is preferable to distinguish three internal areas given the somewhat 
different ideological characteristics of each: 1) eurocritical post-
communist and renovated communists in favour of taking the greatest 
benefit from the EU possible and pressuring for the reversal of its present 
course, 2) Scandinavian postcommunists, whose ideological message is 
renewed, advocating the renationalisation of community policies and – 
in some cases – an exit from the EU, and 3) orthodox communists, very 
doctrinaire and traditionalist, which – however – objectively coincide 
with those of the second block in their type of opposition to the EU. 
Within the first block the PCF, DL, IU, the radical Dutch left and 
AKEL deserve specific consideration 
Historically, the PCF has always maintained an orthodox (pro-Soviet) 
approach to the EC, presented as an instrument of large scale monopolis-
tic capital and as a product of the “Cold War”. The French Communists 
were staunch defenders of national sovereignty and opposed suprana-
tional policy, criteria that – indeed – were not at odds with a “tactical” 
and pragmatic acceptance of the community framework. On the one 
hand, the PCF consistently opposed all integrationist advances, deemed 
by definition as capitalist and imperialist manoeuvres, but on the other, it 
never advocated the exit of France from the EC, which should have been 
the logical corollary of its extremely negative assessment of the same. 
From the alternation of the left in 1981 the decline of the PCF was 
unstoppable, its policy towards the EU remaining the same: the rejection 
of the supranational policy and protesting against the capitalist character 
of community reforms. Having to ally with other leftist groups in order 
to survive (GFR), the PCF has modulated its direct and unsubtle 
criticism of the EU, while maintaining alternative proposals54. 
PCF currently holds that the EU has focused on promoting and 
facilitating free trade and furthering the interests of big business over 
national and popular needs, being insufficiently democratic. Its criticisms 
are directed against neo-liberalism and community elitism affecting 
national sovereignty (the traditional nationalism of the PCF is long 
standing and has only dimmed in recent times), its alternative proposal 
                                                          
53  Hanley, 2008, p. 148 (list of members to 2007); Van Hüllen, 2008, p. 466-473 (list of 
members to 2007, p. 469); De Waele/Vieira, 2012, p. 63-67 and 80-81 (in these two 
last pages a list of members and and observers in 2009 are listed).  
54  Dunphy, 2004, p. 91-103.  
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being the “other” Europe with a “participatory” social economy 
respectful of “identities”. The PCF aims to gradually combine French 
nationalism and Europeanism, with a Keynesian economy and represen-
tative democracy at the community level: a program deemed “reformist” 
by groups located to its left (the Trotskyists variants, in particular) who 
argue for a rigorous “quality” internationalism, socialism and base 
democracy with revolutionary tints (although with very few practical 
consequences). In any case, the radical French left as a whole decisively 
contributed to the failure of the CTEU in the 2005 referendum, 
especially as they managed to accentuate the internal divisions of the 
Socialists. It was precisely this opposing campaign that allowed the FCP 
to recover certain visibility in an increasingly declining phase of its 
influence and project their arguments criticising the social and 
democratic inadequacies of the CTEU55. 
The DL, a party critical of the EU, assumes this to be irreversible 
today and therefore, it tries to promote core social policies to break the 
current dominant logic that is entirely favourable to “markets”. This 
party is in favour of the principle of integration, but is opposed to the 
dominant neo-liberalism and the democratic deficit of EU institutions. 
To these two criticisms, the DL adds the submission of the EU to the 
United States because the CFSP/ESDP are part of NATO, an instrument 
to serve the strategic interests of the superpower56. 
In the case of IU, it should be remembered that the SCP was clearly 
favourable to the EC as one of the fundamental elements of its strategy 
against Franco and that after the transition, it gave its full support for the 
integration of Spain into this body. A change in attitude was seen in the 
IU led by Anguita which derided the TEU or, later, the CTEU. Indeed, 
since then there has been intensified criticism of the neo-liberal policies 
of the EU and the direction taken by the CFSP/ESDP, being increasingly 
linked to the strategic interests of NATO. A minority of IU did not share 
this political reorientation and after a very intense and divisive internal 
debate, it left this collective (the group of the Democratic Party of the 
New Left)57. 
The Dutch Socialist Party, which proceeds from the former extreme 
Maoist left and has today adopted more a moderate position, is 
                                                          
55  Milner, 2004, p. 59-81; Benedetto, Quaglia, 2007, p. 489; Cosseron, 2007, p. 57; 
Courtois, Andolfatto, 2008, p. 107; Heine, 2009, p. 55-56, 58, 60, 66, 70, 72, 75, 80-
81, 84, 88, 94-96, 98-100, 106, 151-152, 154 and 156; Seidendorf, 2010, p. 429 and 
431; Alexander, 2001.  
56  Landwehrlen, 2010, p. 21; Landwehrlen, 2012, p. 142.  
57  Hanley, 2008, p. 151; Benedetto, Quaglia, 2007, p. 492-493; Dunphy, 2004, p. 121-
130.  
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nevertheless critical of the EU for its neo-liberalism and democratic 
deficit. So it campaigned successfully against the CTEU in the 
referendum of 200558. 
Also within this first block, it is interesting to note the change in 
position of AKEL with regard European integration: initially an outright 
rejection of the view that the EU was “an instrument of capitalism and 
imperialism” to a full acceptance of the same – from there its support for 
the accession of Cyprus to the EU, although it rejected the CTEU59. 
Finally, mention should be made of a party that does not sit easily in 
this ideological sector, the SF, given its very singular characteristics. 
Despite its very severe criticisms of the EU, this group – in the end – 
has ceased its direct antagonistic opposition of the same and no longer 
calls for the exit of the Republic of Ireland (or Northern Ireland 
integrated in the UK). In particular, the acceptance of the Stormont 
Agreement has contributed to relativise the traditional opposition to the 
EU of the SF60.  
The second block is represented by the Scandinavian radical left – 
extremely critical of the EU in countries where European integration is 
usually a very mobilising issue. 
The VP defends the exit of Sweden from the EU, a thesis not 
advocated by the Danish radical left. In any case, both parties benefit 
electorally from widespread electoral social Euroscepticism, though this 
does not make them partners in government61. The VP opposed the entry 
of Sweden in the EC and has always voted against any further integration 
in ad hoc referendums (1994 and 2003) and is against the ECB and the 
Euro. The Swedish radical left argues that the EU would be detrimental 
to Sweden on issues such as employment, welfare, ecology and 
democracy, which a large part of public opinion is in tune with. 
For its part, the Danish radical left, which initially took the same 
position (rejection of EU incorporation, the TEU, of the subsequent 
reforms of the same, or the EMU, almost always appealing for “No” in 
every referendum) has toned down its direct opposition to the EU 
recently. Today, the party accepts the EU as an unavoidable reality and 
understands that the EU can be a useful instrument of cooperation, 
provided that that there is a complete change in policies and that it does 
not intend to supplant nation states – as it is against an undesirable 
                                                          
58  Lucardie, Voerman, 2003, p. 172; Voerman, 2008, p. 30-31.  
59  Steorgiu, 2008, p. 262-263; Charalambous, 2012, p. 258.  
60  Hayward, 2009, p. 243.  
61  Ersson, 2008, p. 158-162; Lucardie, Voerman, 2003, p. 218-221; Dunphy, 2004, 
p. 152; Hastings, 2012, p. 96-97.  
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European federal super-state62. There is a perceptible double division on 
European affairs – internal and external – activists and voters exhibit 
contradictory posperceptiblerding this (ranging from Europhobia 
Europragmatism). The same phenomenon of initial outright rejection 
and pragmatic acceptance after the country’s accession to the EU has 
also been seen with the Finnish radical left. 
Finally, the block of orthodox communism is the most rooted in very 
traditional doctrinal positions, linked to the ideological heritage of the 
“Cold War”. 
To begin with, the PCP opposed the entry of Portugal in the EC in 
1986, but then did not advocate its exit. This opposition was due to the 
fact that entry would threaten the “gains of the April revolution,” which 
was yet another reason which prevented unified action with the 
Socialists. Only in 1988, the PCP accepted Portugal’s presence in the 
EC as a “fact of reality”, then trying to “benefit” from it. For the PCP 
for the bulk of EU policies would be harmful to Portugal: the CAP, the 
Stability Pact or employment, which is why this party opposes further 
steps of integration. In fact, the PCP has always rejected all reforms of 
EU Treaties precisely because they meant further deepening of the logic 
of integration. The official argument is that the gradual federalisation of 
the EU is no more than the other face of neoliberalism, mining 
inalienable national sovereignty and benefitting only large capital 
interests63. 
The KKE has a strong tradition of nationalism and has always 
opposed to the entry of Greece into the EC. Among other factors 
because they would support Turkish interests against Greece. In its 
view, the EU would be as “imperialist” [sic] as the United States – 
populism is one of the hallmarks of this party, the type of opposition 
effected by SYRIZA (which comes in part from the former KKE 
Interior) being different. For Greek Communists, the EU is a 
reactionary institution in the service of big business, anti-democratic 
and anti-national. Consequently, not only the KKE has opposed all 
reform of EU Treaties, but also considers that there is no possible 
remedy for the EU given its “class nature”, advocating then the exit of 
Greece from the same64. 
                                                          
62  The SF voted “no” in the Maastricht referéndum (1992), Amsterdam (1998) and the 
UEM (2000): Ersson, 2008, p. 157.  
63  Bosco, 2000, p. 66, 78-79 and 202; Dunphy, 2004, p. 115-120; Cunha, 2008, p. 197-
198 and 208; Jalali, Lisi, 2012, p. 205. 
64  Kalyvas, Marantzidis, 2003, p. 16 and 22; Dunphy, 2004, p. 104-108; Marantzidis, 
2008, p. 252 and 258; Backes, Moreau, 2008, p. 574 (Conclusions); Verney, 2011, 
p. 68-69.  
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Portuguese and Greek Communists must compete electorally in their 
countries with other more modernised radical groups of the left (the BE 
and SYRIZA respectively), which has led them to emphasise their 
criticism of the EU to differentiate themselves and capture the citizens 
unhappy with the policies of Brussels. Indeed, the BE and SYRIZA 
have succeeded is opening a path between classic social democratic 
parties and the classic “orthodox” CPs, – in European affairs, they hold 
rather critical positions, but favourable to supranationality (with 
conditions). This kind of “third option” between the center-left Social 
Democrats and the Communists obliges them to maintain a certain 
ambivalent European discourse: they reject the negative aspects of the 
EU (neoliberalism and “democratic deficit”), but it aim to overcome 
these from within the community. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that although in almost all the CEECs 
the old CP rulers were converted into social democrats, some 
maintained their Orthodox identity: this is the case of the KSČM, which 
opposed the entry of the Czech Republic into the EU campaigning 
against on the occasion of the referendum. Once the country entered, the 
Czech Communists accepted this popular decision, but remain among 
the most critical of the EU and have always opposed any further 
integration (completely rejecting the CTEU)65.  
2. The elections to the European Parliament of 2009 
2.1. Context and variables 
The elections held between 4 and 7 June 2009 were called after the 
failure of the CTEU (in the 2005 referendum in France and Holland) and 
before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (rejected by Ireland in its first 
2008 referendum, then approved in a second with some opt-out clauses 
and finally ratified by all States in the autumn 2009). In these elections 
375 million voters in the 27 states were called to choose the 736 MEPs 
for the VI Legislature, from 2009 to 2014. Contested by some 9,000 
candidates, grouped in more than 300 political parties, and achieving 
                                                          
65  So anachronistically orthodox is Czech communism that it has refused to enter the 
PIE as a full member (it is an “observer”), not only for deeming it “reformist” and 
too close to the capitalist EU, but also by not taking the Statutes of this europarty 
which rejects Stalinism without hesitation: see Mares, 2008, p. 297 and 300; 
Hlovšek, Pšeja, 2001, p. 110-111; March, Mudde, 2005, p. 28-29; Hanley, 2008, 
p. 149; Ishiyama, 1998, p. 61-85; Nedelcheva, 2009, p. 241-246; Bozóki, Ishiyama, 
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representation for 170 national parties represented (about six per state) 
to be subsequently integrated into seven parliamentary Eurogroups66. 
Again, traditional elements of the European elections have been 
accentuated and confirmed: the character of “second class” (or even 
“third”) of the same and the inability of the EP to communicate and, 
even more, convince. It emphasises the paradox that the steady increase 
in powers of the EP discourages citizens and at the same time, it is clear 
that parties carry out low-profile campaigns (of a domestic character) 
and the mass media pays little attention to such events. However, in this 
latter dimension a surge of media interest has been seen, but this has not 
helped to increase civic attention. Again, specifically European matters 
have occupied very little space (sometimes zero) in national campaigns 
and reiterated the widespread popular ignorance of European political 
protagonists67. 
The serious deterioration with the economic crisis revived the 
materialistic preoccupations of citizens, hence the traditional left/right 
axis superimposed supranationalism/intergovernmentalism. In the 2009 
campaign the challenge to specific EU policies related to employment 
and immigration dominated for example and this fact benefited parties 
of the right that managed to tune in better than the left with fears and 
concerns of many voters. Indeed, the rightist parties used more 
“postmodern” campaign resources than the left and had more resources 
and better election professionals at their disposal, which contributed to 
their victory at the polls. Moreover, it is also true that national 
peculiarities and specificities of each party system and more particularly, 
of the respective election modalities had an impact both on the 
modulation of the campaign in each country, and the results segregated 
there68. 
The previous legislature of the EP was marked by important debates 
about the nature of European integration (French and Dutch referendums 
in 2005 and Ireland in 2008), but the worse economic crisis since 2008 
                                                          
66  Upon entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 the number of 
MEPs increased from 736 to 754. The figure of 170 national parties in the EP is from 
Bardi et al., 2010, p. 15-16. Trechsel reduces this to 168, id., 2011, p. 6. In contrast, 
Giebler and Wüst increase this to 216, id., 2011, p. 53; Caravita, 2009, p. vii; 
Coosemans, 2009a, p. 5; Gagatek, Trechsel, Breuer, 2010, p. XI. On the attention of 
the mass media: Jalai, Silva, 2011, p. 111-124.  
67  Gagatek, Trechsel, Breuer, 210, p. XI; Schuck, 2011, p. 42-43 and 46; Hobot, Spoon, 
Tilly, 2009, p. 93-115; OSCE, 2009; Sigalas et al., 2010. On the classic thesis of 
“second class” European elections: Reif, Schmitt, 1980, p. 3-44; Bellucci, Garzia, 
Rubal, 2012, p. 26.  
68  Dupoirer, 2009, p. 536; De Wilde, Trenz, Michailidov, 2010, p. 17; Giebler, Würst, 
2011, p. 54 and 64.  
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has meant that this is the primary concern citizens have. Consequently, 
the almost absolute predominance of economic and financial issues may 
not come as a surprise, followed by immigration and – to a lesser extent 
– environmental protection. 
In any case, given the indisputable nature of the usual overwhelming 
dominance of national dynamics, the important problems of States 
(uncontrollable economic crisis, rising insecurity, environmental 
degradation) can not be overlooked and are at the same time European 
problems. The fact that groups especially critical of the current direction 
of the EU such as the radical parties of the right and left have obtained 
significant results highlights, on the one hand, how artificial it is to 
divide the national from the European and on the other, that the question 
of the nature and scope of European integration itself has political 
significance, at least in several countries69. 
At the same time, an increasing debilitation of conventional politics 
is evident and this phenomenon is accentuated even within the institu-
tions of the EU, far more anonymous than national institutions for 
citizens. This fact has greatly benefitted protest parties – especially some 
groups of the populist right – though the base rejection and/or criticism 
of the EU is a cross-political phenomenon. Even countries with trade-
tionally favourable public opinion showing majority support for 
European integration, saw growing disaffection in 2009 (Belgium, 
France, Germany), although others commonly labelled as eurosceptical 
the phenomenon has remained stable without developing more (Czech 
Republic, Sweden, United Kingdom)70. 
Figure 1 
Attitudes regarding the EU  




Currently Pro-UE 35.1 19.1 25.9 
Eurocritical (“altereuropean”) 11.0 9.6 10.0 
Diverse Eurosceptical 53.9 71.2 64.0 
Source: Percentages from De Wilde, Trenz, Michailidou, 2010, p. 13.  
Personal adaptation. 
If the establishment parties could contain the opposition to the EU, 
then this factor would have little weight in the political system, but 
when a certain threshold has been passed then it is not possible to 
                                                          
69  The 2008 Eurobarometer shows that 71% of European citizens expressed pessimism 
both about the eventual outcome of the economic crisis and the ineffectiveness of EU 
institutions: Coosemans, 2009a, p. 7; Ridola, 2009, p. 2; Schuck et al., 2011, p. 43, 
47 and 50.  
70  Costa/Brack, 2009, p. 255; Ridola, 2009, p. 3-5; Spanje, de Vreese, 2011, p. 423-425.  
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marginalise it and it enters the agenda. It is true that overall the 
Eurosceptics obtained significant results in 2009, but not as large as 
predicted. The best results were achieved by the UKIP and the Martin 
list from Austria – progress was also made by the FPÖ DF, LN, LAOS, 
VB (very few), PRM, BNP, PVV and JMM, while the NSA and FN 
receded and the Polish LPR disappeared. Considering the rest, it was not 
without considerable interest to note the failure of the Libertas Project 
of the Irish millionaire Declan Ganley, a well known Eurosceptic, who 
tried to present common candidatures in the 27 community members: he 
only managed 12 and obtained a single member of the European 
Parliament (the Frenchman Philippe de Villiers). Libertas focused its 
campaign on the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, but citizens turned their 
backs and when it came to protesting against the EU, they put their trust 
in traditional national parties critical of the EU71. 
While abstention has varied according to the States, the significantly 
lower participation (the lowest since 1979) is undoubtedly one of the 
most striking points of the 2009 elections. Indeed, the trend of electoral 
disaffection has continued and so, on average, only 43.2% of citizens 
entitled to vote did so (in 2004 the number was 45.5%), a phenomenon 
accentuated in most CEECs. The fact that participation seems to be in 
continuous decline has to do with the fact that the EP is not comparable 
to national parliaments and that despite its increased powers, it lacks 
legislative initiative, is not a genuine European government and, indeed, 
is a colegislating institution, not the exclusive Legislative organ72. 
Figure 2 
Participation in elections to the EP 2009 2004 
Western Europe 54.3 (-1.3) 
Eastern Europe 32.2 (+1.4) 
Source: Treschel, 2010, p. 5. 
                                                          
71  Gagatek, 2010b, p. 19; Coosemans, 2009a, p. 52; Coosemans, 2010, p. 99-100; 
Schuck et al., 2011, p. 50.  
72  Table 2 should be qualified when national results are analysed since, for example, in 
the west there have been increases in participation in Denmark, Sweden, Austria and 
Luxembourg, with decreases in Italy, Spain and Greece. In the east there are 
increases in Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia, but decreases in Hungary and 
Lithuania. Germany 43.3 (+0.3), Austria 45.9 (+3.5), Belgium 90.3 (-0.4), Bulgaria 
38.9 (+9.7), Czech Republic 28.2 (-0.1) 59.4 Cyprus (-11.79), Denmark 59.5 (+11.6), 
Spain 44.9 (-0.2), France 40.6 (-2.1), Greece 52.6 (-10.6), Hungary 36.3 (-2.1), Italy 
65.1 (-8.0), Netherlands 36.7 (-2.5), Portugal 36.7 (-1.8) Romania 27.6 (-1.8), UK 
34.7 (-4.1), Sweden 45.5 (+7.7). The figure in brackets indicates electoral 
participation in 2004: Coosemans, 2009a, p. 8. Jones, 2011, p. 25.  
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The second remarkable fact of the 2009 elections is the global 
victory of the right, from the radical (to a lesser extent), to the center-
right (the principal winner): the PPE (which confirmed its character as a 
primary force) and the new parliamentary eurogrups of the CRE (which 
in part comes from the old UEN) and the EFD (ex ID) going from 
36.7% in 2004 to 48% in 2009 and this does not include unregistered 
members of extreme right parties. Consequently, the European 
Parliament elected in 2009 is the most right leaning since the first direct 
elections in 1979, with the very negative results for the Social-
democrats, discrete results from the radical left and slightly better results 
than in 2004 for the Greens. The economic crisis and the feeling of 
insecurity led to this conservative retraction and the strengthened protest 
vote capitalised by the radical right. It was precisely the pressure of 
ultranationalist and sovereigntist groups that dented the moderate right, 
tending to emphasise the reservations about any further progress in 
deepening European integration, hardening and restricting legal 
guarantees. Although the radical right are present in 21 of the 27 states, 
it did not reach 10% in 9 of them, but exceeded this figure in 12. Its 
most significant support was concentrated in 7 states, in the west, The 
Netherlands (PVV, 17.0), Belgium (VB, 15.9), Denmark (DF, 15.3), 
Austria (FPÖ, 12.7) and Italy (LN, 10.2), and in the east, Hungary 
(JMM, 14.8) and Bulgaria (NSA, 12.0)73. 
Table 1 
Sanction vote








Source: Frank, Isnard, 2009, p. 607-621. 
The third interesting fact of the 2009 elections is the sanction vote, as 
it is known that the European elections intensified the extension of the 
same: in 2009 governing parties lost in 23 states (85%), even more than 
in 2004. However, in the 11 States where the right and center-right 
parties were in power, these received the most votes in the election (the 
                                                          
73  Dupoirer, 2009, p. 540; Alexandre-Collier, Jardin, 2009, p. 583-590; Sterpa, 
Scoppola, 2009, p. 21; Coosemans, 2010, p. 98; Gagatek, Treschel, Breuer, 2010, 
p. XI; Deloy, Reynié, 2010, p. 479, 488 and 494; Treschel, 2010, p. 6-7. 
Mc Elroy/Benoit, 2012, p. 152-153.  
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only exceptions being those of Nea Demokratia Greek and Maltese 
National Party), while social democratic parties suffered a severe setback 
(with the exception of Slovakia). Indeed, the crisis of reformist left 
governments made the right wing a far more effective electoral option: 
social democracy was unable to present itself as a real European 
alternative and in the 8 European countries where they governed (alone 
or in coalition), the right won74. 
2.2. The radical parliamentary eurogroups 
To analyse the incidence of selected parties in this study, both the 
percentage of voting and representation reached in the EP should be 
taken into account – above all in terms of the ranking achieved in each 
country, as this last piece of information is one of the most significant 
when calibrating the political weight of each in its respective system. 
Figure 3 






Germany DL 1,969,239 7.5 8 5 GUE/NGL 
Austria FPÖ 364,207 12.7 2 4 NI 
Belgium VB 647,170 15.9 2 3 NI 
Bulgaria NSA 308,052 12.0 2 4 NI 
Czech 
Republic
KSČM 334,577 14.2 4 3 GUE/NGL 
Cyprus AKEL 106,922 34.9 2 2 GUE/NGL 
Denmark DF 357,942 15.3 2 4 EFD 
































Holland PVV 772,746 17.0 4 2 NI 
Hungary JMM 427,773 14.8 3 3 NI 



























Romania PRM 419,094 8.7 3 5 NI 
Sweden VP 179,182 5.7 1 6 GUE/NGL 
Source: Chiche, Boissieu, 2009, p. 737-776. With personal expansion and selection. 
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As a result of this data the following descending scales of greater to 
lesser in both ideological groups of parties is obtained. With the radical 
right the downward progression is as follows: PVP, UKIP, VB, JMM, 
LN, DF, FPÖ, NSA, LAOS, PRM and FN. With the radical left: SF, 
AKEL, KSČM, BE, KKE, CDU-PCP, IU, DL, FG, SYRIZA and VP. 
Additionally, it is interesting to note the degree of generic 
Euroscepticism of national public opinions in the 2009 elections as a 
whole because sometimes, the results of parties situated in this spectrum 
exceed the percentage of the eurosceptical population, while on other 
occasions the opposite occurs. 
Anyway, it is unnatural to mechanically extrapolate and in block the 
election results of radical parties and relate them directly to public 
opinion polls as the motivations of these and civic attitudes are always 
more nuanced. 
Figure 4. Eurobarometer question:  
“Generally speaking do you think your country being in the EU is a bad 
thing?” The percentages are reproduced from citizens who think so. 
Germany: 11% Denmark: 13% Italy: 16% 
Austria: 19% Spain: 9% Portugal: 16% 
Belgium: 11% France: 17% United Kingdom: 32% 
Bulgaria: 7% Greece: 15% Romania: 6% 
Czech Republic: 13% Holland: 7% Sweden: 19% 
Cyprus: 18% Hungary: 23%  
Source: Eurobarometer 71. June-July 2009 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb717eb713_annexes.pdf >, p. 38. 
In the previous legislature (2004-2009), the Eurosceptics of the 
radical right were basically in two parliamentary eurogroups, the UEN 
and ID, apart from several in the NI. The UEN had a very conservative 
ideological inspiration accepting intereuropean economic cooperation, 
but rejected supranational policy, while the ID – even more right leaning 
– included openly europhobic groups. In 2009 a new parliamentary 
Eurogroup, EFD was created, which – partly – follows the old thinking 
of the UEN and above all, the ID (its primary origin) and comprises 
32 MEPs, just under the 37 the ID had in the previous parliament75. The 
strongest parties of the EFD are the UKIP, LN, DF and LAOS and this 
parliamentary eurogroup has accumulated a greater percentage of votes 
than the UEN and ID together (from 6.0% to 7.6%), although not in 
numbers of MEPs. It is a rather heterogeneous parliamentary Eurogroup 
of various specific political dimensions, but united by a strong 
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Eurosceptical rhetoric. All members are staunch defenders of national 
sovereignty and are against the policy of supranationality, strongly 
criticising the Community institutions (for their “democratic deficit”) 
and their policies (harmful to national interests)76. 
The change in regulations of the EP in 2008 hampered the formation 
of parliamentary Eurogroups and this has once again harmed the classic 
extreme right-wing (25 MEPs are needed from at least 7 states). Indeed, 
this sector has had chronic difficulties in structuring and of its members, 
only the FN and VB enjoy a long standing presence in the EP. In the 
previous legislature, the ephemeral attempt to regroup (Identity, 
Tradition and Sovereignty) failed, only lasting eleven months due to the 
disagreements between the Romanian extremists and Alessandra 
Mussolini – this leading to the former leaving the parliamentary 
Eurogroup, then losing the quorum. This means that the vast majority of 
classic extremists are in the EP as NI: this is the case of the Martin List 
and FPÖ (Austria), BV (Belgium), NSA (Bulgaria), FN (France), JMM 
(Hungary), the PVV (Netherlands), PRM (Romania) and BNP (UK)77. 
The radical left is relatively stable – with a downward tendency – in 
seats (41 in 2004 to 35 in 2009) and variable in votes according to the 
twelve countries where it is present (not an average because the decrease 
is only 0.4%).  
There is a significant advance in Portugal (CDU-BE and PCP), less 
so in France (FG) and Greece (SYRIZA), and slight decreases in Greece 
(KKE), Sweden (VP), Germany (DL) and Cyprus (AKEL), with the 
surprising disappearance of the Italian Communists. Remember that the 
internal structure of the parliamentary Eurogroup of this ideological 
group (GUE/NGL) is complex because it includes various categories. In 
this parliamentary Eurogroup the principal political forces are the DL, 
the GFR and the KSČM, being the basic common axis of demands for a 
strong Welfare State and the defence of an active and dynamic role in 
the economy78. 
                                                          
76  Coosemans, 2009b, p. 21-22 and 33; Bardi et al., 2010, p. 18, 26-28 and 104. Braun 
et al., 2010. Gagatek, 2010c, p. 37. Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton, 2011, p. 106-108.  
77  Altogether there are 28 MEPs from the NI, the vast majority (23) of the extreme 
right. It is surprising that, present in eight countries and in the absence of only two 
MEPs, it has been unable to group them together to make a Eurogroup, as this gives 
it a much better chance in the political arena: Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton, 2011, 
p. 110; Coosemans, 2009b, p. 23-24; Coosemans, 2010, p. 107; Ennser, 2012, p. 154-
155.  
78  GUE/NGL includes the PIE, a Europarty made up of six national parties (PCF, the 
Parti de Gauche, DL, SYRIZA, BE and IU), two “observers” of the same (AKEL, 
KSČM), a party of NGL (the VP) and eight assigned generically to the Eurogroup 
(KKE, PCP, SF and others): Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton, 2011, p. 103. However, De 
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In the two-dimensional space of European policy (the left/right wing 
horizontal axis and the supranational/intergovernmental vertical axis) – 
apart from the NI – the EFD occupies the rightmost position on the 
horizontal axis and less integrative on the vertical axis, while the 
GUE/NGL occupy the positions more ot the left on the first axis and 
intermediate positions on the second (usually adopting the principle of 
integration, but criticises the current direction of EU policy with respect 
to this). 
Figure 5  
 Scale right/left Supranational scale / 
Intergovernmentalism 
GUE/NGL 4.5 (2) 9.5 (1)
EFD 11.1 (2.6) 4 (4) 








of the EU 
EFD 30.5 4.4 7.6 12.7 
GUE/NGL 3.2 14.5 5.9 5.1 
Source: Bardi, 2010, p. 19. 
In conclusion, the EFD is against the project of European integration 
and emphasises the critique of “permissiveness” of the Community 
authorities on migration. At the same time, the GUE/NGL is highly 
critical of the current EU, but not opposed, in general, to the principle of 
integration and focuses its policies on the defence of the Welfare State. 
2.3. Campaigns and national results of the radical parties 
Germany: European affairs did have an impact on the election 
campaign in this country and, therefore, the Lisbon Treaty, the European 
economic crisis, climate protection and the Turkish candidacy were 
discussed. The DL, which is often characterised even in academic 
circles as a soft eurosceptical party – defined itself with respect to this as 
“eurocritical”: in its view, the current EU should be completely 
restructured (but not abandoned or, worse, dissolved) as the neoliberal 
course would have very negative social effects. In addition, for this 
party, the EU would give up their old pacifist inspiration on actually 
joining with and a subordinating themselves to the CFSP/ESDP and 
                                                          
Waele, Vieira, 2012, provided other figures: 23 national member parties and 11 
observers (also included in both categories to parties from countries outside the EU), 
p. 80-81; Coosemans, 2009a, p. 53; Coosemans, 2009b, p. 19; Alexandre-Collier, 
Jardin, 2009, p. 602, Coosemans, 2010, p. 100 and 104, Gagatek, 2010c, p. 37.  
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NATO, also they would suffer a severe democratic deficit. In sum, the 
DL requires the introduction of the referendum on European issues in 
Germany and a complete change of political perspective. The truth is 
that, beyond its strong direct criticism, the DL has not developed a 
credible alternative program for “their” Europe79. 
Austria: both major governmental parties lost ground (there is civic 
fatigue of the traditional consociational model) and the novelty in 
radical circles was the struggle between three groups for a very similar 
space (the Martin List obtaining 17.7%, the FPÖ with 12.7% and the 
BZÖ, founded by Haider, with 4.6% did not attain representation. 
Notice that all three radical right groups combined obtained no less than 
35%). The FPÖ carried out a strong xenophobic campaign (anti-
immigrant, anti-Turkey), with a maximum emphasis on national 
sovereignty and the denouncing of the EU “mafia”. It has therefore 
proved electorally profitable in Austria to maintain a hermetic defence 
of national identity against the alleged hyperbureaucratic “centralism” of 
Brussels. As a novelty – since the FPÖ party had always been very pro-
market – some neoliberal policies of the EU are criticised, especially 
those negatively affecting Austrian workers80. 
Belgium: despite being not only a founder, but the base for the main 
EU institutions (Brussels is the de facto capital of a sort of “federal” 
Europe), European affairs were almost entirely absent during the 2009 
election campaign. For the first time in European elections, the VBs 
political power stopped growing due to the intense competition with the 
N-VA and, especially, the Dedecker List (in general, the Belgian right, 
especially the Flemish community, increased their power and hegemony 
in the nationalist discourse of identity). The VB emphasised national 
sovereignty, rejected an eventual European superstate, criticised the 
“Eurocrats” for being opaque, inefficient and corrupt and stoked fears 
towards “uncontrolled” immigration and the Turkish candidacy81. 
Bulgaria: national and European elections almost coincided (they 
subsequently did a month later) and it made the electorate lose interest. 
Indeed, they did not operate in the manner of mobilising “primaries”, 
but quite the opposite, as if citizens were “reserving” themselves for the 
important elections to follow. In any case, European affairs did not count 
at all and, therefore, the European elections were simply a preparation 
for the national elections. After a few early years of civic hope in the EU 
                                                          
79  Coosemans, 2009a, p. 11; Liberati, 2009, p. 108; Brunsbach, John, Werner, 2010, 
p. 90-93; Packham, Klepatz, 2010, p. 5, 13, 19, 20 and 22.  
80  Coosemans, 2009a, p. 13; Zei, 2009, p. 38; Kuhn et al., 2010, p. 41-43.  
81  Coosemans, 2009a, p. 15; Togna, 2009, p. 46-47; Crespy, 2010, p. 9 and 13. Smets, 
Van Berendencks, Van Hecke, 2010, p. 47-49.  
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(Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007) disenchantment and disinterest grew 
(in parallel with a profound ignorance) of Community institutions. In 
this election there was a general success for populists (the winner was 
the GERB of Boyko Berisov, the mayor of Sofia, a center-right party 
and member of the EPP). The NSA, which appeared in 2005, benefited 
from its strong populist style and mobilised the sector of public opinion 
that considered the transition process a failure and reflected a desire for 
revenge. This party emphasised national sovereignty opposed to the EU, 
manipulating the nationalist cleavage versus Europeanism and it did this 
by radicalising extremist positions with an aggressive campaign against 
Brussels and also against Turkey, the eternal target of Bulgarian 
ultranationalism82. 
Czech Republic: from the outset one can not ignore the weight of 
vague Euroscepticism in this country, fuelled by none other than the 
President of the Republic, Vaclav Klaus. For this leader of the 
conservative right, the EU is a “germanocentric, centralising, collectivist 
and fanatically environmentalist” entity and although at a social level 
there is more diversity, such opinions cut across almost every party. The 
2009 election campaign was carried out in a climate of strong demotiva-
tion after the fall of the government following a no-confidence motion 
(in March 2009) and the disappointing results of the rotating Presidency 
of the EU in the case of the Czech Republic. The KSČM, despite a slight 
decline, confirmed the existence of their stable and loyal electorate83. 
Cyprus: 2009 European elections were held with Demetris 
Christofias as President, the first time a leader of AKEL had held this 
position. Though by a small margin, they suffered a punishment vote and 
finished second. In Cyprus all politics revolves around the division of 
the island and this has a European overtone, since only the south of the 
island is an EU member as representative of the whole island. The 
conservative opposition accused AKEL of converting itself into a euro-
phobic group, something that this party denies because – in its opinion – 
the key is to preserve the rights of Cypriot workers in the EU, the object 
of the criticism of this party being its neoliberal policies, not the integra-
tion of the island into the community. In any case, AKEL opposes any 
agreement regarding the collaboration of Cyprus with NATO and 
demands the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island. Because of 
this, the debate on the issue of reunification and the Turkish question 
                                                          
82  Coosemans, 2009a, p. 15; Vannucci, 2009a, p. 53 and 56; Todorov, 2009, p. 702-
704; Lyubenov, 2010, p. 54-55; Raycheva, Róka, 2011, p. 62.  
83  Coosemans, 2009a, p. 42; Sawicki, 2009, p. 219-221 (the quote from Klaus comes 
from here); Kárníková, 2010, p. 66-69; Negrine, Stetka, Fialová, 2011, p. 79 and 86.  
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(the military presence in Cyprus, not the Turkish candidacy to the EU to 
which AKEL has no objection) monopolised the entire campaign84. 
Denmark: The election campaign was dominated by the economic 
crisis and the debate about the possible entry of Denmark into the Euro 
– a very divisive issue. The DF gave its parliamentary support to the 
center-right to govern, especially on those issues in which they coincided 
with regard to the EU (Danish Euroscepticism is not only expanding, 
but it is very ideologically transverse). The DF scored a remarkable 
result that helped change internal balances of government coalitions and 
especially benefitted its anti-immigration policy85. 
Spain: the campaign was absolutely dominated by the usual harsh 
confrontation between the PSOE and the PP and entirely focused on 
domestic issues. For the PP in opposition, the European elections would 
serve as “dry run” (that is, a kind of “primary”) to the general election, 
paving the way for their return to power. The IU focused on socio-
economic issues with leftist solutions to attract voters disenchanted with 
the socialist government of Zapatero. Its proposal was to transform the 
EU with a strongly accentuated social redistribution and correction86. 
France: in a context of economic crisis and increasingly important 
debilitation of President Sarkozy, the European debate was dominated 
by the classical issues in the country: loss of national sovereignty, 
negative impact of neoliberalism, the cost of the assimilation of the 
CEECs, foreign immigrants and Turkey. The FN, always faithful to its 
populist, ultranationalist discourse, obtained a negative result because it 
had to compete with other groups of the reactionary right that affected 
its electorate (the Mouvement pour la France of Philippe de Villiers 
Libertas – linked to the Libertas operation – and Chasse, Pêche, Nature 
et Traditions). The FN has repeatedly tried to lead the European far right 
as a whole, but it has never succeeded. By the mid-1980s of the last 
century Le Pen stated: “nationalists of all countries, unite”. The failure 
of this strategy has been structural as it has been impossible so far to 
link supranational solidarity to ultranationalist parties. In any case, the 
EU considers that FN is a failed venture being contrary to national 
interests, which is why this party requires a reappropriation of national 
sovereignty and strong socio-economic protectionism, maintaining an 
                                                          
84  Coosemans, 2009a, p. 18; Fabrizzi, 2009, p. 61-63; Christophorou, 2010, p. 59-62.  
85  Coosemans, 2009a, p. 19; Rodomonte, 2009, p. 68-71; Munkøe, 2010, p. 71-75. 
86  Coosemans, 2009a, p. 21; Frosina, 2009, p. 251-254; Casal, Ferrín, Pardos-Prado, 
2010, p. 167-169.  
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aggressive intolerance of non-EU immigration (especially Muslim) and 
completely rejecting Turkey’s candidacy87. 
The PCF, which has been in constant decline since the 1980s, has 
managed to arrest the fall that was leading to its disappearance thanks to 
the coalition of the FG (on allying with Jean Luc Mélanchon’s Parti de 
Gauche, proceeding from the socialist left) that renewed a somewhat old 
and very tired discourse. This group initially feared competition from 
the Trotskyists of the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste that, ultimately, had 
no impact. For the FG, the key would be “to change Europe” by 
protecting public services and ensuring the rights of workers across the 
EU. However, the voters of the FG are not motivated by “another” 
Europe because 65% of them are only interested in France’s problems88. 
Greece: the highlight of this election was the reversal of the two 
major national parties and the gains of the three minor parties. The 
LAOS radical right criticises the EU from an ultranationalist 
perspective: this party does not advocate the exit of Greece from the 
community, but the strengthening of national interest in the same. 
Furthermore, LAOS is very unhappy with the EU for failing to resolve 
two key foreign policy issues for Greece: FYROM and Cyprus. With 
regard to another issue, the Greek radical right is against Turkey joining 
the EU. With the Greek radical left, there is a relatively balanced 
competition between the orthodox communism of the KKE (usually the 
majority here) and the renovated postcommunism of SYRIZA that, this 
time (occasionally alternating leading positions from one election to 
another), benefited the first (although declining somewhat compared to 
2004, with some relative advance for the second). The KKE’s 
opposition to the EU is direct, bordering on Europhobia and unmitigated: 
in its opinion, the EU is an expression of large scale capitalist 
monopolies, a focus for worker exploitation and part of the new post-
bipolar imperialist order – hence it can not come as a surprise its request 
for Greece’s exit. In contrast, SYRIZA declares itself pro-European, 
although it criticises the current EU for its neoliberal policies89. 
Netherlands: the most significant outcome of these elections were 
the reverse of the three main traditional parties of the country and the 
substantial increase of the PVV radical right, which became the second 
political force at a national level. The campaign was dominated by fears 
                                                          
87  Allegri, 2009, p. 92-93; Boissieu, 2009, p. 733; Coosemans, 2009a, p. 25; Perrineau, 
2009, p. 662; Crespy, 2009, p. 7; Petithomme, 2010, p. 84. 
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89  Coosemans, 2009a, p. 26; Sterpa, 2009, p. 118-119; Vasilopoulou, 2010, p. 95-98; 
Halikiopoulou, Nanou, Vasilopoulou, 2012, p. 15-17.  
Background of the Parties and their Impact on the 2009 Elections 
83 
and civil unrest due to the economic crisis and the increasingly negative 
social perception of non-EU immigrants. On the one hand, Euro-
scpeticism is a rather recent phenomenon in Holland (mid-1990s), and 
on the other, the memory of the murders of Pim Fortuyn (2002) and Van 
Gogh (2008) influenced the rise of the extremists, the PVV of Geert 
Wilders. This party has successfully capitalised on fears of globalisa-
tion, enlargement of the EU to the east, immigration and Turkey’s 
candidacy. Moreover, the PVV criticises the negative effects of the Euro 
and the cost for Holland – in paying its share of community solidarity, it 
is a net contributor. This party demands a sizeable reduction in the 
existing responsibilities of the EU and their return to national states, 
although paradoxically in the fight against illegal immigration it favours 
the increase in inter-governmental community cooperation. In sum, the 
hostility shown to the EU and the xenophobia were the two factors that 
contributed to the rise of the radical Dutch right. The populist 
denunciation of community “interference” and the lack of transparency 
of European institutions, along with anti-Islamic prejudice (Wilders 
warned about an alleged “tsunami of Muslims” if Turkey joined the 
EU), plus the rejection of the traditional national “political class”, were 
skilfully exploited by the PVV90. 
Hungary: the weakness of the socialist/liberal government and the 
adoption of harsh, unpopular economic and social measures provoked 
strong political tensions in the country. This explains the overwhelming 
victory of the center-right FIDESZ and the strong rise of the extreme 
JMM. On the one hand, the European elections in Hungary reflected the 
disappointment and general indifference towards the EU, and on the 
other, the campaign was totally dominated by internal political affairs. 
Since 2006 the JMM has become increasingly visible. It is an 
authoritarian and xenophobic party – neofascist by nature – and has 
accumulated frustrations. This party, which has recovered symbols of 
interwar Hungarian fascism, has today synchronised with – for example 
– the Magyar Guard, a neo-Nazi group that advocates expelling 
Hungarian Jews, gypsies, homosexuals and foreigners. In addition, the 
JMM message has gained acceptance: the economic crisis has worsened 
because the EU used the CEECs as internal colonies. However, it is still 
somewhat contradictory the Euroscepticism both in this party and also 
what is becoming widespread in Hungary. In 2001 only 13% of 
Hungarians were against their country’s entry into the EU – with the 
subsequent rapid disenchantment after 2004, by 2008 only 31% 
considered it positive (22% of Hungarians have a frankly negative 
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image of the EU). Although the central slogan of JMM (“Hungary for 
Hungarians”) is very popular, 69% of voters in this party are against 
their country leaving the EU, reflecting a sort of resigned acceptance 
that there is no possible alternative to the current status quo91. 
Italy: European elections in this country coincided with local 
elections (“administrative elections” in the Italian political lexicon) 
which involved municipalities and provinces. Consequently, once again 
the elections were strictly internal, an evaluation of Berlusconi, so the 
campaign revolved almost exclusively around this controversial leader 
entangled as usual in various scandals and court cases, conspicuously 
ignoring matters strictly European. What was noteworthy in these 
elections was the increase in abstention, the new triumph of right wing 
(PdL and LN) and the disappearance of the radical left, with less 
consensus than ever (the PRC and the Comunisti Italiani attained only 
3.4%, down from 4% needed to obtain representation). In contrast, the 
LN obtained an excellent result (it doubled from 2004) and capitalised 
on the protest vote (being in government, this is not without its 
significance). The LN is increasingly critical of the EU, but does not 
advocate Italy’s exit from the same and during the campaign stressed the 
centrality of national sovereignty of States against Brussels, barely 
mentioning Europe in its campaign, focusing almost exclusively on 
internal affairs92. 
Portugal: the entire campaign focused on an intense debate on the 
severe internal economic crisis and the results meant a net loss of 
socialists in government and a clear triumph for the right wing. The 
radical left did achieve significant progress and in the struggle between 
the two, on this occasion the BE (which doubled its results compared 
with 2004) marginally advanced the CDU-PCP. Both parties harshly 
criticised the EU and manifested opposition to the Lisbon Treaty. Both 
aimed to defend the rights of workers and demand stronger government 
regulation of the economy93. 
UK: Since 2005 British politics have experienced leadership changes 
in the major parties. In the conservative party, Howard was replaced by 
Cameron in 2005, in the Liberal Democrat Kennedy was succeeded by 
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Campbell who, in turn, would be replaced by Clegg in 2007 and the 
Labour Party Blair passed the baton to Brown in 2009. On this occasion, 
the European elections coincided with local elections, two particular 
events that usually do not mobilise the electorate in this country. The 
economic and financial crisis and tensions in the Brown government 
made the whole campaign revolve around these issues, with Europe 
completely out of the debate. As a consequence, the elections were an 
evaluation of the Brown government and in this sense, the result was 
disastrous for Labour since they were relegated to third place, behind the 
europhobic UKIP (in votes not in seats, as they tied in this case). This 
party was one of the big winners of the elections and their excellent 
results confirmed the solidity of Euroscepticism in the UK. The UKIP is 
a monothematic party whose objective is almost exclusively to get the 
UK out of the EU because, in its opinion, the EU imposes “illogical, 
bizarre and wasteful” policies on the British people, ignoring public 
opinion and without allowing citizens to pas judgement on the same. For 
the UKIP, the EU is ruinous for the UK and exacerbates corruption in 
public life. Although its rhetoric contains some xenophobic overtones, 
the UKIP has sought to expand its electoral influence through arguments 
that emphasise national sovereignty against Brussels. 69% of the voters 
of this party express their refusal to continue maintaining current British 
links with the EU and 82% strongly support the exit of the UK from the 
community. This thesis matches the classic far right stance of the BNP, 
that, for the first time, obtained no less than two MEPs94. 
In the case of Northern Ireland, this has its own political dynamic 
with a different party system and the significant novelty here was 
represented by the historical fact that the primary political force in the 
territory was the SF. All things considered, affairs of a strictly European 
nature played a very minor role in the campaign95. 
Romania: the country has a magmatic and personalist party system 
with habitual political defections – this time, with the change of the 
electoral formula (proportional with the possibility of personal selection 
of candidates), the results benefitted the PRM. Indeed, this party – that 
had lost representation in the national parliament in 2008 – would 
maintain this in the European elections of 2009 and this despite having 
to compete for space with the clearly neofascist radical right Noua 
Dreaptă party. Despite the strong ultranationalism of the PRM, it is in 
                                                          
94  Coosemans, 2009a, p. 44-45; Clementi, 2009, p. 210-211; Hanley, 2009, p. 671, 677-
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favour of Romania’s membership of the EU and, in fact, European 
affairs had little impact during the election campaign. The PRM 
reiterated its nationalist ideology, emphasised the Christian character of 
Romania and populistically championed a strict policy against 
generalised corruption96. 
Sweden: European issues are important in Sweden and are very 
divisive politically. In the parties critical of the EU there were populist 
parties that stood out (the Pirate Party) and although the radical left 
retained its European representation, it experienced a significant decline 
(more than seven percentage points), reflecting the electorate’s shift to 
the right with respect to this. The VP is very critical of the EU and 
doctrinally defends Sweden’s exit from the community, although in its 
practical policy it accepts the reality of membership97. 
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CHAPTER III 
Election Manifestos and Programmes 
In both ideological groups of parties the same items are analysed in 
their election manifestos, but for both the order of items varies in their 
presentation, depending on the quantitative relevance offered in the 
texts. With three dimensions (national sovereignty/democracy deficit/ 
neoliberalism) the placing of the second never changes, but the first and 
third do: for the radical right the presentation order is national 
sovereignty/democracy deficit/neoliberalism, while for the radical left it 
is neoliberalism/democratic deficit/national sovereignty. Indeed, 
national sovereignty is a core issue of the radical right and its study 
focuses on two areas: the general rejection of the supranational EU 
policy and the migration issue (with the additional question of Turkey) 
as these form part of the “hard core” essentialist discourse of the radical 
right in relation to the bulk of its criticism of the EU. This does not 
detract from the fact that it also severely judges democratic shortcomings 
in the community and even its neoliberal policies for being prejudicial 
precisely for the national interest. In contrast, criticisms from the radical 
left focus on the direct denouncement of the EU’s current social and 
economic policies and their excessively discriminatory consequences for 
citizens. The democratic deficit of the EU is the main reason for 
considering the principle of national sovereignty actual and defensible 
which needs to be linked to popular interests. 
One must bear in mind that the electoral manifestos of the 
22 selected parties are very different both for their quantitative extension 
(although, in general, they are rather brief) and in their qualitative scope 
given to some or other items. In addition, the letter fonts and spaces 
vary, as well as the fact of having graphic illustrations or not, hence the 
indicator of their reach should be observed with some caution. In 
general, it is evident that the manifestos of the radical right are shorter, 
while the radical left tend to be longer and more extensive. 
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Table 1 
Radical right (number of pages from lowest to highest): 
PVV: 1 
VB (b): 1 * 
FPÖ: 2 
UKIP: 2 
LN: 3 ** 





LAOS (a): 24 ****  
JMM: 56 
VB(a): 145 ***** 
 
Real Total: 117 pages. 
* Programme for the European Elections 2009 
** Programme for the local and European elections 2009 
(The text has 63 pages of which three are on the EU) 
*** Foreign Policy Programme 
**** European Elections Programme 2009 
***** Flemish Programme for the 2009 Election 
(includes 3 pages of scattered European references) 
 
Table 2 
Radical left (number of pages from lowest to highest): 
KSČM: 2  
AKEL: 5 
FG: 5  
SYRIZA: 9  
VP: 9  
CDU-PCP: 12  
SF: 15 * 
BE: 16  
KKE: 21  
DL: 24  
IU: 52 
 
Real total: 170 pages. 
* The English version occupies 15 pages and Gaelic and the other 15. 
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The Radical Right 
1. National sovereignty 
1.1. The rejection of political federalism 
• The PVV is completely opposed to a possible European super-state 
as “nobody wants a supranational state. [It would mean] even more 
bureaucrats, more regulations, more taxes”, hence it only supports 
economic cooperation, strictly delineated through specific, independent 
treaties. 
• For the UKIP the EU is a unbearable corset for the UK and so 
defends its proposal for the UK’s exit from the same since “leaving the 
EU will allow us to regain control and put British interests in front of 
European interests”. Its economistic criteria is unmistakable: “We want 
a friendly relationship and free trade with all our neighbours, but NOT 
[sic] a political union”. Consequently, the “UKIP believes that the UK 
should leave the EU and our current membership should be replaced by 
a genuine free trade agreement similar to that enjoyed by other non-
member nations of the EU such as Switzerland, Norway and Mexico”. 
• The VB criticises the Lisbon Treaty because with it “the evolution 
towards a federal Europe has been strengthened” and that “we are 
against the European super-state which intervenes in all competences of 
member-states: the Nation States must remain the cornerstones of any 
future European collaboration” (VB b). For the VB the key is “the 
protection of Flemish interests, national sovereignty, the right of self-
determination” which could fit into “a confederal Europe, in which the 
states retain their sovereignty” (VB a). 
• The opposition of the JMM to the EU is very articulate, as is its 
alternative proposal, and both premises are based on the radical defence 
of the ever prioritised national interest. The JMM explicitly aligns with 
the forces “called Eurosceptic” that want to counter the dominant EU 
line favouring maximum supranationality: [the EU] “is already posi-
tioned over the states” and is heading towards the European super-state, 
making national independence impossible, a scenario that “must be 
rejected”. Indeed, for the JMM, “the central power of Brussels and the 
political elite that is linked to it (…) is planning to open the way for the 
United States of Europe, which will finally eradicate national states”. 
According to this political group, the pro-EU Hungarian parties have 
hidden the fact that integration would mean “giving up a large part of 
national independence”. After regaining freedom with the disappearance 
of the Soviet empire, now Hungary is being required to voluntarily give 
up its independence. Consequently, “a solid federal system of 
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bureaucrats, like a new breed”, has been created – strengthened by “the 
Treaty of Lisbon (…) [that] could be described as an important stage in 
the process of European empire building”. 
From this diagnosis, the JMM believes that there is an alternative to 
the current EU: the “Europe of Nations” in counterpoint to the project of 
political union. This party supports “flexible forms of economic 
cooperation” meanwhile the right to self-determination and national 
sovereignty is respected. In its view, “Euroscepticism” is in reality 
“Eurorrealism” because “the peoples of Europe do not want to be part of 
an empire”. In short, the JMM argues that Hungary’s national interests 
could be better defended with its proposal, in line with its nationalist 
ideology, offered in the benefit not only of all citizens of the Republic of 
Hungary, but also for “all Hungarians living in national regions that 
have been separated from the country”. This is what leads it to demand a 
closer cooperation between the CEECs because objectively they have 
common interests to defend against the current EU. 
• According to the LN, the EU unceasingly increases the centralisa-
tion of power in Brussels, with its “top down” decision making process 
without the consent of the people. The European integration process “is 
leading to a real and strictly continental super-state, whose democratic 
level, in fact, is nonexistent”. The LN opposes this “intrusive” EU and 
warns “of the danger to European peoples due to the imposed homo-
genisation by the Community institutions”. In this sense, this group 
states with determination that they “absolutely do not want to make the 
EU states “disappear” in the name of a supranational principle”. The LN 
is now habitually classified as a “eurosceptical” group, something that it 
no longer rejects, “perhaps because of these ‘eurosceptical’ positions, 
Europe is starting to discuss the revision of itself”. 
In any case, the LN stated that “it is not against Europe in itself” and 
admits that there are common elements of identity, but this cannot lead 
to uniformity. On the one hand, the LN advocates the necessary 
formalisation of the “Christian roots” in European treaties, and accepts 
the strictly confederal institutional embodiment of the same. In effect, 
the LN confirms adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and 
solidarity traditionally wielded by the Catholic Church’s social doctrine 
and therefore states that “the Christian roots of our continent are the real 
glue that holds European peoples with diverse languages and traditions 
together”. With this, the LN requires the protection of the traditional 
family and roundly rejects any supranational provisions recognising 
unions of people of the same sex. Finally, the LN may accept an EU of 
strictly inter-governmental cooperation: “We want an EU based on a 
confederal model in which the member States maintain their own 
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sovereignty unchanged and where the particular Regional and territorial 
specificities and differences are recognised”. 
• For the DF it is impossible and absurd to try to unite the EU with 
one policy given its substantial internal differences, “the DF is opposed 
to treating all people equally and against destroying the cultural and 
religious bases or creating a new European people. It may sound 
tempting, but it is not the way and can not be forced”. This party is 
against the regulatory expansion of the EU and opposes the possibility 
that this would in itself entitle the imposition of taxes on citizens of its 
various countries. So, “any attempt to create a European Constitution 
should be rejected” because that would mean that “a federal State would 
remove power from European peoples and create a small, only formally 
democratic elite, utterly remote from citizens”. 
The DF, however, could accept intergovernmental economic 
cooperation with full respect for the sovereignty of States. In addition, in 
security matters, it would even be convenient to strengthen this 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, but 
without leading to the creation of a European police force that the DF 
rejects. Apart from that, according to this party “military security in 
Europe can only be preserved through cooperation in NATO”. In 
summary, for the DF the Danish Constitution must be above the 
regulation of the EU and Denmark has to preserve its right of veto and 
its capacity to decide essential issues for itself. The functions of the EU 
should be limited only to those issues in which the majority of the 
population of the member countries agree to delegate, for those tasks of 
a cross-border nature which may require common solutions and for 
mutually beneficial areas. 
• The FPÖ argues that Austrian parties of the establishment “want 
the transformation of the EU into a centralised state (…) with Austria 
losing its freedom and neutrality”. The party defends the need to call 
binding referendums for any amendment of the Treaties, guarantee the 
maintenance of Austrian neutrality, keep Austria’s veto in community 
affairs and, of course, calls for a “Europe of nations” versus a “federal 
State designed by Brussels”. Also, as nationalist party, it is concerned 
about the fact that the German language is receding in EU institutions in 
favour of English and even French. For the FPÖ German should be 
preferred working language in the EU along with the other two 
mentioned. 
• The NSA defines itself as a Bulgarian nationalist party whose pur-
pose is to unite all ethnic Bulgarians and those of Bulgarian conscience 
[sic] – its main demand being to ensure national independence (its 
central slogan is “Give back Bulgaria the Bulgarians!”). The NSA is 
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against all international and supranational organisations that limit the 
sovereignty of the Bulgarian state and threaten whole sectors of economy 
with ruin. National reconstruction has to reinforce the character of 
Bulgarian as an official language in the country and the fundamentally 
central role of the Orthodox church has to be recognised. 
• LAOS feels fully identified with the “eurosceptical” group in which 
it is integrated in the EP (this is the party that does not have the slightest 
inconvenience in being characterised as such). From their point of view, 
“Greece must preserve the right of veto on issues of vital national 
importance” (LAOS b). In any case, this party does not advocate a 
disengagement from the EU, given certain conditions:  
We believe the future of our country is significantly associated with the EU 
and we support the integration of all European countries into a viable Union, 
something only possible If this is established as a confederation where 
historical, cultural and national roots and in particular the specific national 
characteristics of the peoples of Europe are protected. We believe in a 
Europe of nations. (LAOS b) 
Finally, the particular nationalist obsession of LAOS is its radical 
opposition to the possible entry of Macedonia (the former Yugoslav 
Republic this party always calls Skopje, the name of the capital): 
“Macedonia” would be a “denomination of origin” whose ownership 
corresponds exclusively to Greece. Furthermore, according to LAOS, 
“Skopje” would not adequately protect the rights of its ethnic minorities 
and while the denomination of Macedonia is not removed (not even 
FYROM is accepted by this party) nothing can begin to be negotiated 
(LAOS a). 
• The PRM is limited in its brief manifesto to asserting a defence of 
national sovereignty: on the one hand, this party commits itself to “be 
firm in negotiations with the EU to obtain equal opportunities for 
Romania compared to other Member States” and on the other, to 
“maintain and promote Romanian identity, traditions and customs.” 
• For the FN the EU represents a mortal threat to the peoples of 
Europe, “the Europe of Brussels has not been an effective (defensive) 
barrier for our nation and its citizens, on the contrary, it has been the 
cause and factor of aggravation”. The FN “says the way forward is not 
that of Euroglobalism in the hands of a small group that is recruited by 
co-optation: “Eurocracy”; this is not the way of the “European Soviet 
Union” (emphasis on the original). So, the FN is radically against a 
European superstate since this would destroy identities, sovereignty and 
freedoms of the people:  
National entities resolutely combat criminal EU developments. This 
rejection of a Euroglobalist Super-State is in accordance with the true 
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European tradition since Europe (…) has invented the freedom and equality 
of nations (emphasis on the original) (…) Yes, Europe and the world still 
needs France!  
As a logical corollary of this ultranationalist thesis the FN rejects 
both “European citizenship”, much like the CFSP/ESDP: first, national 
citizenship should be preserved at all costs against the risk of a possible 
“absorption” into a “European citizenship”, embodying the submission 
of nations and secondly, the current foreign and defence policy of the 
EU leads its members to participate in “conflicts that are not ours, such 
as the absurd wars against Iraq and Serbia”. 
The FN claims to have “another” idea of Europe “the right direction 
excludes neither European consultation nor industrial, cultural or other 
cooperation. But it implies a radical break with the global system” 
(emphasis on the original). In this sense, this group asserts that “the 
French FN patriots (…) are not ‘against Europe’ as a geographical, 
human or cultural reality, or against any form of European cooperation” 
because they acknowledge that, despite its profound diversity, there is 
“a certain common cultural heritage of the peoples of Europe”. Its 
proposal is that of a “Europe of nations” giving full guarantees to its 
people: “Europe can not be strong if the Nations [sic] that constitute it 
are not also strong, prosperous, independent, sovereign and respected”. 
Of course, this essentialist revaluation of the national bases of the 
peoples of Europe means that the “moral and spiritual values” of 
Christian roots must be faithfully respected. 
Table 1 
  Primacy of National Soveriegnty   All 
  Christian roots     LN 
        NSA 
FN 
 
  No to a European federal state    PVV 
        VB 
        JMM  
        LN 
        DF  
        FPÖ  
        NSA  
        FN  
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  Yes to a European confederation   VB  
  of intergovernmental cooperation   JMM  
        LN  
        DF  
        LAOS  
        FN  
  Abandon the EU     UKIP 
1.2. Turkey and non-EU immigration 
• The PVV is opposed to further enlargement of the EU, “the 
European Union is too big. Enough. Each new member means more 
money for Brussels and a decrease in Holland’s power to decide. So 
there should be no further accessions to the EU. Corrupt states like 
Romania and Bulgaria have to be expelled”. In any case, the maximum 
hostility this party has is focused on Turkey: the intro title of its 
programme dedicated to its nomination is entitled “Turkey will never be 
welcome”. The PVV argues that by 2050 there will be a hundred million 
Turks and that their state, as a member of the EU, will dominate 
Brussels, supposedly a very damaging scenario for Europe and the 
Netherlands. Consequently, “as we in the PVV say: Turkey will not be 
an EU member now or in the next hundred years. Islamic culture is a 
culture diametrically opposed to ours”. For this party, It is precisely in 
this last Islamophobic consideration the central justification of its 
exclusionary criteria resides. 
The intro title of the PVV’s program dedicated to immigration is 
entitled: “Eurabia or Europe?” (Confusing, incidentally, what is Arabic 
and what is Muslim). In parallel with the routine strategy of populist 
parties of the radical right, immigration, Islamisation and insecurity are 
associated – “mass immigration and Islamisation are a disaster for 
Europe and the Netherlands. The Islamisation of Europe and the 
Netherlands has to stop. So we want to decide who to admit and who not 
to. The right to veto on immigration must be maintained. In our country, 
we decide. There is enough Islam in Holland”. 
• UKIP rejects the open-door policy with regard to the immigration, 
“the expansion of the EU encourages uncontrolled immigration (…). 
Our public services are crumbling under the pressure of more than a 
million people who have come to our country”. 
• The VB states that “Turkey is not European but Asian. Turkey is an 
Islamic country that is not part of the European tradition” so it is 
necessary to “stop the negotiations for Turkey’s accession” (VB b). This 
party uses a closed cultural argument to demand “limiting the EU to 
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nations belonging to European civilization: so, Turkey can not be a 
member of the Union” (VBa).  
Given the particularly xenophobic character of the VB (the issue of 
immigration is the most electorally profitable it has), it is not a 
coincidence that its manifesto is very detailed on this topic. For the VB: 
“the tide of illegal immigration is unstoppable and therefore we want a 
true ‘fortress Europe’ [sic] with impermeable borders”. This party 
requires that regularised immigrants be obliged to integrate by passing 
an “integration test” [sic], conditio sine qua non to obtain the right to 
permanent residence. In its view, “immigrants have to adapt to our 
culture, our norms and values, our customs and important traditional 
principles that have been developed on European soil”. In any case, the 
reception of new immigrants should be completely stopped, illegal 
immigrants repatriated, minimise family reunification and prevent 
“abuse” of asylum: 
“On European soil, only European asylum seekers will be hosted” 
(somewhat anachronistic today with the automatic recognition of 
extradition between European countries). But the religious dimension is 
the most exploited by this party, “European states should formulate a 
draconian response [sic] to Islamisation and demand that Muslims living 
in Europe accept our values and our laws”. According to this thesis, 
some Muslim practices “are not just different from ours, (…) they are 
unacceptable (…). They violate treaties on European human rights”. 
With this diagnosis, the prescriptions of the VB are extremely restrictive 
and, indeed, many of them are contrary to Community treaties: 
withdraw recognition and subsidies for Muslim centres, ban the veil in 
public facilities, reserve job vacancies in the public sector for nationals, 
limit the free movement of people, abolish dual citizenship, prevent 
foreigners from voting in municipal elections and encourage repatriation 
agreements with third countries (VB and b). 
• JMM only mentions minority issues with regard to one group 
inside the country and very relevant to Hungary: the Roma gypsies. The 
party rejects the official policies of positive discrimination for this group 
and that – in its opinion – the promotion of the Roma in education and 
employment should be done without the privileges that the current 
formula provides. 
• The LN says that Turkey has no “European features” theirs being 
far from what is common in EU States. The LN cites Giscard d’Estaing 
and Angela Merkel as authoritative sources for the rejection of Turkey’s 
candidature, adding that Turkey’s democratic standards are notoriously 
inadequate. However, the LN asserts that there are powers outside 
Europe, such as the U.S., who would be the most interested in such an 
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outcome. From this viewpoint, it would be a totally conditioned 
guarantee to expand its strategic influence in Europe and weaken it even 
further. With this in mind, the LN adds two additional issues: Christian 
roots and polls. With the first, “Turkey’s entry into Europe would also 
provoke the collapse of the very concept of a Europe based on certain 
cultural and spiritual roots. Roots, we repeat again, that are Christian 
[with a capital “C”]. With the second, all the polls confirm that the 
majority of citizens reject the accession of Turkey – as opposed to the 
“political class” – and not to satisfy their demands would be 
undemocratic. On immigration, the LN demands well regulated 
movements not only for economic factors, but also for social and 
cultural considerations with an increasing trend towards border closures. 
For the DF the constant enlargement of the EU is making the 
decision process increasingly difficult. The DF is concerned about the 
incorporation of new unstable States and, in any case, is opposed to 
integrating countries alien to “Western culture.” The DF believes that 
the strategy of enlargements is an attempt to create a European federal 
state, even though – in practice – this increasingly complicates the 
deepening of integration. This party argues that Turkey “is not a 
European country and [its] culture is incompatible with Europe”. 
Randomly combining geographical, cultural and social arguments, it 
states: “Turkey belongs to the Middle East and its citizens are not 
European. Turkey is influenced by culture and social norms that are far 
from Europe and this is reason enough to refuse it membership of the 
EU”. To more fully justify its rejection, the DF mentions the situation of 
women, occupation of northern Cyprus, high corruption, weak judicial 
independence, torture and denial of rights to ethnic minorities. 
Moreover, given its high population growth, in 2020 Turkey would be 
the most populous state in the EU and this would have an unbearable 
economic cost given its enormously underdeveloped agriculture. In 
conclusion, the DF agrees to increase cooperation with Turkey, but not 
incorporating it as a community partner. 
According to this party, the EU immigration policy is totally 
misconceived because you can not open doors to people foreign to 
Western culture without their at least acquiring a minimum knowledge 
of it. Because of this, the EU policies of always attracting new waves of 
immigrants will cause “an unprecedented chaos” and also “attract less 
qualified people”. Again the usual Islamophobia blooms in this party 
when it asserts that “increased immigration into the EU will lead to a 
devastating Islamisation of Europe”. To sum up, “the DF believes that 
Denmark should maintain its right to ensure its own independent 
immigration policy” and, beyond this, that it must be the whole EU that 
stops the new influxes. 
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• The FPÖ argues that “Europe must end at its geographical 
borders”, an entirely arbitrary and useless conventional criteria because 
of its impossible objective determination. Its position is to immediately 
stop negotiations for Turkey’s accession to the EU. Its main critical 
arguments are concerned with certain international guarantees of Turkey 
with regard to the alleged dangers of Islam. In the first case, defending 
Turkey’s candidacy would be to convert oneself into a “henchmen of 
U.S. interests”. In the second, radical Islam and illegal immigration are 
associated with Turkey in a biased and unprovable way – for the FPÖ 
those who defend its candidacy provoke a return of radical Islam in 
Europe and mass emigration of Turks into Austria, with negative 
consequences for the people” and even for all the “Christian West”. 
Therefore, the sequence for the FPÖ is clear: Turkey’s accession would 
be a boon for radical Islamism and uncontrolled immigration. 
Consequently, the FPÖ demands the holding of a referendum in Austria 
on the possible incorporation of Turkey into the EU for the people to 
decide and that, from their perspective, you can not keep taking 
decisions of this calibre from behind citizens’ backs. In any case, you 
could offer Turkey a partnership agreement, but never integration. 
For the FPÖ, on one hand, costly social benefits for those from 
outside the EU should be cut and on the other, the open door policy that 
has caused the increase in crime in Austria needs to be stopped: “Spain 
legalised thousands of illegal immigrants overnight who now can move 
freely throughout the EU. Since then, East European gangsters and 
bogus asylum seekers, who are actually criminals, bring muggings, 
robberies, the drug and human trade to Austria”. The FPÖ demands the 
reintroduction of border controls in the east, the expulsion of all non-
native criminals and facilitating the acquisition of weapons for Austrian 
citizens, this last being a disturbing demand that favours private self 
defence over public safety. 
• The NSA does not mention Turkey explicitly in its manifesto, but 
does include a mention of an internal regulation affecting the ethnic 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria, “Ataka proposes as its main purpose the 
suspension of the Islamisation of Bulgaria” and adds that building 
strictly non-Christian religious temples must be regulated. 
• The LAOS is against Turkey joining the EU because it invaded 
northern Cyprus and that it continues to deny the Armenian genocide. 
From these premises, this party feels that negotiations with this country 
can not even be started. On other issues, the LAOS added that Turkey 
does not meet the minimum economic conditions for their integration in 
the EU, even with long transition periods (LAOS a). 
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• For the FN,  
the Europe of Brussels (…) is the Europe governed by technocrats remote 
from reality (…). It is also the Europe colonised by immigration of African 
or Asian origin (…), the Europe in the process of Islamisation that plans to 
make Turkey one of its members. These are the results of the betrayal of the 
political classes and financial leaders and of their commitment to unbridled 
free trade and globalism. 
Therefore, the FN rejects the candidacy of Turkey or any other “non-
European” country intending to join the EU. Instead, we should enhance 
cooperation with European nations that are not in the EU (Serbia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia). 
On the issue of migration, the FN advocates a restoration of internal 
border controls and rejects the European Pact on immigration for being 
“permissive” (despite its harshly restrictive “Return Directive”) and for 
giving the Commission “excessive” power. According to this party, 
migration should be strictly restricted and must be exclusively a matter 
of national responsibility. With regard to other issues, the FN reaffirms 
its thesis of “national preference” in employment and, in all cases, 
prefers Community workers over foreigners.  
Table 2 
  No to Turkey in the EU    PVV  
        VB 
        LN  
        DF 
        FPÖ  
        LAOS  
        FN 
 
  No to immigration from outside the EU   PVV 
        UKIP 
        VB 
        LN 
        DF 
        FPÖ 
        FN  
2. Democratic deficit and neoliberalism 
• For the PVV, “Holland’s interests must always prevail”, so this 
country should have the power of veto and to block EU decisions as 
well as a clear objective of “recovery of powers in all areas”. With 
regards the present, this party demands that the Lisbon Treaty (which it 
rejects) be subject to popular referendum. After this political criticism, 
the PVV expresses its protest about economic issues: “The Netherlands 
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is the largest net contributor to the EU. We want our money back. We 
want to allocate billions of Euros back to Holland and not to Brussels”. 
In accordance with closed ultranationalist criteria, the PVV rejects the 
idea that Dutch money can serve “to train farmers in Poland and France” 
or to build roads in Bulgaria or Portugal. 
• The UKIP indicates that the EU is not only economically negative 
for the UK, but also in political terms as it has an unacceptable 
democratic cost. With this in mind, it states in its manifesto that in the 
last twelve months about 2,500 rules have come into effect in the 
country (75% of all laws that came into force in the UK in this period), 
something to be rejected because – in the opinion of the UKIP – these 
were “impositions” of “unelected bureaucrats in Brussels”. For this 
party, the British people have been denied a say via referendum on the 
Treaty of Lisbon, which is nothing more than a “camouflage” of the 
Constitutional Treaty rejected by the French and Dutch. The UKIP 
wants a UK “governed not by anonymous bureaucrats in Brussels, but 
by our own people through our elected parliament in Westminster” and 
that “the only people who should decide who can come, work and live 
in Britain are the British people”. In sum, the UKIP creates great alarm 
about the supposed loss of British control of agricultural and fisheries 
policies, which would be ruinous to the national interest. According to 
this diagnosis, the UK would lose jobs and substantial funds (“the EU 
costs us £ 40 million each and every day”), so “we believe that British 
taxes should be used in Britain”. 
• The VB demands that key decisions such as the accession of 
Turkey or further transfers of sovereignty to the EU must always be 
subject to popular binding referendum (VB a and b). In economic 
affairs, the VB argues that Flanders should be one of the primary 
regions of the EU – this being blocked by some of its policies. On one 
hand, the VB requests the application of reduced VAT in some areas, 
and on the other, not to reduce the community measures for agricultural 
support in the face of international competition, to maintain subsidies to 
fishermen and to make the PPC more flexible (VB a). 
• For the JMM, the EU works undemocratically, is bureaucratic, 
corrupt, anti-national and neoliberal: the Lisbon Treaty basically 
amputated national sovereignty, reduced democracy and erased the 
content from the European social model. According to this party, the EU 
is not democratic and is not governed by the classical theory of the 
division of powers, it is hyperbureaucratic, given the overreaching 
power of unelected decision makers in Brussels, it is unable to eradicate 
corruption (citing the case of the Santer Commission, despite being 
exonerated by the report of the “committee of wise men”), agrees to 
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accept States into the union that recognise same-sex marriage that 
undermines the traditional family model, admits no criticism of its 
policy on immigration, automatically disqualifying this as xenophobic 
and considering racist those who reject positive discrimination for the 
Roma (the case of the JMM). On one hand, the JMM criticises the 
Hungarian establishment that has submitted itself to the ordinances of 
Brussels and has disengaged itself from people’s problems and is 
disappointed with the EU after entry and on the other asserts that it is 
unacceptable that EU law directly meddles in the internal legal order, 
assuming a position superior even to the national Constitution. The 
JMM opposes the neoliberal policies of the EU, a model that favours 
market concentration in a few large corporations. Such guidelines are 
designed by technocrats serving multinational companies whose 
deregulatory, liberalising and privatising policies have mined social and 
economic sovereignty. For the JMM, the EU falsifies the market and 
serves US centralised globalised finance – increasingly resembling a 
multinational neoliberal empire. This party asserts that the majority of 
Hungarian society feels cheated and deceived after the country’s entry 
into the EU because the “political class” of the establishment drew an 
idyllic picture that has not been fulfilled at all, silencing opponents at 
the same time. Subsequent developments have confirmed that the 
promises of welfare and progress were a crude manipulation. Therefore, 
all Hungarian governments are responsible for accepting unfavourable 
terms of accession that have sacrificed national interests. In this general 
criticism, the JMM includes not only liberal forces and the post-
communist left, but also the parliamentary right, which has been co-
responsible for a capitulation of such a manner that all political groups 
function as a “single pro-EU party”. According to the JMM the condi-
tions of accession of Hungary should be thoroughly reviewed as the 
current situation is very negative for national competitiveness, the 
“SMEs”, workers and internal production in general being increasingly 
marginalised and defenceless against the a flood of Western 
multinationals. In summary, the EU does not promote truly equal 
competition, suffocates the system with bureaucratic regulations and 
does not act democratically. The JMM claims that Hungary has lost 
national territory (26% now foreign owned), does not protect farmers 
from a CAP that only favours large agroindustrial entities, has not been 
able to open the labour market in Germany or Austria to Hungarian 
workers and has placed the country at the service of multinationals. The 
EU has not even been able to secure the rights of Hungarian minorities 
in neighbouring states. In conclusion, Hungary as a country has lost out 
in joining the EU and has been colonised in the same way as all the 
countries in the CEE area. 
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• For the NL, the 2008 Irish referendum was to be yet again a 
reiteration that the distance between the people and the EU had been 
confirmed, “the EU today is structurally based on a real and strict 
democratic deficit” (underlined in the original). In its view, “the 
progressive transfer upwards of sovereignty and powers is contributing 
to the removal of the voice of the people of Europe”. The remedy the 
LN proposes is the absolute respect for the principle of subsidiarity: “no 
European regulation should be adopted when this same regulation may 
be decided by the States (or regions with legislative powers)”. In 
economic affairs, the LN is against “bureaucratic regulations” and unfair 
competition, while defending the revaluation of traditional local 
products. 
• The DF argues that various referendums have shown the growing 
separation between Brussels and citizens – something due to the 
inability to democratically control EU decision makers given the lack of 
real supervisory mechanisms. According to this party, Denmark can not 
accept intervention in its internal affairs from the outside, nor the waste 
of public money due to the irresponsible management, corruption and 
despotism of the EU. The elites have hijacked decision making against 
society’s interests, national democracy is in danger because of this 
process and citizens have not the slightest chance of influencing this. 
Consequently, the DF always demands referendums for any further 
transfer of powers to the EU, whose powers should be limited and, in 
part, renationalised. Although the DF recognises that the EP has 
increased its powers of control, the party is against its growing 
legislative function. On the one hand, “the DF does not see the European 
Parliament as being representative of citizens even when imposing its 
own rules” and on the other, “does not want it (…) to have legislative 
functions”. The party indicates that the PE favours greater integration, 
far beyond what people want, its “legislative interference” is inadmis-
sible and that it violates free cooperation between sovereign states. In 
summary, the DF proposes cutting the powers of the Commission – 
which should be reduced to mere administrative body – and increase the 
Council of Ministers which oversees national interests. 
For the DF it is inadmissible to share a common currency between 
countries that have carried out economic reforms and others who have 
not done so, since this harms the former, like Denmark (though not in the 
Euro). In any case, the DF advocates a drastic cut in community budgets. 
• The FPÖ demands ongoing binding referendums on EU treaties and 
advocates radically dismantling Brussels bureaucracy. At the same time 
it rejects the neoliberal policies that only serve to benefit the interests of 
big business. In its view, the bank is responsible for the current crisis 
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and “the EU means globalisation at any price”. More particularly, the 
crisis has been caused “by profit seeking, pure and simple, the 
withdrawal of security measures, an irresponsible extension eastwards 
including doubtful trading and an almost servile alliance with the U.S.”. 
Consequently, the EU has not protected their countries from the 
catastrophic consequences of the economic crisis” and therefore 
“Brussels is the cause of mass unemployment and bankruptcy”. With 
this grim diagnosis, the FPÖ states that “the change in the EU should 
not be determined by corporations, but with the effort of social 
security”. For this, the transitional periods for the Austrian labour 
market should be broadened, tax havens frozen, the unconditional 
alliance with the U.S. ended, Austrian banking secrecy maintained, the 
national contribution to the EU cut and the country’s best assets not sold 
off. The FPÖ’s prescriptions seek to protect the domestic market and the 
interests of Austrian workers, reducing the net contribution of Austria to 
the EU by half, since the current level is notoriously unfair to the 
country – being also uncontrollable (in its view, many funds are 
squandered in corrupt Eastern european countries) – and to radically cut 
covert immigration, repatriating the foreign unemployed. 
• For the NSA Bulgaria is at the bottom of income ratings for the EU 
because of the unrestricted application of a ruinous economic model 
imposed by the same, “the time has come to declare the end of 
neoliberal speculation”. The party supports “a state policy of recovery of 
lost markets for Bulgaria outside the EU” and requests the creation of a 
special agency to manage non-governmental EU funds transparently. 
Finally, “Ataka considers the revision of all agricultural production 
quotas with the EU necessary because they do not correspond to the real 
possibilities of production in Bulgaria and are damaging our country”. 
• The PRM defends the promotion of Romanian products inside and 
outside the country and the prevention of domestic prices rising above 
the EU average. It also demands the receipt of “urgent and warranted” 
new community funding and specifies that this has to be three times 
what Romania gives to the EU. Also, the PRM seeks more EU grants for 
Romanian agriculture and demands that transitional periods that impose 
restrictions on Romanian labour within the EU are withdrawn as soon as 
possible. 
• The FN demands that any new EU treaty or any new accession 
must necessarily be subject to a binding national referendum. In any 
case, it stands against the Lisbon Treaty that has betrayed the popular 
mandate of the majority of the French, Dutch and Irish. For the FN 
national law must always prevail over that of the community and States 
must be able to veto regulations set in Brussels. In the economic sphere, 
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the FN proposes the establishment of limiting import quotas in areas of 
special interest to France, advocating the reintroduction of the Franc and 
leaving the Euro as merely a virtual common unit, rejecting any transfer 
of financial authority to Brussels, as well as creating a European tax, 
declaring itself against the Community directives on hunting and fishing 
and condemning the “stupid” [sic] Stability Pact. 
Table 3 
The EU Treaties must always be subjected to a popular binding referendum PVV 
          UKIP 
          VB  
          DF 
          FPÖ 
          FN 
 
The EU institutions are not democratic     JMM 
          LN  
          DF  
 
Community law can not be superior to national law    UKIP 
          JMM 
          DF 
          FN  
 
Neoliberal policies are ruinous for national interests   PVV 
          UKIP 
          JMM 
FPÖ 
          NSA 
          PRM  
3. The balance of radical right parties 
The large amount of text dedicated to the myth of national 
sovereignty in the programmes of this ideological group stands out: not 
only does this dimension occupy about half of all the manifestos, but it 
is ideologically their raison d’être. In some cases, the emphasis on 
nation – usually with strong ethnic connotations – is reinforced with 
ideological reference to “Christian roots”, a clearly controversial 
element in counterpoint to the Muslim world and immigrants of this 
religious denomination. It is a kind of instrumental “neoconfesionalism’ 
that pays electoral dividends for these parties in some countries. 
This group resoundingly, massively and directly rejects a suprana-
tional European political union as they attribute every possible vice to 
this eventual European “super-state”: political centralism, administrative 
bureaucracy, undemocratic technocratic elitism, globalised economic 
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intrusion and cultural homogenisation. Instead, most are willing to 
accept the maintenance of mutually beneficial economic ties, but always 
from an intergovernmental perspective respectful of national sovereign-
ty. Moreover, several parties even explicitly pronounce in favour of a 
loose confederation of independent states which could embody a true 
“Europe of Nations”. Only the UKIP maintains an eccentric position 
given its strategic option of leaving the EU as soon as possible. 
The majority are very hostile and aggressive with the rejection of any 
eventual Turkish accession to the EU, a possibility that is filled with 
shades of the apocalypse: it is a country that would benefit from a 
representation in EU institutions given its huge population, it would 
claim almost all the structural and cohesion funds due to its serious 
economic backwardness, “it would flood” Europe with hundreds of 
thousands of immigrants and, especially, encourage the expansion of 
Islamic radicalism. Turkey and non-EU immigration are precisely two 
sides of the same propaganda strategy of these parties: they are stoking 
fears and resentments with a populist and xenophobic tone that in 
themselves provide electoral dividends. It is usual in this media to link 
immigration, crime and even terrorism for such reasons. Some of these 
parties are notoriously demagogical on illegal immigration and its 
allegedly “unbearable” cost to the public purse and public safety. 
Naturally these obsessions are characteristic of radical right parties in 
developed Western Europe – it is not the same with parties of this 
ideology in the CEE where the phenomenon of receiving immigrants 
from outside is virtually unknown given the under-development of these 
countries. 
In keeping with the traditional distrust of the radical right parties in 
representative institutions, it is no coincidence that several of them 
demand the use of direct democracy for any reform of the Treaties 
and/or accession of new members. From their point of view, European 
leaders reiteratedly contravene the desire of various sectors of their 
populations who have had occasion to speak out negatively about 
certain community projects. The fact that the “political class” of the 
establishment always looks for ways to circumvent and even infringe 
some referendum results is an irrefutable testament to the undemocratic 
and anti-popular parties that encourage them. From these premises, the 
Community institutions are severely judged, denouncing them for bring 
grossly undemocratic, opaque and elitist. There are several parties of 
this ideological group that claim such institutions are unrecoverable and 
advocate a maximum strengthening of national control mechanisms to 
prevent anonymous and irresponsible “Brussels bureaucrats” taking 
decisions over national interests. 
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Finally, it is of great interest to analyse the economic criticism of the 
mostly neoliberal policies promoted by the current EU as this partly 
refutes certain topical viewpoints about such parties. Indeed, radical 
right-wing parties are traditionally attributed with a clear preference for 
free-market economic policies, perhaps coloured by conceptions of 
protectionist domestic production and commercial sectors. However, in 
the manifestos of 2009 there are repeated criticisms of financial 
globalisation and neoliberal economic policies that are deemed very 
harmful to national interests and are criticised for only benefitting 
multinational corporations and harming the great majority of people. 
Not surprisingly, critics of neoliberalism are particularly harsh with 
parties in the CEEC – socially very affected by them –, but the novelty 
is that many parties of this Western European ideological group reject 
the economic model that the current EU has imposed. 
The Radical Left 
1. The rejection of neoliberal Europe 
• The SF says generally that the current economic policy of the EU 
increases poverty and inequality and in particular criticises EU compete-
tion regulations for inflexibly limiting regional and local State invest-
ments. Following this reasoning, the economic agenda of the EU only 
benefits large multinational corporations and harms the “SMEs” and the 
rights of domestic workers. The SF opposes the supremacy of the 
market, deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation of essential public 
services that should strictly be the States’ responsibility. With this, the 
party says that education, health, transport, communications, housing, 
water and energy are sectors that should not come under the auspices of 
the community. On one hand, the SF is against company relocations, 
and on the other, demands that European companies working outside the 
EU be especially respectful of labour rights and the environment. 
With regard to specific policies, the SF – consistent with its 
nationalist ideology – demands a reform of the CAP to make Ireland’s 
agriculture and livestock industries ecologically sustainable and socially 
prosperous and to provide a viable fisheries policy for the country. It 
then moves on to make a clear commitment to renewable energy, “we 
completely reject suggestions that nuclear power has a role in reducing 
Irish carbon emissions as it is not a safe renewable source of energy”. 
What is then included is a specific demand of another type calling for 
the suspension of the preferential trade agreement with Israel while it 
continues the occupation of Palestinian territories. With this diagnosis, 
the SF focuses on prioritising the fight against poverty, inequality and 
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social exclusion as an alternative as it is essential to preserve the rights 
of workers. The party supports a sustainable and equitable economy, 
based on public services, environmental protection and regional develop-
ment. Community funds should be used primarily to improve living 
conditions in society, while promoting fair trade: “the current economic 
crisis requires the EU to rethink its strategy and put people’s interests at 
the centre of its decision-making process”. 
• For AKEL the current economic crisis is, in fact, the neoliberal 
model, whose consequences are being paid only by working people. The 
party is opposed to the liberalisation of public services and other 
antisocial measures, with the alternative of preserving today’s 
threatened social model: “a strong presence of forces of the progressive 
left in the European Parliament may contribute to the fight for a Europe 
the people rather than that of the monopolies”. 
• The KSČM rejects the neoliberal policies of the EU because they 
worsen citizens’ living conditions, restricting social rights and 
sharpening differences. In addition, for this party, the EU imposes 
discriminatory conditions on the Czech Republic by limiting its 
agricultural production, reducing the free movement of labour and 
cutting funds. The KSČM demands a EU of citizens and nations with 
full democratic, economic and social rights. For this, goals such as job 
security, economic development, the end of business relocations, 
increased investment in education and an end to the privatisation of the 
public sector need to be pursued. As a consequence, banks must be 
regulated to limit speculative trading, energy policies coordinated, 
opportunities for truly free competition created (it is still striking that 
communists pursue this Smithian goal), tax or wage dumping prevented 
and way made for sustainable development. 
• According to the BE, since the Treaty of Maastricht all successive 
European Commissions without exception have imposed neoliberal 
policies which are those that have led to the present social catastrophe: 
“Brussels is unable to agree a common strategy for relaunching the 
economy. The crisis demonstrates the limits and shortcomings of a 
European construction that unified markets, but that has always rejected 
the development of common policies to defend employment and 
improve social protection”. In summary, “the crisis shows the failure of 
the European project as we know it. The decline of the Union, when 
those who suffer need it most, constitutes, in itself, the death certificate 
of a strategy based on the single market and currency”. For the BE, EU 
leaders have only mobilised themselves to save the banks from collapse, 
while with social issues it is unable to develop common effective 
strategies. The BE demands that public funds supporting companies at 
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the European level should depend on the maintenance of jobs, while 
firms receiving public assistance that relocate should be severely 
penalised. For the BE there is a need for a “social and democratic 
refounding of the European project” in order for the EU to put solidarity 
and employment at the centre of its policies, “the security of the Union 
lies in economic development, in the model of social protection, the 
rights offered and the solidarity promoted”. As a consequence, the 
alternative is to promote Europe-wide anticrisis measures with more 
financial regulation, more transparency, more taxes for multinationals 
and more penalties for tax evasion, all in line with its central slogan: 
“We are Europhiles of the left”. 
• Of those selected in this research, the KKE is the party that 
criticises the EU more severely with an overall valuation broadly 
condemning all its policies. On one side, the Greek Communists claim 
that “the EU has nothing to do with a people’s Europe”, and on the other, 
oppose the “four community freedoms” “established” by the Treaty of 
Maastricht (an incomprehensible mistake as it back references no less to 
the original Treaty of Rome in 1957). For the KKE the EU is a 
“Imperialist intergovernmental union” and all its economic, political and 
military proposals are “reactionary”. In its view, the EU only benefits 
big capital and is an example of worker exploitation and the miming of 
fundamental social rights. Consequently, the KKE asserts, “no to the EU 
of monopolies, capitalist exploitation, militarism and interventionism”. 
From this approach the KKE affirms that the EU generalises redundan-
cies in all member countries and – with a victimism linked to conspiracy 
theories – the KKE claims that the EU favours anti-communist 
persecution [sic] in the whole community, while objectively promoting 
racism [resic]. In summary, all EU policies are neoliberal and catastroph-
ic for workers, confirming the failure of hopes in the Welfare State: a 
very classical orthodox conclusion about the limits of reformism. 
Indeed, for the KKE “the EU can not be reformed in favour of the 
people (…). It is a creation of the capitalists. The peoples who want to 
advance must oppose the EU and its policies, disobey and in accordance 
with due procedures disengage from its ties”. From this perspective, the 
weaker the EU the greater the possibilities for new forms of just 
cooperation between European countries to open up. So, the KKE 
claims that “we must weaken and overthrow the imperialist structure of 
the so called EU” and, in any case, disassociate Greece from it: 
‘Breaking the ties with the EU would be the [Greek] contribution to the 
international peoples’ struggle”. It is no coincidence that the KKE is 
especially critical of Greek parties that support the “pro-EU consensus” 
that – in its opinion – should “be punished without remorse”. Though 
still sharing a eurogroup in the EP, the KKE is blunt with the PIE 
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(which SYRIZA – the national competitor among the radical progressive 
electorate – forms a part) – a Europarty disqualified as an “accomplice” 
of social democratic governments that carry out anti-popular policies. 
For the KKE, the PIE will lead to the disarmament of the labour 
movement, the dissolution or mutation of the CPs, the reduction of their 
influence and strength among working people and the intensification of 
the EU’s anti-communist and anti-socialist campaign. 
So, for the KKE, only a socialist Europe would be fair, only a 
workers’ Europe would ensure fairness and so what is needed is 
resistance, disobedience, insubordination and internationalist action: a 
classic agit-prop programme of anti-systemic confrontation. 
• For the CDU-PCP, “the crisis of capitalism is also a crisis of the 
foundations of the EU”. This is in crisis because of the neoliberal 
policies enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty based on deregulation, privatisa-
tion and cuts in social spending and fully in agreement with the views of 
the European Central Bank whose monetary policy only defends the 
interests of major powers. In addition, quite in keeping with its orthodox 
ideological doctrinaire, the Portuguese communists add that the 
enlargement of the EU with the CEECs has been “A reckoning with the 
experience of building socialism” that has destroyed its “progress” and 
“gains”, a nostalgic reflection absent from any criticism of the old real 
socialism. The party argues that “European integration was never a 
neutral process. The EU was and is, increasingly, a tool of capital 
powers in Europe”. In summary, the EU is in the service of the 
oligarchy and the powerful and is becoming a block of “imperialist 
character” [sic]. For the CDU-PCP, the EU only pursues policies of 
exploitation, capitalist concentration and centralisation, which reveals its 
“class nature”, in very traditional terms. The EU is deepening its neo-
liberal, federalist [sic] and military [resic] character, something that 
proves the “fallacies” of the rhetorical europhile discourse. 
Portuguese Communists reject the Stability Pact and the free trade 
agreements sponsored by the EU, vindicating reform of European funds, 
the CAP and CFP to defend national interests. For the CDU-PCP the 
“fight against the three pillars of the ongoing process of European 
capitalist integration – neoliberalism, militarism, and federalism – and 
the construction of a workers Europe” must be undertaken. Ultimately, 
the CDU-PCP’s alternative message is to reverse the current rightist 
orientation of the EU to promote social and economic redistribution, 
always prioritising the interests of workers and the people of Portugal, 
national sovereignty and interests, “for an alternative Europe of workers 
and peoples!”.  
Election Manifestos and Programmes 
109 
• According to the IU, “the process of European integration 
prioritises economic and monetary union over political union and social 
cohesion” and also with neoliberal strategy that favours stability over 
employment, services and social benefits. This party approves the 
enlargement of the EU to include the CEEC, a real milestone, but it 
rejects the path chosen with the imposition of “shock therapy” that has 
had devastating social consequences. Neoliberalism only takes into 
consideration the wishes of banks and business and produces a 
concentration of wealth in a few irresponsible transnational monopolies. 
The Lisbon strategy based on competitiveness is producing disastrous 
social effects with public entities – that can not be regarded as 
commodities given their general public interest -having been privatised. 
So, on one hand, “the EU privatises profits and socialises losses” and on 
the other, “threatens public services”. Specifically, the IU demands a 
fundamental reform of the CAP to truly favour small and medium sized 
farmers and the repeal of the Bolkestein directive on the liberalisation of 
services. The IU advocates replacing the Stability Pact for one of 
Solidarity since “the Europe we want requires a democratisation of the 
economy”. The party considers “necessary restructure the EU based on 
new parameters, capable of focusing on people and their rights rather 
than private benefits”, this is the only way – in its opinion – to 
redistribute, generate stable and quality employment, protect the environ-
ment and extend social rights. The IU criticises the larger political forces 
for not deciding for a strategic refoundation of Europe – this being the 
cause of crisis in the integration process. The alternative advocated is “a 
pro-European policy of the left, not eurosceptical in nature, able to 
change the model of the EU” and “a persistent action against racism, 
xenophobia, ultra-nationalism, chauvinism [any difference between this 
and the former is not clarified, since both are practically synonymous], 
fascism, anti-communism [without recognising that authoritarian 
communism exists], homophobia and any other form of discrimination”. 
• According to the DL, the neoliberal policies of the EU are 
responsible for the aggravation of the greatest economic crisis since the 
Second World War. The obsession with competitiveness sacrifices social 
rights: “in the EU the freedom of enterprises and capital has priority 
over fundamental social and political rights”. Therefore, the current EU 
– according to the DL – “goes against the interests of the majority of the 
population” and also “increasingly manages the implementation of 
imperial capital interests”. According to the party, the disturbing rise of 
neofascist forces in Europe is not a coincidence, it is something that 
should “be denounced and fought against without reservation”. The DL 
opposes deregulation – privatisation and liberalisation always affect key 
sectors and basic services and it demands the “highest priority for the 
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protection of public property”. In specific sectors, the DL rejects EU 
policies on development cooperation given that these have not promoted 
fair trade, it opposes EU constraints on collective bargaining in the 
States, does not support commercial criteria in research and demands the 
EURATOM Treaty be repealed, with a total abandonment of nuclear 
energy to avoid the complete failure of environmental policies. 
For the DL neoliberal policies must be ended, not an impossibility as 
the triumphs [though ephemeral] of the referendums in France and 
Holland in 2005 and Ireland in 2008 have proven. The alternative 
proposal is to establish control of multinational corporations and 
international financial centres, with strict regulation of capital flows and 
their transactions in order to prevent speculative manipulation. The 
Stability Pact should be replaced with another promoting sustainable 
development and full employment and also there will have to be an 
increase in the insufficient EU budget and redirect this for social issues: 
“Die Linke advocates the prioritising of political and social rights above 
the free market”. To do this, “Europe needs a European government, 
oriented to employment, social cohesion and the sustainable economy”. 
The recovery and strengthening of the European social model should 
serve to give way to “a new economic and financial order”, countering 
speculation. In summary, the DL calls for “a Europe of people and not 
of business” in which social rights are not mere commodities. Finally, it 
is in favour of some further enlargement – but with a strategy of 
solidarity – and the rescue of CEECs after the “brutal” adjustments of 
their economies and societies. 
• The FG argues that “this crisis is also the failure of ‘liberal 
Europe’”, an expression of the “historic crisis of capitalism” (a term, 
incidentally, which is already more than a century old). According to 
this party, “the EU is fully committed to the bankrupt neoliberal 
capitalist model”. From this perspective, the entire EU policy is aimed at 
privatisation, deregulation and the concentration of resources for the 
few. In summary, we should “question the dogma of free trade, develop 
public services, democratise them and reject their liberalisation” and all 
available instruments in the EU should be at the priority disposal of 
social and environmental interests. 
• SYRIZA rejects the “pacted liberal-conservative/social democratic” 
EU – two sides of the same neoliberal coin that continues to cut social 
rights. Since the Treaty of Maastricht the expansion of neoliberal has 
not ceased because, on one hand, public money is used to rescue ailing 
banks and on the other social rights are cut. Neoliberalism severs 
national sovereignty and community institutions only “reinforce the 
measures that increase capital profit”. This coalition opposes further 
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privatisation, public spending cuts and policies designed to help develop-
ment at the service of multinationals. For SYRIZA the “preservation and 
expansion of the welfare state” must be undertaken, clearly explaining 
to the public that it is the neoliberal capitalist order and an EU at its 
service that has caused the current crisis, hence the “need to show an 
alternative route to call into question the neoliberal hegemony and the 
capitalist system”. At the end of its manifesto, the slogan of a socialist 
Europe led by the left as the only long-term solution is reaffirmed. 
• According to the VP, “the free market is superior to everything, 
more important than the environment, social rights and consumer 
protection”. That is, in the EU, the rights of companies are much more 
important than anything else, proving that “peace, prosperity and 
solidarity have never been [its] priorities”. In specific policies, the VP is 
against the current CAP that only benefits large agribusiness and 
livestock producers, and demands the re-nationalisation of the sector. It 
rejects the commercial criteria of the EU’s external trade policy, even 
more neoliberal and even neocolonial than that of the U.S. and it 
opposes the fact of Brussels deciding environmental standards and 
restricting state policies in these areas. Much in keeping with the high 
standards demanded by Scandinavian ecology, the VP asserts: “The EU 
is a bad scenario for climate and environmental policies” as they are 
subordinated to corporate interests. The VP “works for equality and 
against discrimination and repression [sic] in the EU”, does not accept 
that the EU can “interfere in welfare policies of member countries” (this 
is a widespread concern in Scandinavia) and claims to be a party 
“representative of many voters who oppose and are critical of the EU”. 
Table 4 
The economic policies of the EU increase social inequalities  All 
The economic policies of the EU only benefit an oligarchy  BE  
        KKE 
        CDU-PCP 
        DL 
        SYRIZA 
        VP 
Essential public goods should not be privatized  All 
The alternative is to recover the welfare state   SF 
        AKEL 
        KSČM 
        BE 
        IU 
        DL 
        SYRIZA 
The alternative is to leave the EU and reclaim socialism  KKE 
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2. The democratic deficit and national sovereignty 
2.1. The limits of European democracy  
The SF rejects the Lisbon Treaty for being undemocratic and ruinous 
for Ireland, i.e., for not reflecting – in its opinion – popular interests and 
not really making Community institutions controllable. This was the text 
rejected in 2008 by the Irish South (Republic of Ireland) and deprived 
the people of Northern Ireland the opportunity to voice their opinion. 
The SF criticises an unelected and unaccountable Commission and a 
Court that prioritises the free market and private profit over sustainable 
development and a fair redistribution of wealth. In addition, the EU 
increasingly meddles in tax matters, something that should be 
immediately stopped at the root as this affects Irish tax sovereignty. The 
SF then proposes a thorough restructuring of relations with EU 
institutions through new and truly democratic treaties that should always 
include the Social Progress Clause and to strengthen the role of national 
and regional parliaments to correct the serious democratic deficit in the 
Community. Additionally the noticeably weak civic participation in 
decision-making in the EU should be increased and its finances made 
more transparent. 
• The AKEL asserts that the failure of the TCUE “shows the wide 
gap between the aspirations of the peoples in the EU Member States, the 
governing circles in Brussels and the ruling classes in European states”. 
From the institutional point of view, the party is in favour of increasing 
the powers of the EP as the main way to improve the poor quality of 
democracy in the EU. 
• The Czech Communists criticise the fact that in some countries the 
EU now have an exorbitant weight in decision-making processes, apart 
from the four principal community freedoms “they do not ensure a 
decent life for citizens – not even offering protection against the 
economic crisis. The influence of the market is implacable”. This has 
projection in the community’s political model – for the KSČM – 
dominated by an uncontrollable bureaucracy taking decisions with 
enormous lack of transparency and imposing many meaningless rules. 
• The fact that the TCUE and the Lisbon Treaty have been rejected 
by three European nations and, despite this, the Lisbon text is in force, 
for the BE this is damning evidence of the unsurpassed elitist and 
undemocratic nature of the EU. It reveals the democratic deficit of the 
EU that acts with arrogance and authoritarianism to the exclusion of 
citizens. The BE demands a move beyond the anachronistic Lisbon 
Treaty and the drafting of a new text, a task that should be left to 
Parliament. A new treaty, concise and precise on objectives, rights and 
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institutions that should be subject to national parliaments. Also, the BE 
demands the democratisation of the European Central Bank, whose 
primary objective should be to place monetary policy at the service of 
job creation, which would require the establishment of mechanisms of 
social solidarity and equitable economic coordination in the EU. In 
summary, the BE states: “We are Europeans, but we are not eurocentric. 
We are pro-European, but we are not Eurocrats”. 
• The KKE maintains the same argument as the BE for the people of 
France, Holland and Ireland to indicate the path they should follow in 
the current EU. The Greek Communists, even more emphatically, 
disqualify the EU Treaties as “reactionary” for being so negative for 
workers and society. 
• In accordance with the unique interpretation of the Portuguese 
communists, the EU is based on inseparable triad (neoliberalism-
federalism-militarism) whose logic is profoundly undemocratic and anti-
social: the Treaty of Lisbon “heightens federalism as form of 
concentration of economic and political power in the large scale 
European capital and major powers”. Each step in the deepening of 
federalist institutional integration leads to the strengthening of the other 
two pillars, neoliberalism and militarism. Therefore, the CDU-PCP calls 
for a “combat against illusions based on federalist visions of Europe”. 
Consequently, their institutional proposals are clearly statist and 
intergovernmental: the Council of Ministers (today, the Union’s) is the 
entity that should have a leading role in the EU, ensuring each country 
has a vote and the right to veto. The CDU-PCP demands the mainte-
nance of one commissioner per country, does not admit the reduction in 
the number of MEPs that can affect smaller countries like Portugal and 
rejects the transfer of justice and interior affairs to the community level, 
as this subtracts “competencies from the sovereignty of States’. 
• The IU states that the “Lisbon Treaty demonstrates the political 
absurdity of where the Union now stands” a text obsessed with setting 
“free market pre-eminence over any other issue”. For this group, the 
popular rejection expressed in some referendums show some civic 
disagreement with so many anti-democratic and anti-social EU policies. 
The IU considers that European institutions have been at the exclusive 
service of dogmatic neoliberal policies. To reverse this course, “the EU 
should be open to the democratic participation of the entire society 
because if not, there is no future for it”. The democratisation of the EU 
involves giving way to responsible governance, the full guarantee of 
human rights, respect for minorities and the full participation of civil 
society with a capacity for control. On one hand, the IU states that the 
EP has to be enhanced (“it must have power to initiate legislation”) and 
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on the other, defends “a truly European constitutional process”. A new 
draft Constitution for Europe could only emanate from a democratically 
elected Constituent Assembly by direct universal suffrage for all citizens 
of the Member States and with a mandate to do so. Then, the new 
Constitution should be put to a referendum in every country on the same 
date. 
• According to the DL, the EU states are increasingly addressing 
international crises with the use of military force, something that the 
Lisbon Treaty has strengthened. This is one of the main reasons for this 
party to oppose the same, using this to compete effectively with the 
Greens in Germany, historically the champions of pacifism which, 
incidentally, they have modulated after their experiences in federal 
government. The DL programme is quite detailed when criticising the 
democratic shortcomings of the EU Treaties and makes various 
alternative proposals: the President and all the Commission must be 
elected by Parliament, it must have the same political weight as the 
Council, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice should not focus on 
the dogma of free competition because this limits the rights of workers, 
50% “of all positions in the process of decision making at every level of 
the European institutions” must correspond to women candidates (this is 
also competitive with the Greens), Europol should not be “an agency of 
the European Union” and, finally, the storage of personal data that the 
EU is carrying out under the pretext of fighting terrorism is not 
admissible (the Treaty of Prüm, the agreement of 2007 with the U.S. on 
passenger data for flights) as this limits guarantees on individual rights. 
Instead, the EU should create a European tax for corporate and financial 
profits, at the same time simultaneously fighting against tax havens in a 
much more effective way. 
For the DL democracy must take precedence over market radicalism 
and for this it needs, on one hand, to give way to a European economic 
government rather than the economy governing Europe, and on the 
other, approve a truly democratic European Constitution “the EU needs 
another contractual basis: a Constitution for the EU designed by citizens 
and endorsed by them in each of the Member States”. To this end, the 
DL advocates that the EP assumes the task of promoting the only 
institution to be legitimated by citizens and then ultimately gives the 
final word to them via referendum. Among the items that such a text 
should contain, the DL indicates a true separation of powers, economic 
neutrality (the European Constitution should be open to a mixed 
economic order in which the public sector can be the more relevant) and 
a vocation for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, implying progressive 
disarmament. To move in this direction, the DL suggests combining 
both the institutional struggle, as well as grassroots movements, very 
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much in line with some features of its political culture so critical of the 
system: “the democratisation of institutions and the democratisation of 
the economy can not be achieved without the extra-parliamentary 
organisation of a countervailing power. For this reason, we want to 
support a European network of networks”. 
• The FG asserts that the EU suffers from a serious democratic 
deficit, with many unelected powers and not subject to the principle of 
popular sovereignty. This group rejects the Lisbon Treaty on which the 
French people have not been able to voice an opinion, which invalidates 
the referendum on the TCUE whenever the new text is basically the one 
rejected. The only institutional reference in its election manifesto is to 
the European Central Bank, an entity subject to the financial markets 
which should be placed at the service of society and subject to 
democratic control. The FG demands an independent Europe that rejects 
the competitive logic between peoples and pursues policies of peace and 
just cooperation. 
• SYRIZA fully supports the rejection of the TCUE in France and 
Holland in 2005 and the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland in 2008, 
expressions of popular opposition to hegemonic neoliberalism. This 
coalition demands the repeal of the Lisbon Treaty and the calling of 
obligatory referendums for successive texts. In its opinion, EU 
institutions are constantly slimming democracy and popular control over 
governments and this is what requires a profound institutional change. 
The EP should always be informed before and after the meetings of the 
two councils, national parliaments should increase their auditing 
capacity, the Court of Justice would require a major overhaul since it 
continues to cut social rights on an ongoing basis and the Central Bank – 
currently an uncontrolled neoliberal fundamentalist entity – should be 
changed from the roots up. 
• The VP claims that supranationalism and the community Treaties 
in force respond to unacceptable policies as “the Lisbon Treaty transfers 
extensive power to the EU system controlled by the elite and the 
bureaucracy”, leading it to demand a referendum on this text in Sweden. 
This party asserts that “the EU is not democratic” nor transparent, nor 
fair, nor that the growing alienation of citizens is a coincidence. In its 
view, EU legislation is increasingly uncontrollable, secretive and 
invasive and therefore “we vote against proposals to increase the power 
of the EU”. It is an entity in which it is impossible to demand real 
responsibilities from decision makers who only act “in favour of their 
own interests”. The EP is conditioned and limited by projects that can 
only be submitted by a bureaucratic Commission serving interest groups 
linked to big business. The most shocking is that once this lack is 
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illustrated, the VP, instead of advocating an increase in the powers of 
the EP, affirms that it “must be replaced by a gathering of members 
from national parliaments”. This idea – effectively nationalist – 
contradicts the entire historical strategy of the bulk of left wing pro-
Europeans and, translated, would be a regression to the situation before 
1979, the year of the first direct elections to the EP. With respect to the 
Court of Justice, the VP criticises the fact that democratic decisions of 
the EP can be overridden (thereby ignoring its partial role as an effective 
Constitutional Court) or the non-approval of state decisions favourable 
to social rights (without realising that community law is superior to that 
of the national entity in their areas). Consequently, the party demands 
that “control of the police and justice should be taken from the EU”. At 
the same time, it criticises the lack of financial transparency in the 
Community which increases fraud and embezzlement and threatens to 
extend its fiscal competencies. For the VP, “the EU must decide on 
taxes” and criticises Swedish parties of the establishment because, 
although the Swedish people rejected the Euro in a referendum (2003), 
those – who are pro-Euro – adapt national economic policies to the 
same. For the VP, democracy over community governance must be a 
priority, social justice over market freedom, peace over defence. 
2.2. National sovereignty and popular interests 
• For the SF the national interests of Ireland are a priority in Europe, 
its view includes the whole of Ireland and from there it seeks 
community support for the reunification of the same. This party argues 
that the strategic plans of the EU should take into consideration the 
reality of a global “whole Ireland” when nominating objectives for EU 
funds because the “structural distortions” caused by partition must be 
compensated. In its view, the reunification of Germany in the EU 
indicates the path Ireland should follow regarding this. The SF defends 
strong economic sovereignty for Ireland, with strict control over natural 
resources and strong regulatory mechanisms for the market and the 
Treasury. In addition, it demands the support of Gaelic in EU 
institutions. The SF is against the CFSP/EPSD as they subordinate 
national interests and these policies are increasingly linked to NATO, 
which affects the neutrality of the Republic of Ireland. Finally, the party 
rejects ceding national sovereignty in police and judicial matters to an 
insufficiently democratic EU, which is also unacceptably restricting the 
right of asylum. The SF argues that Europe is becoming a security 
fortress, “this is the main reason why we oppose greater integration and 
centralisation of police and judicial powers” and that “we do not support 
the Schengen system”. 
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• From the outset, AKEL states its priority in the EP to be the fight 
for the rights of the Cypriot people, which is why this party demands 
more EU pressure on Turkey to resolve the problem of the division of 
the island. In its view, the Turkish Cypriots should not be able to vote in 
European elections in the present circumstances, but this does not 
prevent AKEL wanting to maximise closer relations with Northern 
compatriots. AKEL opposes the increasing militarisation of the EU and 
demands an autonomous European foreign and defence policy without 
reliance on NATO. 
• The priority for the KSČM is to obtain contracts for Czech 
companies and reject NATO for subordinating national interests to the 
U.S.A., “the KSČM rejects NATO’s aggressive policy that has triggered 
local wars on behalf of the United States (…). We reject the 
participation of the Czech Republic in foreign military missions in our 
country”. 
• The BE states, “we want a bigger and better Europe, but we reject 
the standardisation, reduction of local culture and the lack of respect for 
the mosaic of peoples, languages and countries that make up make 
Europe”, a fear – in fact – entirely unfounded because not even the most 
radical European federalist has ever proposed (nor could even try) to 
standardise the immensely rich pluralism within the EU. The BE points 
out that the EU has no real foreign policy, what little there is, is fully 
subordinated to the U.S.A. Consequently, European defence does not 
need NATO, an organisation inherited from the “Cold War” which, – in 
the opinion of this party – should be dissolved. In matters of cooperation 
with dependent countries, the behaviour of the EU is “deplorable” 
because its migration policies are increasingly restrictive and repressive, 
violating the fundamental right of the free movement of people. 
• On one hand, the KKE claims that European funds for Greece have 
been established under very harsh and negative conditions for the 
country as they benefit the capitalists much more then the people and on 
the other, states that Greece alone has sufficient resources to ensure a 
wealth redistribution far superior to the actual situation. The KKE 
completely rejects the PESC/PESD and the eventual configuration of an 
improbable European Army and demands the withdrawal of Greek 
troops on NATO/EU missions. In its view, interventionism of the EU on 
humanitarian pretexts or the fight against terrorism are the equivalent to 
assuming the doctrine of preventive war led by the U.S. 
• For the CDU-PCP the Lisbon Treaty violates the Portuguese 
Constitution whenever Portuguese law must be sovereign (ignoring the 
normative hierarchy of the sources of law with reference to Community 
supremacy, as the Court established decades ago). In addition the 
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treaties should be reversible and should prevent further transfer of 
sovereign powers to the EU because they subordinate Portugal. The 
CDU-PCP affirms that EU policies are at the service of the major 
powers in the EU (not only the usual triad – Germany/France/UK, but 
also Italy and Spain, (the latter being criticised – highly characteristic of 
Portuguese nationalism) and this affects the capacity of small countries 
such as Portugal, removing its control of national resources, both 
materially and even spiritually. In the latter sense, the CDU-PCP 
demands “the respect and the uncompromising safeguard of the cultural 
identity of each country and of all official and working languages”. 
It is noteworthy, in particular, the anti-federalist obsession that 
responds to both Portuguese Communist nationalism and to a prejudice 
because the alleged political federalisation of Europe has not been 
empirically verified. The CDU-PCP defends a “Europe of cooperation 
between sovereign and equal states”, with “full respect for national 
sovereignty” against supranational impositions and federalism. In this 
sense, like the KKE with regard to SYRIZA, in Portugal the CDU-PCP 
has to face a competitive rival in the electorate of the radical left – the 
BE, leading in turn to forceful criticism of same “the Leftist Block 
essentially shares the federalist philosophy that proposes a strengthening 
of the supranational character of the EU’s institutional framework, 
devaluing and belittling the central importance of preserving national 
sovereignty as a guarantor of democracy”. For the CDU-PCP the EU is 
rapidly militarising in serving the interests of U.S. and also, is 
configuring a “fortress Europe” with a discriminatory immigration 
policy. 
• The IU rejects the “rearmament the Lisbon Treaty advocates” and 
the subordination of the EU to the U.S. Consequently, the party calls for 
the dissolution of NATO and is against the creation of European 
military structures, although it affirms – somewhat contradictorily – that 
the EU should have its own form of “security” detached from the NATO 
and the U.S. In summary, for the IU NATO is a serious threat to 
European sovereignty and U.S. bases on European soil should 
disappear. As a party favourable to EU enlargement and, in particular, 
Turkey’s candidacy, the IU makes only one remark with regard to this: 
“the prerequisite for Turkey’s entry into the EU is the withdrawal of this 
country of Cyprus”. 
In Spain, a country with a recent massive reception of immigrants, 
the IU criticises the contradictory policies of the EU in this area. In its 
view, EU policies have centered on external border controls with an 
“extremely hard sanctions system” of “irregular migrants”. On the one 
hand, “the EU has chosen to fortify” and on the other, “the absence of a 
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genuine European immigration policy has been supplemented by 
repressive measures”. In summary, the IU affirms, “we want to work 
towards a cosmopolitan Europe – open to immigration”. 
• From a decidedly non-nationalist perspective, the basis of the DLs 
political thought in the dimension related to sovereignty has a clear anti-
militarist commitment exceeding the German Greens. For the DL, 
security in Europe must be based on disarmament, non-intervention and 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts within the framework of the OESC 
and the UN. Moreover, in the opinion of this party – the EU has set a 
disastrous precedent in Kosovo, having violated international law (this 
being true, it can not be ignored that the bulk of this party historically 
originates from the old SED and with the Yugoslav conflict always 
showed “understanding” of the Serbian authorities’ viewpoint, 
proceeding as they did from the former Titoist nomenclature). The DL 
argues that the FPCS/EPSD encourages militarism and rejects 
enlargements of NATO and the overseas military missions. The party 
advocates the dissolution of NATO and the forces of EU military 
intervention “the cooperation and links between NATO and the EU have 
to end”. Its ideology is so doctrinally hyperpacifist that the “DL opposes 
all war missions, even those with a UN mandate” and that because 
“‘Humanitarian’ military interventions” do not exist. Being in favour of 
the enlargement of the EU, in the case of Turkey the DL states that this 
country “must respect and ensure the human and political rights of all its 
people, including its minorities.” On community policies for specific 
States the position of the DL is very orthodox: the EU should withdraw 
its unconditional support for Israel, to renounce its confrontation with 
Iran and “normalise” relations with Cuba. 
On the issue of immigration, the DL demands the abolition of the 
border protection agency Frontex because it is “opposed to the current 
policy on immigration and asylum in the EU”. Also, the detention 
camps for illegal immigrants must be abolished because the immigration 
law can not be subordinated to the interests of the economy to provide 
cheap labour. The DL wants the recognition of full rights for the 
approximately eight million “undocumented” people residing in the EU 
and opposes the “return directive”. 
• On a similar line, though not as developed, is the criterion of the 
FG for whom the EU should not be linked to the militaristic policy of 
the U.S.A: “Europe must break its Atlanticism and its alignment with 
the U.S., especially in the framework of NATO”. On the issue of 
migration, the FG demands the extension and strengthening of the rights 
of immigrants and the repeal of the “shameful” return directive. 
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• SYRIZA disagrees with creating a European superstate without the 
support of the people and without transparency. This coalition is not 
against cooperation between European peoples, but “the major field of 
conflict remains in the national States” and it is there where we have to 
change the balance of power to modify the character of the current 
unification of Europe. For SYRIZA a worrying attempt to create a 
European army is under way, which would increase the future risk of 
aggressive interventionism. So this group is opposed to what it sees as a 
drift towards militarisation in Europe and because of this demands the 
abandonment of Greece from NATO due to its imperialist policies. On 
Immigration – it is against both cutting the social rights of immigrants 
and not legalising undocumented migrants. 
• According to the VP, with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has taken “a 
major step on the road to a super-state” with increasingly intrusive 
ambitions and it “does not accept the dictates of EU bureaucracy as the 
interests of voters are more important than the establishment of the EU”. 
For the VP as “there is no strong public support to build a European 
super-State” the continued strengthening of the EU “must be avoided”. 
This does not prevent the maintenance of fair, flexible and free 
cooperative formulas between States and peoples, an impossibility – 
from its point of view – with the current elitist and bureaucratic EU. The 
deep distrust the VP has for the EU has a nationalist substrate linked to 
the protection of the welfare state itself: this is not the EU of 1994 when 
Sweden joined and today the large countries prejudice the smaller 
countries. So, on one hand, “the Swedish collective model is challenged 
by the EU system”, and on the other, “Sweden’s membership of the EU 
has had negative effects for work and public welfare”. Not surprisingly, 
then, the conclusion: “We want Sweden to leave the EU”. 
The EU is already – as it is – effectively a military Alliance, with 
active “preventive” strategy policies that all contravene Swedish 
neutrality: [the VP] “will continue their struggle against the 
militarisation of the EU (…). The EU should not be a military defence 
alliance and Sweden should not participate in a progressive adaptation 
to NATO”. The VP points out that Sweden has its own defence system 
and if it participates in an international operation this should only be 
possible – in its case – with UN and of course Swedish Parliamentary 
authorisation. 
The VP opposes a “Fortress Europe” that clearly discriminates and 
restricts rights. The party is opposed to the expansion of Community 
powers in the areas of police and justice because the use made of the 
same proves the fact of the growth of hostility in the EU towards non-
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EU peoples. Finally, the VP is a strong supporter of strengthening the 
right of asylum and the free reception of immigrants. 
Table 5 
No o the Treaty of Lisbon    All 
 
Strengthen Parliament      AKEL  
        BE 
        IU  
        DL  
        SYRIZA 
 
Strengthen national parliaments     SF  
        CDU-PCP 
        VP 
 
Primacy of National Sovereignty    SF 
        AKEL  
        KSČM 
        KKE 
        CDU-PCP 
 
No to a European federal superstate    CDU-PCP  
        SYRIZA 
        VP 
 
Leave the EU      KKE 
        VP  
 
Not to CFSP/ESDP within NATO     All 
 
Free reception of non-EU immigrants    BE  
        IU 
        DL 
        FG 
         SYRIZA 
3. The balance of radical left parties 
The direct denouncement of neoliberal policies in the current EU is 
not only the unanimous leitmotiv of this ideological group, but also the 
most developed in their election manifestos. As parties that, in general, 
are linked to the historical tradition of the labour movement and anti-
capitalist socialism it is no accident that they devote about half of their 
programmes to criticising the existing European socio-economic model 
that is objectively harmful to workers. All agree that the economic 
policies of the current EU aggravate social inequalities, precariousness 
and marginalisation and several specify that these only benefit a small 
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speculative financial oligarchy, unconnected from the real economy, 
which has subordinated governments according to their strict class 
interests. All the groups strongly support giving primacy to the public 
sector and, more particularly, the non-privatisation of essential goods 
and services because a society can not be considered as marketable 
commodity. An interesting point of interest is that, in a great majority of 
cases, their alternative proposals are not revolutionary in character as 
they limit themselves to asserting the need for the classic Welfare State 
of the “thirty glorious” years (1945-1975). In other words, the bulk of 
the radical left does not demand the opening of a path to an anti-
capitalist programme of a transition to socialism, but – more modestly 
and realistically – to take the model of a mixed economy and universal 
social coverage typical of the post-1945 Western Europe tradition 
seriously. With this, the extreme radical position of the Greek 
Communists is exceptional, the only group that explicitly considers that 
the welfare state has been superseded from a historical point of view. 
In the other two areas (democracy and national sovereignty) there is 
a connection because – in theory – this group of parties do not consider 
themselves doctrinally nationalist. So, in general, the defence of national 
primacy vis-à-vis the EU is undertaken not with essentialist arguments 
about ethnicity more or less, but about democracy: the democratic 
inadequacies of the current EU make it inadvisable to cede new lots of 
national sovereignty as this would be detrimental to popular interests. In 
other words, in an elitist and bureaucratic EU as we have today, we 
would be sacrificing democracy if we continue ceding lots of national 
power. So, while the EU does not undergo a real process of democratisa-
tion, the defence of national sovereignty is more than anything a 
democratic rather than a strictly nationalist imperative, though the 
objective effects of this policy today strengthen civic nationalist move-
ments in many states. All parties of the radical left reject the Lisbon 
Treaty, especially because a fraud has reputedly taken place against 
countries who rejected the CTEU (in the view of these parties the Lisbon 
Treaty is practically the same) or the same (in the case of Ireland). This 
Treaty is presented as the consecration of the starkest neoliberalism in 
all its dimensions and even with the most elitist and anti-democratic 
opacity in its institutional format. 
Now, when judging the existing alternatives in the dimension of the 
quality of democracy, two attitudes stand out: 1) several parties, in 
accordance with the historical tradition that is in principle more 
favourable to the supranationalism than that the internationalist left has 
defended, are particularly in favour of increasing the powers of the EP 
more than anything, yet 2) others, however, are wary of this approach 
and require the strengthening of the power of control and even the veto 
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of national parliaments, making them stronger than the EP. The first 
group is almost entirely made up of postcommunist or recycled 
communist parties, while in the second there is more heterogeneity for 
various internal reasons (they take nationalist positions here, for 
different reasons – three parties that are very different from each other: 
the SF, with an irredentist character, CDU-PCP, orthodox, and the VP, 
which is postcommunist). 
The emphasis on national sovereignty as a shield against EU 
intrusions is very characteristic of the classic communists, the most 
enthusiastic supporters of this old doctrinal principle of little relevance 
in the world today. Not many clarify what their political project for the 
“other” Europe would be, or those who explicitly reject its eventual 
federalisation, the option with which both Communist and post-
communist parties coincide, so national conditions being once again 
those that determine the strategy of each party in this area. The option of 
leaving the EU is also a very exceptional, radical proposal – only two 
parties, one Orthodox and the other postcommunist, have come 
postulate this. 
The rejection of the EU’s current CFSP/ESDP is unanimous as the 
overall criticism is that they serve the interests of NATO and, worse, the 
U.S. For the majority of these parties the security and defence policies 
of the EU are taking on a dangerous militaristic drift that does not even 
benefit European states as such as they are in line with Washington’s 
agenda. With the rejection of NATO being virtually unanimous, it is 
also significant to find that several of the radical left parties – though 
they are a minority – refuse even to consider the possibility of creating a 
distinct European defence system, detached from NATO and the U.S. 
The anti-militarist and anti-imperialist culture so characteristic of this 
ideological group has produced a deep distrust and even rejection of 
such an option. 
Finally, the issue of immigration is only mentioned by the parties 
from the countries where it is a relevant issue in the political agenda 
(Germany, France and Spain, in particular). They all have a very 
receptive attitude to non-EU immigration that they regard as a key 
contribution to European development. Their policies are flatly contrary 
to restrictions or repressive hardening of immigration laws – on the 
contrary, they are in favour of unfettered, free reception, hence their 




From the outset, the main problem of the term Euroscepticism is its 
conceptual vagueness by including not exactly matching semantic 
meanings (rejection/reservations). In this regard, it is useful to 
distinguish not only between respective positions, but also clarify the 
scope and meaning of these reservations: in short, outright rejection 
implies Europhobia, reservations (especially political) imply Euro-
scepticism in the strict sense and dissatisfaction with the current impasse 
of the actual EU that eurocritical postures embody. Following this 
through to its logical consequence, the theoretical possibility even exists 
to dispense with the term of Euroscepticism, although this process may 
already be irreversible due not only to its full academic acceptance, but 
also to the progressive conceptual purification and the rich empirical 
research that has been developed. 
Euroscepticism is and is not a new cleavage and although European 
policy has traditionally had a secondary character in national States, it 
will become increasingly less so since many of the internal problems are 
interconnected with those derived from the contradictions of the actual 
process of integration and this is what increases politically relevant 
social and partisan divisions within the same. It can be said in 
conclusion that there is Euroscepticism both for economic reasons and 
for political and cultural reasons. More precisely, they are the negative 
evaluations in terms of cost/benefit, the rejection of the elitist and 
delegative style in community institutions (notoriously opaque) and a 
fear of losing “identity” the root causes of the phenomenon. Something 
that has gained widespread projection almost all the EU States and is 
manifested both in parties and with voters across the ideological 
spectrum, with different intensities depending on the country and 
situation. 
Indeed, some parties channel such perceptions and civic feelings, 
while not quite matching the critical positions and policies of the parties 
of the radical right or left because with the former Euroscepticism is not 
just a waymarker, but also a principle (although most pragmatically 
accept carrying on in the EU), while in the latter the fundamental 
discrepancy is with the path itself (sharing neither the style nor the 
policies of the Community authorities) as there are very few who reject 
the principle of integration. Although it is a controversial issue, it 
appears that – despite obvious ideological differences – there are a few 
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items critical of the EU that the radical right and left share, though the 
emphasis on one or the other differs. To begin with, there are sectors of 
the electorate of these parties that may not only overlap, but may also 
even be interchangeable (roughly, the “losers” of the current process of 
European integration). Then the social discontent of significant sectors 
against “central block” parties and governments and against representa-
tive institutions increasingly perceived as distant, can be captured 
almost indistinctly by ideological parties of either ideological group. 
Although the radical left and right can agree on the defence of national 
sovereignty, they undertake this with distinct ideological criteria: 
ethnicity in the first instance and the defence of national sovereignty in 
the second. In this area there is a major antagonism between respective 
ideological groups with issues related to non-EU immigration and the 
Turkish candidacy: the radical right declares itself xenophobic while the 
radical left openly manifests a desire for integration. Similarly, the 
extent of the criticism of neoliberal politics is different – in the case of 
the radical right it is rather circumstantial and secondary, while for the 
radical left it is part of the core of their policies. Finally, regarding the 
“democratic deficit” of the EU itself there is a notable coincidence 
regarding the opacity and elitism of “Brussels”, albeit with a much more 
populist tone from the right than from the left. 
Some analysts have hypothesised various future scenarios regarding 
Euroscepticism, well synthesized by Leconte: 1) marginalisation (despite 
the difficulties, the process of European integration is unstoppable and 
ongoing), 2) reinforcement (in fact, significant establishment parties 
have a growing Eurosceptic presence in their ranks) and 3) reforming 
reorientation (in this case, Eurosceptics assume that a certain kind of EU 
is irreversible, but with a “defederalising” reorientation from within). 
Given these scenarios, there could also be three responses: 1) maintain 
the status quo (not embark on any new projects of ambitious reform to 
avoid risk), 2) radically re-shape the EU (i.e. give way to a genuine 
political federation, something not feasible today given the correlation 
of forces) and 3) reform the EU incrementally (continue with a 
functionalist strategy of the lowest common denominator, the only way 
– with all its limitations – that allows partial progressive progress). 
When classifying the variants of Euroscepticism it is relevant to 
recall the observation of Sczerbiak and Taggart on the inconvenience of 
multiplying the theoretical categories due to the difficulties in making 
them operative. Consequently, this study concludes with a proposal for a 
personal adaptation of the more nuanced model from Kopecky and 
Mudde based on four positions: 1) Europhiles, 2) Europragmatics, 
3) Eurocritics and 4) Europhobes. The first group shares the principle of 
integration and the direction in which the current EU is moving, the 
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second group does not accept the principle, but accepts the results, the 
third group is the most integrationist, but rejects the current process and 
the fourth group rejects everything. 
Table 1  
 Principle Direction 
Europhile YES YES 
Europragmatics NO YES 
Eurocritics YES NO 
Europhobes NO NO 
Source: the author. 
In any case, the term Euroscepticism is already well consolidated 
academically and the proposal put forward is merely a theoretical 
suggestion that needs to be proved with empirical tests. In this sense, 
this scheme can adapt to the term eurosceptical with the distinction of 
two subcategories of the same: not hard and soft, but those affecting 
“mixed” positions. In other words, the contrast between Europhiles 
(double yes) and Europhobes (double no), seems very clear, the position 
of Eurocritics and Europragmatics being more ambiguous. Both 
categories can be defined as eurosceptical, but in different ways: the 
Europragmatics being negative Eurosceptics and positive Eurocritics the 
positive Eurosceptics. This is: the negative Eurosceptics can accept a EU 
of simple intergovernmental economic cooperation, while the positive 
Eurosceptics believe that with the current direction the economic and 
statist limits will never be exceeded, its own supranational project being 
much more ambitious. With this, the resulting picture allows a 
reasonably systematic grouping of the main party groups: 1) Europhiles 
(parties of the “core block”), 2) negative Eurosceptics (conservative, 
agrarian), 3) positive Eurosceptics (radical left) and 4) Europhobes 
(radical right). Of course, this picture is merely indicative and not only 
supports various exceptions, but also any new partitions – in principle 
the bulk of the party options can fit into this area. 
As a balance of affinities and differences it should be noted that there 
is more Europhobia on the radical right than on the radical left. This is 
significant because of the level of the former’s rejection of integration, 
something quite unusual with the latter. The objective coincidence 
between both is produced in the way they respond to the operational 
channels and methods of the present EU, albeit from different 
ideological perspectives. Both criticise the Community establishment 
who they feel are distant and do not generally count on them. 
Consequently, the EU is perceived as an artificial web and distant, 
damaging to national and popular interests. This explains why the 
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radical right and left collect much of the discontent and protest from 
many of the citizens affected by the ongoing integration process. 
From the outset, the principal distinctive argument the radical right 
has in its criticism of the EU focuses on the emphasis on national 
sovereignty, severely endangered – in its opinion – by “Eurocrats”. It 
should be noted that, while not being the primary objection of the 
radical left, a large part of it is sensitive to this reasoning and also 
opposes the transfer of new lots of national sovereignty. However, the 
main difference between them is the focus given to this classic concept: 
a focus on ethnic exclusion in the first case and the condemnation of the 
limitations of democracy in the second. Just as the radical right so 
unanimously rejects the hypothesis (from its perspective, a reality in the 
making) of the European superstate, the radical left (with exceptions) 
may not oppose this scenario, but only with very specific conditions 
(with another political and economic model). In short, the radical right, 
looking through its nativist nationalist prism, does not accept the 
supranational progression of the EU, nor the continuing expansion of the 
same. In contrast, the radical left’s principal distinctive feature of its 
opposition to the current EU lies in its rejection of neoliberalism, 
notoriously harmful to social rights. Part of the radical right is not 
insensitive to this argument and does not accept the current supranational 
economic model of the EU as it stands, serving only the interests of 
opaque transnational lobbies. This ideological group advocates a 
protected domestic market and a welfare chauvinism reserved for 
national citizens, elements that the radical left do not share. Finally, it 
criticises the democratic deficit of the EU’s institutional framework, 
reinforcing its belief that without a total change of system it can not be 
supported; a criterion the radical right partly shares in considering that 
the Community authorities are accountable to nobody. 
Table 2: Predominant Items in the discourse of opposition to the EU  
of the radical right and left wing (high to low)  
 Right      Left 
 
1) Yes to national closed sovereignty  1) No to neoliberalism 
2) Yes to ethnic identity 2) No to democratic deficit 
3) No to European federal superstate  3)  Yes to national sovereignty 
linked to popular interests 
Source: the author. 
For its part, the European Parliament elections of 2009 reiterated the 
“secondary” character of this call to elections and the constant civic 
disinterest towards them. The overall result has strengthened the center-
right as a whole and has also consolidated the radical right to a degree. 
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In turn, the decline of center-left is notable and the maintenance (with a 
slight downward trend) of the radical left. Therefore, despite a certain 
superficial impression that these elections have mainly benefited the 
more radical groups, the results show a more nuanced picture, a certain 
“freezing” of the inherited situation. In any case, the radical right has 
endemic difficulties to structure itself into a single parliamentary Euro-
group – however, the radical left demonstrates the greater predisposition 
to integrate into a common entity (despite the not insignificant internal 
differences). 
The treatment the analysed parties’ electoral manifestos give to the 
three chosen dimensions is very unequal – those of the radical right 
favour the stubborn defence of national sovereignty in its criticism of 
the EU while those of the radical left focus on denouncing neoliberal 
socio-economic policies. 
Instead, a similar space is given to “democratic deficit” and therefore 
it is necessary to initiate a conclusive analysis from this dimension – and 
not only for quantitative reasons, but also because the question of 
democracy in the EU is qualitatively connected to the other two because 
it directly conditions them. The deficiencies attributed to community 
institutions and procedures are the ones which are projected negatively 
on the national interest and the social rights of the population. So, with 
different priorities and strategies in this triad, the radical parties of the 
right and left present various objective coincidences in their criticism of 
the EU, but with some evident, profound differences that separate both 
ideological groups (the issue of immigration, in particular). 
The “democratic deficit” denounced by everyone crystallises in the 
almost unanimous rejection of the Lisbon Treaty. The critics then agree: 
this treaty enshrines the elitist and bureaucratic EU for reasons of both 
form and substance. From the first point of view, it has violated the right 
of citizens to voice a direct opinion and from the other, the Lisbon 
Treaty only preserves the opacity in the operational and decision-
making processes of Community institutions. It is not unusual to detect 
a significant distrust of representative mechanisms in both ideological 
groups, albeit with a greater emphasis of this in the case of the radical 
right. These parties all demand – with a populist character – to “give 
voice” to the citizens to express their views on any reform of the 
Treaties, being precisely they who accept or reject further transfers of 
sovereignty to “Brussels”. In addition, the current institutional 
framework of the EU is totally dysfunctional, disallowing a real popular 
control and strengthening an unchecked “bureaucracy”. It should be 
noted that this criticism is much more characteristic of the manifestos of 
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the radical left, more inclined (due to its traditional political culture) to 
defend the expansion of popular participation. 
Table 3  
The Lisbon Treaty:   Right    Left 
Imposes decisions not voted for UKIP   KKE 
by each national population  LN   CDU-PCP 
      NSA   VP 
      PRM 
      FN 
      PVV 
 
Has not been submitted to popular  VB   SF 
referendum    DF   BE 
      FPÖ   KKE 
      FN   FG 
         SYRZIA 
 
Does not respect the division of  JMM   SF 
powers and cedes power to a   DF   AKEL 
bureaucratic oligarchy     KSČM 
         BE 
         IU 
         DL 
         FG 
         SYRZIA 
         VP 
As a block all parties of the radical right pronounce themselves in 
defence of the absolute primacy of national sovereignty, while with the 
radical left this is an issue that is only defended by some. To this first 
difference two other orders of consideration should be added: 1) the 
radical right makes an “essentialist” defence of the mythical principle of 
national sovereignty because, very often, this thesis has ethnic and 
xenophobic connotations in its discourse, 2) the radical left parties that 
defend this issue as a priority assert that they do so in the name of the 
material interests of the real population, i.e. the citizens, not of abstract 
doctrinal concepts. A very obvious difference is the assumption of 
“Christian roots” as an unequivocal identifying characteristic of 
European peoples that some parties of the radical right make, something 
entirely absent in the other ideological group given their militant 
secularism. In any case, the myth of national sovereignty has a very 
clear result: the massive rejection of the radical right of an eventual 
European federal state, a hypothesis that some radical left parties also 
reject. it is not surprising then that this criterion exists in a party like the 
irredentist SF or the orthodox Communists who have become the main 
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supporters of this classical notion (Czechs, Greeks, Portuguese). In 
nationalist parties such as those of the radical right, the rejection of 
political supranationalism is entirely congruent, but it is more difficult to 
justify on the left, given its internationalist tradition. The truth is that 
some radical left parties have effectively assumed a nationalist 
philosophy that they want to be progressive – disconnected from old 
ideological dogmas, but to preserve the material interests of their 
peoples in the face of an insufficiently democratic and neoliberal EU. 
The total rejection of political federalisation of the radical right and 
substantial rejection on some of the radical left, does not prevent either 
ideological group from accepting elements of intergovernmental 
European cooperation that are mutually beneficial for their peoples. 
However, the principal differentiating element between the radical right 
and left on questions related to the national community is seen with 
issues such as immigration or Turkey, which continue to be related. 
These differences are, in fact, antagonistic: for the radical right 
European civilization faces a deadly threat represented by an alleged 
“invasion” of non-EU immigrants, the vast majority Muslims. Indeed, 
Islamophobia and the xenophobic rejection of immigrants have become 
the main demagogic tools for the electoral growth of this type of party. 
In many cases, anti-immigrantion policies are almost the only reason for 
these parties to exist because they have become the resource providing 
more electoral dividends. In parallel, the direct and hostile opposition to 
Turkey’s candidacy is associated with this exclusive mentality: this 
country has no place in Europe, its incorporation would be unnatural, it 
would be a huge risk for collective security – with a deterioration of 
social services and an increase in crime and even terrorist threats. Apart 
from the apocalyptic, reactionary and unfounded ideological character 
of these prejudices, this is a complete contrast with the positions of the 
radical left. Indeed, it is in favour of the continued unrestricted reception 
of immigrants whose rights must be recognised, both for reasons of 
solidarity and even as a benefit to Europeans. It goes without saying, no 
party of this ideological group objects to Turkey’s candidacy – the only 
proviso being that it should comply with the requirements of the 
Copenhagen Accord. 
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Table 4 
National Sovereignty   Right   Left  
Primacy of national sovereignty All   SF 
         AKEL 
         KSČM 
         KKE 
         CDU-PCP 
 
No to a European federal state  PVV   CDU-PCP 
      VB   SYRZIA 
      JMM   VP 
      LN 
      DF 
      FPÖ 
      NSA 
      FN 
 
Yes to European intergovernmental  VB   All 
cooperation    JMM 
      LN 
      DF 
      LAOS 
      FN 
 
National Sovereignty   Right   Left 
Rejection of immigration  PVV   - 
      UKIP 
      VB 
      LN 
      DF 
      FPÖ 
      FN 
 
Free reception immigration   -  All 
 
In principle, radical right parties doctrinally accept a market econo-
my, since they reject the model of comprehensive socialisation regarded 
as Marxist. Having said this, several parties in this ideological group are 
against the neoliberal direction in which the current EU is going as this 
has negative consequences for nations and wide sectors of society. 
Additionally, the phenomenon of globalisation is even seen from a 
conspiracist viewpoint by some of them, regarding it as U.S. manoeuvre 
to subordinate European nations. From this stems the usual populist 
rejection of these groups of a greater Europeanisation of the EU as this 
process is interpreted as a derivation of globalisation and a subjugation 
of Europeans to a denationalising strategy imposed by remote centres of 
power. The radical right supports the market economy, but with some 
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conditions: strong national protectionism to defend and preserve certain 
productive and commercial sectors and, more recently, greater coverage 
and social protection for the less favoured groups (national, of course) in 
each country, especially in the CEE. In any case, the fact is noteworthy 
that in no case the welfare state as such is defended because the radical 
right doctrinally attributes this model to the left and often criticises it for 
being “partyocratic”, bureaucratic, parasitic, unsustainable and corrupt. 
The radical left is against the unregulated market economy because 
of its serious antisocial operating methods. From this perspective, the 
economic policies of the current EU are discriminatory, oligarchic and 
undemocratic. They: 1) aggravate inequalities between a increasingly 
privileged minority and the majority who are having their rights cut, 
2) concentrate economic and financial power in too few hands that share 
profits against the interests of the wider society, particularly workers, 
and 3) mine democracy of its meaning as representative government has 
fully subjugated itself to the interests of superior powers in such a way 
that the results of elections are irrelevant while it is impossible to 
change certain structural policies from the governments. The radical left 
parties demand a strengthening of the areas of public intervention and 
social welfare, hence their requests for regulations, controls, nationalisa-
tion and the maximum possible extension and the highest possible 
quality of universal social benefits. The most notable finding then is that 
these parties are the main defenders of the classic welfare state because, 
in fact, there are few who feel this is finished and directly defend 
socialism as the only possible alternative to the system (this is the quite 
exceptional case of the KKE). Being then the key to the welfare state – 
what can not be ignored is that this rests on a mixed economic model – 
the vast majority of these parties emphasise the protection of what is 
public against neoliberal policies because, in their view, social rights 
can not be regarded as commodities and must be considered as popular 
achievements inseparable from a modern democratic state. 
Table 5 
Neoliberalism   Right   Left 
Rejection of neoliberal social  PVV   All 
and economic policies   UKIP 
      JMM 
      FPÖ 
      NSA 
      PRM 
In conclusion, it appears that there are no Euro-enthusiasts in either 
ideological group, confirming that they are far from the “centre block” 
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(popular, socialist, liberal) in the EP. All then, are critical of the EU, but 
with very different gradations, ranging from the less belligerent to the 
most intransigent opposers, through an intermediate majority. Effectively, 
both the sectorial critics that do not demand the dismantling of the 
current EU and those who feel the entity is lost, unrecoverable and defend 
abandonment and all the motley range of positions found in the parties in 
both ideological groups are a minority. The different attitudes must be 
grouped into blocks: 1) Europragmatics (minority), 2) Eurosceptics/ 
Eurocritics (majority) and 3) Eurorejectors/Europhobes (minority). The 
parties of the first block are very critical with some EU policies, but work 
to change the balance of forces internally and bring them closer to their 
respective programmed interests. There is a coincidence here from the 
extreme Romanians and Austrians to the left wing parties with more or 
less achieved ambitions for renewal and aspirations for change in the EU. 
The second block, which is quantitatively greater, poses a conceptual 
problem with reference to the label of Euroscepticism: to try to be 
operative this concept must be conserved by parties that, fundamentally, 
have a strictly instrumental attitude towards the EU, i.e., the acceptance 
of the same as merely an entity of economic cooperation, always from 
clear, inviolable intergovernmental budgets. On the other hand, there are 
some parties of the radical left that do not fully fit into this category 
because although they may share many of the criticisms of the same, they 
are differentiated by the fact of they advocate “more Europe” at a 
supranational level. Finally, the third block (a small minority), maintains 
the exceptional position of abandoning and even dismantling the EU, 
considering it to be not only useless, but even irretrievable. 
Table 6 
 Euroenthusiasts Europragmatics 
  Right Left 



























SF  SYRZIA   
Source: self generated from the Kopecky, Mudde table, 2002. 
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Direct Sources 
1. Radical Right 
DF:  Europæiske Den Dansk Folkeparti Union-land-dit, dit valg /  
The EU-Danish People’s Party, your country, your choice. 
FN: Programme “Europe” du Front National. “Leur Notre Europe 
n’est pas ! Voilà l’Europe that nous Voulons” / Program 
“Europe” from the National Front. “Its Europe is not ours! Here 
is the Europe we want”. 
FPÖ:  Unser Kurs ist klar: Echte Volksvertreter EU-Verräter statt. 
Tag der Abrechnung 7 Juni 2009 / Our change is clear: true 
representatives of the people rather than traitors of the EU. Day 
of the surrender – 7 June 2009. 
JMM:  Magyarország to magyaroké! A magyar Jobbik programja to 
Erdek to Nemzetek Európája megteremtéséért / Hungary for 
Hungarians! Jobbik’s programme to defend Hungarian interests 
with the aim of creating a Europe of Nations. 
LAOS:  Euroekloyes 2009 / European Elections 2009 (a).  
LAOS:  I Thesis tou LAOS stin Exoteriki Politiki / Positions of the 
LAOS regarding Foreign Policy (b). 
LN:  Programma Lega Nord europee 2009. Proposte obiettivi. 
Programmatici Punti per le elezioni Parliament 6 and 7 giugno 
2009/ Northern League European Programme 2009. Proposed 
objectives. Points programme for the elections to the European 
Parliament 6 and 7 June 2009. 
NSA:  Program za na ATAKA Parthia Parliamentarians izbori 2009 / 
ATAKA Programme for parliamentary elections 2009. 
PRM:  Decalogul PRM. Anti-criza Program / PRM Decalogue. 
Programme anti-crisis. 
PVV:  Verkiezingsprogramma Europees Parlement 2009 / Manifesto 
for the 2009 European elections. 
VB:  Dit is ons land. Programma Vlaamse Verkiezingen 7 juni 2009 / 
This is our country. Flemish Election programme, 7 June 2009 
(a). 
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VB:  Pour une Europe européenne! Ce que nous Voulons / For a 
European Europe! What we want (b). 
UKIP:  Say No to European Union on 4 June.  
2. Radical Left 
SF:  European Election Manifesto 2009. 
AKEL:  Declaration of the Plenum of the Central Committee of AKEL 
in view of the European Elections 2009. 
KSČM:  Otevřený volební programa KSČM pro volvi Europského 
Parlamentu 2009 / Opening of the KSČM manifesto for 
elections to the European parliament, 2009. 
BE:  Eleitoral Compromisso do Bloco da candidacy as europeisas / 
Election commitment f the block candidacy in the European 
elections. 
KKE No to the EU of Injustice, Inequality, and Explotation. There 
is an Alternative for the peoples of Europe to follow. 
CDU-PCP: CDU-declaração PCP program do às Eleições peias Euro-
2009 / CDU-PCP Programme Declaration for the European 
Elections 2009. 
IU:  Electoral programme. European elections 2009. The United 
Left. 
DL:  Solidarität, Demokratie, Gemeinsam für den Frieden-Wechsel 
in Europe! Der Partei Europawahlprogramm 2009 DIE 
LINKE / Solidarity, democracy, peace – Together for a change 
in Europe! Program European elections, 2009 the party of 
THE LEFT.  
FG:  Déclaration of princes du Front de Gauche pour changer 
d’Europe / Declaration of principles of the Leftist Front left 
for change in Europe. 
SYRIZA:  Politiko Plesio yia tis tou SYRIZA politikes ekloyes / The 
SYRIZA Draft policy framework for elections.  
VP:  Valplattform EU-parlamentsvalet / Electoral platform for the 
election of the EU Parliament. 
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1.  Acronyms for political formations subject  
to this research  
Radical Right 
DF  Folkeparti Dansk / Danish Popular Party (Denmark) 
FN  Front National / National Front (France) 
FPÖ  Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs / Austrian Freedom Party (Austria) 
JMM  Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom / Movement for a Better Hungary 
(Hungary) 
LAOS  Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos / Popular Orthodox Rally (Greece) 
LN  Lega Nord / Northern League (Italy)  
NSA  Natsionalen Săyuz Ataka / National Union Attack 
 (Bulgaria) 
PRM  Partidul România Mare / Greater Romania Party (Romania) 
PVV  Partij voor de Vrijheid / Freedom Party (Holland) 
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UKIP  United Kingdom Independence Party (UK) 
Radical Left 
AKEL  Anorthoiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou / Pro-Congressman Party 
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Portuguese Unitarian Democratic Communist Coalition Party 
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Euroscepticism, Europhobia and Eurocriticism 
152 
SYRIZA Synaspismos tis Rizospastis Aristeras / Radical Left Coalition 
(Greece) 
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PDS  Partito Democratico della Sinistra / Democratic Party of the Left 
PE  European Parliament  
PECO (CEEC) Central and Eastern European Countries  
PESC/PESD: (CFSP) Common Foreign and Security Policy / 
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PIE Party of the European Left 
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Socialist Party 
TCUE  Constitutional Treaty of the European Union  
EU  European Union 
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union 
UEN  Union for Europe of the Nations 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
V / ALE  Greens / European Free Alliance 
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